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Abstract
Varieties of Transnational Life:
Brazilian Nikkeis’ Changing Cross-border Ties with Two Homelands
by
Hiroyuki Shibata
Advisor: Dr. Robert C. Smith
This dissertation explores the varieties of Brazilian Nikkei’s – Japanese emigrants to
Brazil and their descendants – transnational lives throughout a century of their migration history.
I propose an interactive process approach to migrant transnationalism to understand the
divergence of Brazilian Nikkeis’ transnational lives between their two homelands, Japan and
Brazil. First, I focus on the four macro-institutional contexts: 1) positions and development
patterns of sending and receiving states within the international state system; the infrastructural
power of states, more concretely 2) the diasporic bureaucracy of sending states and 3) the
incorporative power of receiving states; and 4) the mobilizing capacity of migrants’ networks
and associations. I argue that the interactions among them yield varying modes of migrants’
transnational ties with the homelands over time. Second, I also draw attention to the processual
nature of migrants’ agency that produces further variations of transnational lives. I conceptualize
migrants’ agency as the dynamic relationship between a) social belonging that represents one’s
sense of belonging to the relevant subcultures and b) possible selves that informs future
pathways. Interacting with meso-level institutional contexts over time, migrants’ agency can
generate variations in transnational lives even under the same configuration of macroinstitutional contexts. In short, this dissertation shows how the interactions among the four
macro-institutional contexts and the agentic dynamics over time produce varieties of Brazilian
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Nikkeis’ transnational ties and lives between Japan and Brazil. I claim that the analytical
framework developed through the case of Brazilian Nikkeis in this dissertation can be helpful to
guide other studies on migrants’ transnationalism and assimilation.
This dissertation employs case-oriented comparisons and focuses on three prominent
episodes in Brazilian Nikkeis’ transnational history over a century. Chapter 1 compares Italian
and Japanese migrants in early 20th century São Paulo and how the form and breadth of
diasporic supports to the homelands differed between the two migrant groups. Chapter 2
compares two Japanese migrant communities in the hinterland of São Paulo and how they
differently reacted to Japanese defeat in World War II. Finally, Chapter 3 compares four
Brazilian Nikkei youths in contemporary Japan and how their life trajectories diverged widely
including both an upwardly mobile incorporation into the mainstream Japanese society and an
upwardly mobile return to Brazil. These case-oriented comparisons across the cases and each
case along the way enable me to carefully analyze the divergence dynamics of migrants’
transnational lives working both at macro-institutional and micro-agency levels.
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INTRODUCTION
Four Portraits of the Brazilian Nikkeis
In 1940, Atsushi Miyao, the then vice-director of the Central Agricultural Cooperative of
the Japanese in Brazil (Nippaku Sangyou Chuou-kai), wrote a petition to the Japanese
government from São Paulo, requesting higher export quotas of cotton to Japan. He noted that
80% of the Japanese in the state of São Paulo were engaged in cotton production and appealed
for recognition of their contribution to the homeland with highly nationalistic wordings:
The preferential quota would not only help the economic advancement of the Japanese
cotton growers in Brazil through the collective sales of the Cooperative, but also would
provoke their consciousness as vanguards of the national imperative of Hakko Ichiu.1 In
turn, their strongly impressed consciousness would strengthen the unity in the
Cooperative’s activities, and also their elevated adherence to the national imperative must
improve the quality of their cotton production.2
It is questionable if Miyao truly believed in his own nationalistic wordings because it was a
petition to the homeland government. However, it seems almost certain that he and his
agricultural colleagues relied on the transnational ties with the homeland, regardless of their own
belief. Moreover, that he used this language to make this appeal indicates that he understood this
was the rhetorical currency that would be heard by the Japanese government. It fit with their way
of looking at the world.
*

1

Hakko Ichiu (八紘一宇), which literally means “eight crown cords, one roof,” was a slogan of Japanese imperialist
expansionism.
2
Miyao, Atsushi (宮尾厚). “On Application for Licensed Quotas of Cotton” (許可申請に関する件), October 14,
1940, (移 1 (D3), reel no.45, MJE-NDL).
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In the immediate aftermath of the Pacific War – a theater of World War II fought in Asia
and the Pacific Ocean – in 1945, Hisaichi Nireki, a Japanese migrant who came to Brazil in
1931, did not accept the Japanese defeat. He lamented other Japanese migrants’ lack of faith in
Japanese victory: “How petty it is that too many people have concerns and worries inappropriate
for the Japanese national. It’s no exaggeration to say that they failed to be Japanese on a daily
basis. I am so ashamed of them.”3 In 1963, however, Nireki wrote in his diary as follows:
I have been staying in Brazil for 33 years. These days, I end up reading and listening to
news about Brazilian politics, economy, and society rather than news from Japan. When I
listen to news from Japan, I feel foreign completely. Even when I find some interests in
them, they come to me just as remote knowledge distant from my daily life. I belatedly
came to understand that we have been transformed into Brazilians.4
His other diary entries of the same year were occupied by his concerns about the growing
inflation of Brazilian economy. Almost two decades after Nireki wrote down his confidence and
determination to remain Japanese, he found that his interests and concerns had largely shifted
towards Brazilian ones.
*
In early 2019, I met Flora, a third generation Nikkei, in São Paulo. She was waiting for
her vestibular (Brazilian university exam) results. Flora graduated from a Brazilian school in
Japan, worked in a Japanese factory as a contract worker for half a year, and came back to Brazil
last summer. “Essa vida não era pra mim [that life was not for me],” Flora looked back on her
factory life in Japan, “Não quero, era muito ruim [I don’t want it, it was really bad].” I asked
Flora what she thought back on her high school days in Japan. She replied:

3
4

Hisaichi Nireki (楡木久一). August 27, 1945. Diary no.5, VE3, MJE-NDL.
Hisaichi Nireki. December 31, 1963. Diary no.17, VE3, MJE-NDL.
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I really liked my school. Of course, I had several things that I didn’t like because school
secretaries did not speak Japanese and they didn’t help me in that regard. […] My
Portuguese teacher was the best thing that happened to me. I owe her a lot for what I
learned about literature, art, and Portuguese. It was my teacher that helped me prepare for
this [vestibular].
After having been in Japan for five years with her family, Flora’s fluency in Japanese was still
limited. While she was not confident in the vestibular results, she was highly motivated to try
them again next year if she would fail that year. Flora imagined her prospective future in the
country of her origin, Brazil, not in the host country, Japan.
*
Aline, a fourth generation Nikkei, was in the final year of Brazilian high school when we
met for the first time in summer 2016. Like Flora, Aline was not confident in speaking Japanese
while being in Japan for almost 10 years. I asked about her plan after graduating high school. “I
think I will work [in a factory] for some three months at least. […] I can earn a lot in the factory.
So, if I work there, I can save more money faster. If I work in other places, it takes longer to go
back [to Brazil].” However, unlike Flora, Aline did not quit a contract job at the factory as she
initially planned. She has occasionally traveled around Japan for beaches and skiing when she
could afford it. “Basically, I am willing to study. It’s okey. I’m not gonna stay at the factory
forever.” Almost two years after her high school graduation, she did not completely abandon her
plan to go back to Brazil but at the same time she seemed to gradually get used to Brazilian
Nikkeis’ working-class life in Japan.
***

3

This dissertation is about the varying cross-border or transnational ties between Japan and
Brazil of the Brazilian Nikkeis — Japanese emigrants to Brazil and their descendants.5 The
portraits above exemplify four prominent, if not exhaustive, variations of transnational lives in
the history of Brazilian Nikkeis over a century. Miyao relied on and engaged in the transnational
ties with the homeland government. Nireki was confident to be part of the Japanese nation but
eventually found himself losing interest in it. Flora lives in a transnational field that goes both
ways: to a Brazilian university and another to a Japanese factory. She chose the former over the
latter to develop her future prospects. And finally, Aline lives in the same transnational field as
Flora does. Unlike Flora, however, Aline gravitated towards the other way around. Why and how
did Brazilian Nikkeis in pre-WWII Brazil evolve and sustain transnational ties with Japan? Why
and how did they fade in the post-war period? And why and how do some Brazilian Nikkeis
once again form their ties with Brazil while others are incorporated into Japan in the process of
ethnic return migration from Brazil to Japan started in the 1990s? More generally, what
mechanisms shape and reshape the variations of migrants’ transnational lives?
This dissertation offers an interactive process approach to these questions and seeks to
understand the varieties of Brazilian Nikkeis’ transnational lives and assimilation in a coherent
manner. It pays attention to interactions between the contexts in which migrants are embedded
and their agency. I underscore the interactive process because both contexts and the agency
change dynamically over time. Indeed, the variations of migrants’ transnational lives are
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Scholars have debated the conceptual stretch of the notion of transnational (Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004).
However, many studies use “transnational,” “cross-border,” and “diasporic” interchangeably. Even a prominent
article that consciously advocates and employs “transborder” in lieu of “transnational” mentions “transnational” as
one of the article’s keywords (Brubaker and Kim 2011). In any case, either by “transnational,” “cross-border,”
“transborder,” or “diasporic,” the phenomenon at issue is identical, that is, migrants’ ties with their homelands. This
dissertation uses transnational ties and transnational lives more than other terms. When I use transnational ties, I
emphasize the practices and actions engaged by migrants objectively observable from researchers’ perspective
regardless of how migrants themselves see the ties. In contrast, when I use transnational lives, I emphasize what
meanings migrants give to the ties and how they live them (see Smith 2006: 6).
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products of the interactions between the contexts and migrants’ agency. I argue first that varying
configurations among the contexts affect the dominant form and breadth of migrants’
transnational ties with the homelands, and second that migrants’ agency itself evolves interacting
with the relevant contexts. This interaction in turn produces more nuanced individual variations
of transnational lives within a given contextual configuration.
Specifically, I focus on three prominent episodes in a century-long history of Brazilian
Nikkeis’ transnational ties between Japan and Brazil: patriotic donations to Japan made by the
Japanese migrants in the pre-Pacific War period in Brazil; violent conflicts between Japanese
migrants who accepted the Japanese defeat and those who did not in the aftermath of the war in
Brazil and their local variations; and diverging life trajectories of Brazilian Nikkei youths in
contemporary Japan. I strategically choose these episodes to further our theoretical
understanding of migrants’ transnational ties with the homelands. Overall, the major prior studies
of immigration and migrant transnationalism predict the gradual decline of migrants’
transnational ties over time. However, the three episodes do not demonstrate only a linear decline
as predicted by most theory, but various forms of migrants’ transnational lives, including a return
to Brazil, as in Flora’s case above. What explains the divergence between our theoretical
expectations and the various empirical realities in my data? This dissertation seeks to explain this
divergence and variations of Brazilian Nikkeis’ transnational ties.
We can briefly describe how theoretical expectations of increasing assimilation and
decreasing transnational ties do or do not fit the historical experience of Brazilian Nikkei
migrations. The initial migration from Japan to Brazil started in 1908. Until the outbreak of the
Pacific War in 1941, they had demonstrated a broad transnational engagement with Japan in the
form of patriotic donations. In the post-war period, their engagement gradually declined. In this
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respect, the prediction of prior studies describes what happened. However, the pattern of decline
varied across local Nikkei communities in São Paulo. This was indicated by different responses
to the Japanese defeat by the local communities of Brazilian Nikkeis: some local communities
experienced a rapid dissolution of the diasporic social life and resulted in violent conflicts
concerning the defeat of Japan between community members while other local communities
underwent a gradual transition from the diasporic social life to incorporation into Brazilian social
life and did not see such violent conflicts. The ethnic return migration of Brazilian Nikkeis to
Japan started in the mid-1980s. This trend gained momentum especially when the Japanese
government started issuing a special residential visa to the Japanese descendants overseas in
1990. Instead of steady assimilation into Japanese social life as prior theory would predict, my
data show that Brazilian Nikkei youths’ life trajectories and attachments to Japan and/or Brazil
vary widely. Indeed, I will document various pathways into early adulthood, including a
working-class integration into Japanese society, and a return to Brazil with prospects for upward
social mobility, a pathway not previously documented in the literature.
In analyzing mechanisms that produce these variations of transnational ties over the
history of Brazilian Nikkeis, this dissertation seeks to develop an analytical framework to
understand the various patterns of migrants’ transnational and assimilation process that could be
useful in analyzing other cases: why and how do certain migrant groups or individuals sustain
transnational ties while others make upwardly or downwardly mobile assimilation into the host
societies? First, I focus on the four macro-institutional contexts: 1) positions and development
patterns of sending and receiving states within the international state system; the infrastructural
power of states, more concretely 2) the diasporic bureaucracy of sending states and 3) the
incorporative power of receiving states; and 4) the mobilizing capacity of migrants’ networks
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and associations. I argue that the interactions among them yield varying modes of migrants’
transnational ties with the homelands over time. Second, I also draw attention to the processual
nature of migrants’ agency that produces further variations of transnational lives. I conceptualize
migrants’ agency as the dynamic relationship between a) social belonging that represents one’s
sense of belonging to the relevant subcultures and b) possible selves that informs future
pathways. Interacting with meso-level institutional contexts over time, migrants’ agency can
generate variations in transnational lives even under the same configuration of macroinstitutional contexts.

Migrants’ Agency at the Conjuncture of International State System, Sending and Receiving
States, and Migrants’ Networks
1) Technology, Agency, and Institutional Contexts
Migrant transnationalism is more an epistemic perspective than an emerging social
phenomenon itself. It emerged in the early-1990s as a response to assimilation theories that have
been a dominant way to understand international migration (Glick Schiller, Basch, and BlancSzanton 1992, Basch, Glick Schiller, and Szanton Blanc 1994). Whereas assimilation
perspectives focus on the process through which people are incorporated into the host society,
migrant transnationalism pays sustained attention to the ties that migrants maintain with the
countries of origin and people left behind. In its early formulation, coupled with the buzzword of
the day “globalization” and chorus of influential post-national discourses (Robertson 1992,
Bauböck 1994, Soysal 1994, Appadurai 1996, Sassen 1996), researchers pointed to the modern
innovation of communication and transportation technologies under an increasingly
encompassing world capitalism as the important condition for the rise of migrants’ transnational
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ties (Glick Schiller et al. 1992, Smith and Guarnizo 1998, Smith 1998, Portes, Guarnizo, and
Landolt 1999, Levitt and Glick Shiller 2004). However, a doubt arose almost simultaneously:
migrants in the past also maintained multiple ties with their homelands (Foner 1997, Kivisto
2001, Morawska 2001, Waldinger 2008). It increasingly became untenable to insist that modern
technological innovations account for migrants’ transnational ties at least as the decisive cause.
Aside from the early technological determinism, a notable emphasis of migrant
transnationalism is on migrants’ agency. It underscores migrants’ voluntary actions as the
fundamental motor of their transnational ties. Some studies point out migrants’ resources and
interests as main fuel of the motor. They diagnose that migrants who actively commit to
transnational practices are limited to a resourceful few and even when they engage in such
practices, their transnational ties gradually decline as their material and ideational interests shift
from homelands to the host countries over time (Portes et al. 1999, Portes 2001, Kasinitz et al.
2002, Levitt and Waters 2002, Rumbaut 2002, Alba and Nee 2003, Waldinger 2015). Since it is
migrants themselves that engage in, maintain, and disengage from transnational ties with the
homelands, migrants’ agency must account for the development of transnational ties in the final
analysis. However, the studies with a focus on the migrants’ agency tend to overlook the social
contexts in which the agency is embedded.
An emerging body of literature looks at the institutional contexts in which migrants’
agency is embedded and examines how these contexts affect migrants’ transnational ties. They
shed light on the diasporic bureaucracy of sending states to reach out to emigrants, on the one
hand (Sherman 1999, Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003, Smith 2003b, Brand 2006, Fitzgerald 2008,
Délano 2010, Brubaker and Kim 2011, Lafleur 2013, Chin and Smith 2015, Gamlen, Cummings,
and Vaaler 2019), incorporative power of receiving states vis-à-vis migrants, on the other
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(Torpey 2000, Koopmans et al. 2005, Bloemraad 2006), and migrants’ associations on the third
hand (Levitt 2002, Brubaker et al. 2006, Portes, Escobar, and Redford 2007, Portes and Zhou
2012, Sites and Vonderlack-Navarro 2012, Jones-Correa 2013, Portes 2016). Furthermore, some
literature views migrants’ transnational ties in a triadic relationship between a sending state, a
receiving state, and a migrant group (Brubaker 1996, Smith 2003a, Cook-Martín 2013, Mylonas
2013, Kim 2016). In fact, the interactive process approach builds upon these state-centered
institutional approaches especially in understanding varieties of migrants’ transnational ties in
the light of the triadic conjuncture between sending and receiving states, and a migrant group.
However, it must be noted that the prior state-centered institutional approaches have their own
shortcomings.
First, they tend to analyze a snapshot of contextual configuration and its impact on
migrants’ transnational ties at a certain point. It is rare that they follow the way in which the
contextual configuration shifts over time. As a result, they are not attentive enough to the
sequential effects of contextual change. However, a context changes with its own rhythm and
interacts with other contexts. Therefore, the configuration among the relevant contexts shifts
sequentially. As a result, the causal meaning of an event can vary across cases, depending on the
different contextual configuration preceding the event.6
Second and more importantly, they tend to put migrants’ agency in brackets inasmuch as
they address the relevant contexts. It is certainly a truism that our life unfolds as a sequence and
our life goals change along the life. Yet, social science research has often missed to incorporate
this common-sense wisdom and presumed rather a static agency. Ultimately, they treat agency as

6

See, the analytical distinction between trajectory and turning point in Abbott 2001 (ch.8), the reactive sequence
model in Mahoney (2000), the downstream dynamism of precedent contextual conjuncture at a critical juncture in
Pierson 2004 (ch.2), and the notion of historical reversals (Haydu 1998, 2010).
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a physiological “homunculus” (Abbott 2016: 246, see also Douglas and Ney 1998), equipped
with a uniform algorithm, such as universal kind of rationality or particular but collective kind of
cultural norms, that constantly translates a certain given configuration of contexts into one’s
action. However, unlike a homunculus, which is fully formed from its inception, human agency
changes over time, reflecting on the past and projecting on the future in relation to the present
(Emirbayer and Mische 1998, Abbott 2016). As individuals’ agency evolves by interacting with
the contexts, the meaning of contextual configuration itself varies within the same person over
time and across persons.
Ironically, these shortcomings are also shared by the agency-centered studies mentioned
above. They may acknowledge the impact of contexts on migrants’ transnational lives while not
making it explicit. For them, however, the contexts are fixed. Migrants exercise a single-step
agency within the given contexts. They constantly gravitate towards a certain uniform direction
to which the contexts channel their interests. The agency-centered studies predict the general
decline of migrants’ transnational lives because they take for granted the contemporary
institutional arrangements consistently incentivizing migrants to invest more in social relations
within the host countries while the transnational ties with homelands wither away (Waldinger
2015). Both agency-centered and context-centered approaches fail to acknowledge the sequential
developments of both contexts and migrants’ agency and their varying consequences for
migrants’ transnational lives.

2) Interactive Process Approach
Both contexts and agency are indispensable components for a framework to understand
migrants’ transnational ties and lives. However, they matter not as static conditions but as
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dynamic processes. Inspired by social science traditions attentive to the importance of causal
sequences (Haydu 1998, 2010, Mahoney 2000, Abbott 2001, 2016, Pierson 2004), I propose a
combined theoretical approach, an interactive process approach, to theorize the variations of
migrants’ transnational lives and assimilation in an integrated manner. It sheds light on the
processes through which a) interactions among the relevant contexts yield varying contextual
configurations over time, and b) migrants’ agency itself evolves through interactions with the
relevant contexts. I argue first that the varieties of migrants’ transnational ties are products of the
sequential interactions between a sending state, a receiving state, and migrants’ networks within
the international state system, and second that migrants’ agency that changes over time,
interacting with meso-level contexts, generates further variations in their transnational lives even
within a given configuration of macro-level contexts.
For contexts, the four contexts are particularly relevant for varying migrants’
transnational ties: 1) positions and development patterns of sending and receiving states in the
international state system, the infrastructural power of states, more concretely, 2) the diasporic
bureaucracy of sending states, 3) the incorporative power of receiving states, and 4) the
mobilizing capacity of migrants’ networks and associations.7 The positions and development
patterns of sending and receiving states under the international state system affect their
respective stances toward migrants, and in turn the mobilizing capacity of migrants’ networks.
When a sending state tries to build diasporic relations with migrants or a receiving state tries to
incorporate them, the success of their efforts depends on the configuration between the diasporic
bureaucracy of the sending state, the incorporative power of the receiving state, and the

7

See Smith 2003a for a similar contingent framework with a different set of factors: relationship of sending state to
the global system, its domestic politics, mode of incorporation in the receiving state, and migrants’ claim-making
ability toward sending and receiving states.

11

mobilizing capacity of migrants’ networks and associations. The variation in form and breadth of
migrants’ transnational ties emerges from these interactions.
In addition to various configurations among the four contexts mentioned above, the
interactive process approach puts a great emphasis on timing and sequential dynamics that
produce the varieties of migrants’ transnational ties. Specifically, I pay attention to two types of
dynamism: upstream and downstream divergence dynamisms. Although they are not specific to
migrants’ transnational ties, these two sequential dynamics generate variations in migrants’
transnational ties.
First, the upstream dynamism creates branching points for the subsequent development of
migrants’ transnational ties. For instance, which side of infrastructural power – the diasporic
bureaucracy of sending state or the incorporative power of receiving state – reach out to a
migrant group earlier affects the subsequent pattern of their transnational ties. This dynamism
can be understood as a kind of critical juncture in the path-dependent models (Goldstone 1998,
Mahoney 2000, Collier and Collier 2002 [1991]). Chapter 1 will demonstrate this type of
upstream dynamism by comparing Italian and Japanese migrants’ cross-border commitments to
the homelands’ war efforts in the 1930s.
Second, the downstream dynamism points to the process in which the causal meaning of
an event varies depending on the contextual configuration preceding the event. For instance, the
impact of a change in the diasporic bureaucracy of sending state on the mobilizing capacity of
migrants’ networks varies across cases, depending on the legacies of contexts preceding the
event. The downstream dynamism is closely related to but different from the upstream
dynamism. While the upstream dynamism concerns how a contingent switch point makes a
difference in subsequent outcomes, the downstream dynamism concerns how preceding
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sequences shape the switch point differently (Haydu 1998, 2010, Pierson 2004: ch.2). Chapter 2
will examine this type of downstream dynamism by comparing the varying impact of the retreat
of Japanese diasporic bureaucracy in two communities of Japanese migrants in rural São Paulo in
the aftermath of World War II.
While the dynamics of contextual configurations largely condition what form of ties can
be dominant with what breadth, they do not determine migrants’ transnational lives. Even when a
certain mode of transnational ties is dominant among a group of migrants, migrants within the
group always demonstrate varied transnational lives. Importantly, the variations are not only in
degree but in kind. For instance, even when the majority makes a downward or horizontal
assimilation into the working class in the host society without stripping off their ethnic
distinction, some follow an upwardly mobile pathway into the mainstream of the host society at
the expense of transnational ties with the homeland, and others go back to the homeland
permanently with a bright prospect. These variations emerge not just because each individual has
different attributes and properties such as human and social capital, but also because each one
develops his or her agency through different biographical lives, interacting with the relevant
contexts over time.
The emphasis on this temporal and evolving nature of human agency is especially useful
for analyzing migrant youths’ divergent life trajectories in the developmental context because we
rapidly develop our sense of self during the period from adolescence to early adulthood,
interacting with changing social contexts (Rindfuss 1991, Shanahan 2000). In particular, I
conceptualize young migrants’ agency as the dynamic relationship between one’s social
belonging and possible self. Social belonging represents one’s sense of belonging to the relevant
subcultures. Possible self expresses one’s multiple self-images, which inform future pathways.
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Migrant youths develop their social belonging in relation to the meso-level contexts, especially
the school context and the migrant bargain – that children make up parents’ sacrifice by meeting
their expectation. In turn, their social belonging provides a decision framework for the possible
future choices: which future pathway is desirable and navigable in light of one’s current social
belonging. As they progress over the life course, they develop varying agencies, which primes
different life pathways into the future, ranging from an upwardly mobile assimilation to the host
society to a permanent return to the homeland. In this way, migrant youths’ agency
conceptualized as the dynamic relationship between social belonging and possible selves can
generate variations in transnational lives even under the same macro-contextual settings. Chapter
3 will analyze how Brazilian Nikkei youths’ agency generates the divergence in their pathways
to early adulthood in the context of contemporary Japan.
In sum, the interactive process approach pays sustained attention to the interactions
between the contexts and migrants’ agency over time. Both contexts and agency change as a
result of the interactions. Varying configurations among the diasporic bureaucracy of sending
states, the incorporative power of receiving states, and the mobilizing capacity of migrants’
networks under the international state system set up the dominant mode of migrants’
transnational ties. Moreover, migrants’ agency produces further variations at the micro
individual level within a given configuration of contexts.

Analytical Strategy and Methods
1) Analytical Strategy: Case-oriented Comparisons
Throughout this dissertation, I employ a case-oriented comparative strategy to analyze
Brazilian Nikkeis’ changing transnational ties and lives. The unit of comparison moves down
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from a group level through a sub-group level, and finally to an individual level as chapters move
on. First, to analyze Brazilian Nikkeis’ broad cross-border commitment to the war effort of Japan
in the pre-war period, I compare it with the case of Italian migrants in Brazil and their
commitment to the Fascist regime. Second, I compare two Brazilian Nikkeis’ rural communities
in the state of São Paulo and analyze how and why they showed different responses to the
Japanese defeat in the Pacific War. Finally, I compare four different life trajectories of Brazilian
Nikkei youths in contemporary Japan and analyze what make their life trajectories diverge.
A lot of social scientific research makes a substantial effort to grasp the major trends of a
certain social phenomenon and what the units of analysis — either societies, groups, or
individuals — share in common. However, it often overlooks empirical variations of the
phenomenon at issue. In the context of current study, we can identify two dominant inclinations
among the existent studies. On the one hand, the studies that investigate relevant positive cases
tend to see the sustenance of transnational ties as the central trend in the case concerned.8 On the
other hand, the other studies with an encompassing scope doubt whether migrants’ maintenance
of transnational ties constitute a major trend in the whole universe of international migration,
criticizing the studies of the former kind for sampling on the dependent variable (Portes 2003).
They rather view the persistence of migrants’ transnational ties as an outlier. Both observations
are not wrong in their own lights. However, both of them fail to comprehend empirical variations
of migrants’ transnational ties, including both presence and absence, and to explain why
migrants are, or are not, engaged in transnational ties to different degrees and in different forms
in different social and historical contexts.

8

Studies of this kind are so abundant that I cannot list them all here. To name a few, Basch, et al. 1994, JonesCorrea 1998, Itzigsohn et al. 2001, Levitt 2001, Østergaard-Nielsen 2003, Smith 2006, Smith and Bakker 2007.
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To counter this tendency, I employ a case-oriented comparative analytical strategy with
an emphasis on variation-finding (Skocpol 1984, Tilly 1984, Green 1994, Mahoney and
Rueschemeyer 2003, Ragin 2014). It draws sustained attention to variations of outcome among
cases rather than the shared pattern across cases. With this comparative strategy, I address the
following questions: why did Japanese and Italian migrants in São Paulo demonstrate different
degrees and breadth of cross-border engagements with the homeland politics? Why did two
Brazilian Nikkei communities in the state of São Paulo react differently to the Japanese defeat in
the Pacific War? And why do Brazilian Nikkei adolescents in Japan follow different life
trajectories in the transition to early adulthood, ranging from an upwardly mobile incorporation
into the Japanese mainstream to an upwardly mobile return to Brazil?
Each chapter differs not only in the chronological and geographical setting but also in the
unit of analysis. The first two chapters examine Brazilian Nikkeis’ transnational ties in pre- and
post-Pacific War periods in Brazil and employ group and sub-group level comparisons. In
contrast, the third chapter looks at the individual-level variation of transnational lives among
Brazilian Nikkei youths in contemporary Japan. By switching the unit of analysis in each
chapter, I can distinguish the effects of larger contexts and the role of agency in the varying form
of migrants’ transnational ties and lives. In the larger framework of this dissertation, both macro
contexts and migrants’ agency vary. For clarity, I divide the argument into two parts. When I
examine Brazilian Nikkeis’ transnational ties in the pre- and post-war periods in Brazil, I treat
migrants’ agency as a black box that translates the contextual effects into their action in a
relatively constant manner. I do so not only because systematic individual-level data are not
available in these periods but also because I can clearly identify the effect of varying
configurations of contexts on the transnational ties. However, in reality, agency is not a
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physiological homunculus. It varies across persons and even within the same person over time.
When I examine Brazilian Nikkei youths’ transnational lives in contemporary Japan, I look at
their varying agencies and divergent life trajectories within a relatively stable contextual
configuration. This helps to analyze how their agency brings about the variation in life
trajectories without losing sight of the larger contextual configuration that conditions migrants’
agency.

2) Methods of Data Collection
For data collection, I draw on archival and ethnographic data in addition to secondary
literature in Japanese, Portuguese, and English. For archival sources, I examined government
documents (policy reports, administrative circulars, and internal memoranda), ethnic newspaper
articles, pamphlets, police records, memoirs, and manuscripts of local histories. I consulted the
following archives: Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (DAMFAJ), Tokyo; Materials on Japanese Emigration, National Diet Library (MJE-NDL), Tokyo;
National Archives of Japan (NAJ), Tokyo; Japanese Overseas Migration Museum (JOMM),
Yokohama; Arquivo Público do Estado de São Paulo (AP-ESP), São Paulo; Museu Histórico da
Imigração Japonesa do Brazil (MHIJB), São Paulo; and Centro de Estudos Nipo-Brasileiros
(CENB), São Paulo. When I cite or refer to unpublished archival materials, I mention this in the
footnotes. Some archives hold rare published materials. I show where they are available in the
bibliography section. For Japanese and Portuguese materials, I mention bibliographical
information in original languages along with English translation for reader’s convenience to
locate them.
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I intensively use ethnographic data to analyze the divergent life trajectories of Brazilian
Nikkei youths in contemporary Japan. I collected data by two steps. First, I conducted an
intensive field research in the Tokai region, Japan (see Appendix A) from January 2016 to
September 2016, where a large number of Brazilian Nikkeis live. I collected Nikkei youths’ life
trajectory data through life history interviews. During this period, I interviewed 28 Brazilian
Nikkei youths (19 Brazilian school students and graduates and 9 Japanese school students and
graduates, see Appendix E) and other relevant individuals such as their parents, teachers of
Brazilian and Japanese schools, and members of migrant supporting non-profit organizations. In
total, I interviewed 46 individuals. Second, I followed 16 informants out of the 28 Nikkei youths
and had occasional follow-up interviews with them until early 2019. The case selection was
based on informants’ future life plans informed by the first-round of interviews and the degree of
our rapport. Out of the 16 cases, I developed four primary cases, which represent four distinct
life trajectories among Brazilian Nikkei youths in Japan. In analyzing the four primary cases, I
selectively employ these secondary informants’ narratives.9
In order to gain access to Brazilian Nikkei youths, I used three entry points. First, I, as a
volunteer, participated in a non-profit educational organization run by a Brazilian Nikkei woman.
At the organization, I have tutored Brazilian Nikkei youths who were in Japanese schools and
built rapport with them. I invited them to interview and also asked them to introduce their
friends. In addition, some of my colleague tutors were Brazilian Nikkei young adults who were
enrolled in Japanese universities. I offered them interviews as well.

9

All names are pseudonyms. Nikkei youths in Japan often have both Brazilian and Japanese names. I asked what
they preferred to be called. When they mentioned a Japanese name, I assigned a Japanese pseudonym and vice
versa.
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Second, I have visited four Brazilian schools in the Tokai region and two accepted my
request to cooperate. I visited classrooms and asked students to participate in my research. Third,
I employed a snowball sampling technique to gain access to potential informants. By attending a
Brazilian congregation at a local Catholic church and some Brazilian cultural events such as
Festa Junina, I got acquainted with Brazilian Nikkei youths. I asked them to participate in my
interview research and to introduce me to their friends. As a side effect of the snowball sampling,
I had opportunities to know Brazilian Nikkei young adults who live in Japan after graduating
from Brazilian schools. I offered them an interview as well.
All translations of archival materials and ethnographic data from Japanese and
Portuguese are mine.

Chapter Overview
Chapter 1 does theoretical and empirical work. First, it develops the analytical framework
for the interactions among the relevant macro contexts, building upon the shortcomings of the
prior agency-centered and context-centered approaches. Second, it explains different forms and
breadths of transnational ties between Italian and Japanese migrants in the state of São Paulo in
the early 20th century: the Italian migrants demonstrated different degrees of diasporic supports
for the homeland’s war efforts by social class, whereas the Japanese migrants displayed broader
support for the homeland regardless of social class. Previous approaches cannot explain this
difference between the two migrant groups.
I argue that the sustained attention to the four contexts — 1) positions and development
patterns of Japan, Italy, and Brazil within the international state system, 2) Japanese and Italian
diasporic bureaucracies, 3) Brazilian incorporative power, and 4) the mobilizing capacity of
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Japanese and Italian migrants’ networks — and sequential interactions among them better
explain the different forms and breadths of diasporic engagements between Japanese and Italian
migrants with the respective homelands. I will argue that due to the different configurations
among these three contexts, Italian upper- and middle-class migrants formed an integrated
exclave – a form of migrants’ collective life where both the Italian diasporic bureaucracy and the
Brazilian incorporative power reached out to the intensive networks of the Italian upper- and
middle-classes – whereas the emerging Brazilian nation-state incorporated working-class
Italians, whose networks were once dispersive, into the Brazilian corporativist regime, and
finally Japanese migrants formed a diasporic exclave – another form of migrants’ collective life
where the Japanese diasporic bureaucracy succeeded in embracing the intensive networks of
Japanese migrants and limited the influence of the incorporative power of Brazil on the migrants.
Chapter 2 examines intra-group conflicts between the Japanese migrants who accepted
Japanese defeat and those who did not in the immediate aftermath of the Pacific War. I compare
two local Japanese communities in the state of São Paulo: Bastos and Registro. The conflicts
resulted in violent incidents in Bastos, yet Registro saw no explicit violence. I explain this
difference by the changes in the contextual configuration in the two communities. The retreat of
Japanese diasporic bureaucracy from Brazil by the time of the outbreak of the Pacific War
triggered the dissolution of Japanese diasporic exclaves in Brazil. However, there were multiple
pathways leading to that dissolution. Bastos and Registro represent two different pathways
respectively: Bastos underwent a rapid erosion of diasporic exclave and Registro experienced a
gradual transition to a settlement enclave. In the end, they resulted in the contrasting
developments of intra-group conflicts.
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In analyzing the difference between the two communities, I pursue two theoretical goals.
First, I locate the decline of transnational ties among the Brazilian Nikkeis within the broader
analytical framework developed in Chapter 1. I argue that a change in Japanese diasporic
bureaucracy (its retreat) affected the mobilizing capacity of migrants’ networks and associations
(the legitimacy of community associations) differently, depending on local socioeconomic
conditions (the reliance on an exclave economy), which had been developed under the earlier
contextual configuration. Bastos, a local Japanese migrants’ community with the heavily reliance
on exclave economy in the pre-war period, was more susceptible to the changing Brazilian and
Japanese developments within the international state system during the war period than Registro,
another local Japanese migrants’ community that relied less on the exclave economy.
Second, I challenge the largely essentialized cultural argument dominant in earlier
historiographies of Brazilian Nikkei history (e.g., Maeyama 1972, 1982, Mita 1978, 2009). The
prior studies on the intra-group conflicts among the Brazilian Nikkeis in the aftermath of World
War II emphasize the Japanese nationalistic cultural values shared by Brazilian Nikkeis as the
main cause of the conflicts. However, the conflicts among them cannot be explained by the
shared cultural values precisely because of the claimed sharedness of cultural values. Against the
cultural explanation of prior studies, I argue that the disjuncture between economic and
organizational lives in Brazilian Nikkeis’ local communities better explains the rise of the
conflicts among them in the aftermath of the war.
Chapter 3 examines the divergent life trajectories among Brazilian Nikkei youths in
Japan. The previous two chapters focus on the macro-institutional level contexts. I switch the
focal level to meso-institutional and micro-agency levels in Chapter 3.
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Here, let me briefly describe the macro-level contextual configuration for Chapter 3. On
the macro level, the ethnic return migration of Brazilian Nikkeis to Japan occurred within the
configuration of the following contexts. First, the Brazilian economy suffered from
hyperinflation in the 1980s while the Japanese economy boomed. Within this world economy
context, second, the Japanese government started providing special residential status to the
Nikkeis overseas to fulfill the increasing labor demands without disturbing the putative ethnic
homogeneity of the Japanese society (Miyajima 1993: 59, Tsuda 1999b, Tsuda and Cornelius
2004). However, it does not mean that Japanese citizenship is also guaranteed to them as an
ethnic privilege. Because of the jus sanguinis principle underlying Japanese nationality law,
Brazilian Nikkeis and their children legally remain as resident denizens in Japan. While
naturalization is an available option, their naturalization rate is notably low.10 Third, most
Brazilian Nikkeis, at least initially, came to Japan as a target earner (Tsuda 1999a, Yamanaka
2000) and were incorporated into the segmented unskilled labor sector controlled by labor
brokers (Kajita, Tanno, and Higuchi 2005, Tanno 2007, Takenoshita 2013). Against these
backgrounds, fourth, Brazilian Nikkeis in Japan formed Brazilian schools as an institutionalized
exclave accredited by the Brazilian government and recognized by the Japanese government
under the de facto interstate reciprocity.11 As a result, two different types of educational

10

I estimate their annual naturalization rate is less than 1%. Official statistics puts Brazilians in the “other” category.
For instance, in the 2010s, less than 2,000 “other” category residents have naturalized each year. Considering the
number of registered Brazilians, which recorded the lowest number (173,437) in 2015, an estimated naturalization
rate among them would be less than 1.0% in 2015 even if assuming that those who are categorized as “others” were
all Brazilians. See, http://www.moj.go.jp/content/001180510.pdf and
http://www.moj.go.jp/housei/toukei/toukei_ichiran_touroku.html (both retrieved on May 26, 2020).
11
The recognition of Brazilian schools by the Japanese government is de facto because the Japanese School
Education Act provides no comprehensive legal basis for “overseas schools.” Some Brazilian and other overseas
schools are operating as “miscellaneous schools” under the School Education Act and others are operating just as a
private enterprise. At the same time, the Japanese government does not implement a strict nationalization policy
towards overseas schools like the ban on ethnic schools by the Brazilian government in early 20th century
nationalization period in Brazil.
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opportunity are available for the children of Brazilian Nikkei migrants in Japan: the Japanese
public school system as an apparatus of national incorporation and the Brazilian school system as
an diasporic exclave institutionally connected to the Brazilian society.
The analytical task in Chapter 3 is to unravel the dynamics that produce the divergence in
life trajectories of Brazilian Nikkei youths in Japan, ranging from an upwardly mobile
assimilation into the Japanese mainstream, a generational-reproduction of segmented Brazilian
working-class life in Japan, and to an upwardly mobile return to Brazil within the macro
contextual configuration described above. I consider Nikkei youths’ agency itself as an evolving
process with a biographical life. I analyze the interactions between their agency and the relevant
meso-level contexts, especially the school context and the intra-family migrant bargain. In the
end, Nikkei youths’ agency evolves through the interactions with those meso-level contexts, and
produces the divergent patterns among Brazilian Nikkei youths’ life trajectories.
In the Conclusion, I summarize the major contributions this dissertation makes by
highlighting three analytical implications that can be useful to advance our understandings of
varying migrants’ transnational lives more generally. Specifically, I show how each chapter
contributes to developing an interactive process approach for the analysis of migrants’
transnational lives along the three broader theoretical implications. First, the interactive process
approach develops an analytical framework that considers the varying configuration between the
diasporic bureaucracy of sending state, the incorporative capacity of receiving state, and the
mobilizing capacity of migrants’ networks within the international state system. Second, not just
seeing a contextual configuration at a certain point, it puts a great emphasis on the timing and
sequential dynamics that bring about changes in migrants’ transnational ties. Third, and related
to the second, I emphasize the processual nature of migrant youths’ agency, interacting with the
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relevant contexts over time. In conclusion, the variations of migrants’ transnational lives can be
better understood from a deeply processual perspective.
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CHAPTER 1
CHANGING CONFIGURATION OF MIGRANT TRANSNATIONAL TIES:
A COMPARISON BETWEEN ITALIAN AND JAPANESE MIGRANTS’ DIASPORIC
POLITICS IN EARLY 20TH CENTURY SAO PAULO
Chapter Summary
This chapter compares the different patterns of diasporic engagement with the homelands of
Italian and Japanese migrants in early 20th century São Paulo respectively. Both Italian and
Japanese migrants responded to their homelands’ war efforts in the mid-1930s, but to varying
extent and in different forms. Why did the two groups display different transnational
engagements with the homelands? Guided by this empirical question, this chapter contributes to
the theoretical debate on migrant transnationalism. Against two prior approaches – agencycentered and state-centered approaches – I develop an interactive process approach that considers
dynamic interactions between the diasporic bureaucracy of the sending state, the incorporative
capacity of the receiving state, and the mobilizing capacity of migrants’ networks within the
international state system. I argue that their varying conjunctures better explain the different
form and breadth of migrant transnationalism than the prior approaches.
Introduction
In 1935, when Mussolini declared a war against Ethiopia, Italian migrants in the state of
São Paulo hailed it with an enthusiasm. Soon after the declaration, Italian migrants organized a
war cooperation campaign and raised donations of at least 8,000 contos de réis – roughly
US$ 640,000 (Trento 1989: 342-4, Bertonha 1998b: 236-7). However, it was disproportionately
upper- and middle-class Italians who participated in the campaign. Working-class Italians instead
showed little interest to the campaign (Rios 1958b, Ianni 1963: 120, Bertonha 1998a: 63). A gap
between social classes characterized the Italian diasporic campaign unfolded in the state of São
Paulo.
In the meanwhile, when the Sino-Japanese War broke out in June 1937, Japanese
migrants in São Paulo also raised donations. By the following November, about 600 contos de
réis – roughly US$ 48,000 – was amounted (Burajiru Jiho 1937, Seisyu Shimpo 1938). The sum
of donation raised by Japanese migrants was much smaller than that of Italians, reflecting a
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smaller size of Japanese migrant population compared to Italian migrants.1 However, they were
mobilized in the diasporic cooperation campaign more broadly across social classes than the
Italians (Negawa 2013: 246-8).
Why did the Italians demonstrate different degree of diasporic engagement with the
homeland by social class whereas the Japanese offered broader diasporic support for the
homeland’s war efforts? In answering this empirical question, this chapter seeks to give an
answer to a broader theoretical question: what affects the form and breadth of migrants’
engagement in their transnational ties with the homelands and how? My argument, in brief, is as
follows. We can understand the difference in the form and breadth of transnational engagement
between Italian and Japanese migrants by analyzing the different configuration of four contexts:
1) positions and development patterns of sending and receiving states within the given
international state system, 2) the diasporic bureaucracy of the sending state, 3) the incorporative
power of the receiving state, and 4) the mobilizing capacity of migrants’ networks and their
associations as its nodes. These contexts interact with one another and yield the variation in
migrants’ transnational ties with the homelands.
This chapter engages with two theoretical approaches to migrant transnationalism:
approaches that focus on migrants’ agency and those that focus on the role of the state. The
former posits that migrants’ own actions produce transnational ties, and predicts that the ties
decline as migrants’ self-interests gravitate towards the host society or when they do not possess
resources to sustain the ties. Such approaches, however, do not fully explicate why the form and
breadth of transnational engagements differed between Italians and Japanese in this chapter. On
the other hand, state-centered approaches underline the role of receiving and sending states in

1

By 1940, about 186,000 Japanese entered Brazil whereas 1,500,000 Italians did so (Levy 1974). See also Figure1-1
below.
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shaping migrants’ transnational ties but undertheorize the conditions in which the states affect
those ties.
My own approach is built upon state-centered approaches. Rather than solely focusing on
the states, however, I underline the configuration of the international state system, sending and
receiving states, and migrants’ networks and the sequential order of their interactions. The
development patterns of sending and receiving states within the international state system affect
their stances toward migrants, and in turn the mobilizing capacity of migrants’ networks. When a
sending state tries to build diasporic relations with migrants or a receiving state tries to
incorporate them, the success of their efforts depends on the mobilizing capacity of migrants’
networks and associations. The variation in the form and breadth of migrants’ transnational ties
emerge as a result of these interactions.
In the following pages, I first show that both agency-centered state-centered approaches
do not solve empirical puzzles that comparative cases of Italian and Japanese migrants pose.
Second, I elaborate an interactive process approach, particularly focusing on its macrocontextual aspect, to investigate the cases in question. Third, I analyze three cases — Upper- and
middle-class Italians, Working-class Italians, and Japanese migrants in São Paulo. Finally, I
discuss the implications of the interactive process approach to migrants’ transnational ties with
the homelands. The comparative cases of this chapter are historical, but its analytical framework
should apply to contemporary cases as well.

A Critical Review of Agency-centered and State-centered Approaches
Agency-centered Approaches

27

For over 20 years, migrant transnational ties have drawn a considerable attention by
challenging the conventional assimilation model (Basch et al. 1994). While the conventional
perspective places a focus on the mechanism of migrants’ incorporation into the host society, the
transnational perspective focuses on cross-border ties sustained by migrants with their
homelands. Since a large portion of the transnational perspectives has emerged out of the
criticism of methodological nationalism (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002), they emphasize the
standpoint “from below” (Smith and Guarnizo 1998; Portes et. al. 1999). As a result, they tend to
view migrants’ voluntary actions as the primal driver of transnational practices (Chin and Smith
2015: 81-2). Some studies with a post-structuralist inclination even seek potential forces that
may transcend limits of the nation-state system in migrants’ transnational practices (Kearney
1991, Rouse 1991, Clifford 1994, Appadurai 1996, Ong 1999). Studies in a more positivist
tradition also posit migrants’ voluntaristic agency as the main factor of their transnational ties.
Prior approaches mainly point out two agency-focused factors: migrants’ self-interest and
the resources that they possess. First, the self-interest hypothesis argues that migrants’
transnational ties emerge out of their own survival strategy and that the transnational ties
gradually decline as migrants’ self-interest shift from the homeland to the host society and thus
the transnational ties are barely transmitted to the subsequent generations (Portes 2001, Kasinitz
et al. 2002, Levitt and Waters 2002, Rumbaut 2002, Alba and Nee 2003, Waldinger 2015).
Second, the resource hypothesis predicts that a positive association between the amount of
migrants’ resources and the degree of transnational ties (Portes et al. 1999). This approach views
that migrants’ transnational ties are limited to a resourceful few.
The comparative cases of Italian and Japanese migrants of this chapter pose inconvenient
puzzles to the agency-centered approaches. The self-interest hypothesis may account Japanese
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migrants’ broader transnational engagement than the Italians, arguing that Japanese migrants
with a shorter time in Brazil still had interest in maintaining ties with Japan whereas the Italians’
interest with a longer time in Brazil already gravitated towards the Brazilian society. In fact, the
peak period of Italian migrants’ entry to Brazil was the last two decades in the 19th century
whereas Japanese migrants’ peak entry period was between the late 1920s and the early 30s (See
Figure 1-1). In the mid-1930s when both Italian and Japanese migrants engaged in the diasporic
donation campaigns, the socially active cohort of Italian migrants mainly consisted of the second
generation whereas that of Japanese migrants was still the first generation.

Figure1-1: Italian and Japanese Migrants’ Entries to Brazil, 1875-1940

Source: Levy 1974: 71-74.
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However, the self-interest hypothesis does not explain why only upper- and middle-class
Italians retained transnational ties with Italy despite their longer settlement time in Brazil. In this
regard, the resource hypothesis may answer the question, arguing that upper- and middle-class
Italians possessed more resources (both time and money) to invest in transnational practices
whereas the working-class Italians did not afford such an investment. However, the case of
Japanese migrants poses an empirical challenge to this inference. The social differentiation
between landowners and sharecroppers and other lower social classes also emerged among
Japanese migrants in the 1930s. In 1937, the landowner to other lower classes ratio among
Japanese migrants was approximately one to one (Census Committee for the Japanese
Immigrants in Brazil 1964, vol.2: 716-7). The resource hypothesis does not account for why the
Japanese migrants demonstrated a cross-class transnational engagement with Japan.
The self-interest and resource hypotheses partly explain the different levels of diasporic
engagement between Italian and Japanese migrants: the demographically active cohorts of the
Italians shifted to the second generation whereas the first generation Japanese was socially
predominant in the mid-1930s and thus the diasporic engagement of the former was limited
comparing to the latter; upper- and middle-class Italians accumulated resources and showed a
stronger commitment to the diaspora donation campaign than working-class Italians did.
However, the same hypotheses do not necessarily account for other aspects of Italian and
Japanese cases: the upper- and middle class Italians rather intensified the diasporic commitment
despite the alleged decline of transnational ties over generations; the Japanese demonstrated the
broad diasporic commitment across social classes despite the social differentiation already
emerged among them. In short, when triangulating both hypotheses with empirical realities of
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Italian and Japanese migrants in early 20th century São Paulo, they do not fully fit with the
cases.

State-centered approaches
In contrast to the agency-centered approaches, emerging state-centered approaches draw
attention to the role of sending and receiving states in shaping migrants’ transnational ties. These
approaches are innovative in that they point to larger contexts in which migrants are embedded.
Nevertheless, state-centered approaches have two shortcomings. First, there are few attempts to
clarify how sending and receiving states affect migrants’ transnational ties. Second, and related
to the first, they fail to explicate why and how some states successfully affect migrants’
transnational ties and others don’t.
On the one hand, studies on receiving states focus on policies and institutional
arrangements that either facilitate or hinder migrants’ incorporation into the receiving states
(Torpey 2000, Koopmans et al. 2005, Bloemraad 2006). They implicitly and explicitly presume
the “caging” effect of infrastructural power of receiving states (Mann 1993) — the capacity of
states to regulate the population by state institutions such as passport, citizenship, schools, and
social welfare and labor programs — on migrant population. Receiving states identify and
categorize who they are and incorporate or exclude them from the body politic according to the
assigned categories such as aliens, denizens, or citizens (Hammar 1990). In short, receiving
states embrace migrant population by its infrastructural power while in a differential manner
(Mann 1993, Scott 1998, Torpey 2000). Indeed, some influential studies underscore that
receiving states ward off migrants from the influence of sending state (Alba and Nee 2003,
Waldinger 2015).

31

On the other hand, studies on sending states draw attention to “diasporic bureaucracy,”
“diaspora institutions,” or “diaspora policies” of sending state characterized by its symbolic and
instrumental capacities to embrace its emigrants overseas and establish transnational ties with
them, exercised through the consular activities such as the registration of co-nationals and
financial and social supports to them (Smith 2008a, Gamlen 2014, Délano Alonso 2018, Délano
Alonso and Mylonas 2019, Smith, Waisanen, and Yrizar Barbosa 2020). They document various
instances and explore conditions that develop diasporic bureaucracies (Sherman 1999, Levitt and
de la Dehesa 2003, Smith 2003b, Brand 2006, Fitzgerald 2008, Délano 2010, Waterbury 2010,
Brubaker and Kim 2011, Lafleur 2013, Chin and Smith 2015, Gamlen et.al. 2019). However, the
causal link between the diasporic bureaucracy and migrants’ transnational ties has been
disproportionately understudied (Bloch 2017).
Here again, the cases of Italian and Japanese migrants pose puzzles to the state-centered
approaches: the Brazilian government incorporated working class Italians but failed to
incorporate Japanese migrants; the Italian diasporic bureaucracy succeeded to embrace only
upper- and middle-class Italians; and the Japanese diasporic bureaucracy successfully embraced
Japanese migrants broadly across social classes. First, the prior studies on the diasporic
bureaucracy simply do not help to answer why the Japanese diasporic bureaucracy successfully
embraced its nationals in Brazil whereas the Italian counterpart failed because the analytical
focus is more on factors and mechanisms that develop the diasporic bureaucracy itself than on
the relationship between the diasporic bureaucracy and migrant groups. Second, the studies on
the incorporative power of receiving state do not explicate the different impact of the
incorporative institutional arrangements of Brazilian government on Japanese and Italian
migrants. Especially, if the receiving state wards off migrant groups from the influence of the
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diasporic bureaucracy of sending state, why did the Brazilian government fail to prevent the
Japanese diasporic bureaucracy to embrace Japanese migrants?
Certainly, a handful of emergent studies see migrant transnationalism in a triadic
relationship between sending and receiving states, and a migrant group (Brubaker 1996, Smith
2003a, Cook-Martín 2013, Mylonas 2013, Kim 2016). However, they do not elaborate
sufficiently enough the causal dynamics of how sending and receiving states affect migrants’
transnational ties. For instance, in the case of Italian and Spanish migrants in Argentine, CookMartín points out that sending and receiving states compete to “gain the allegiance of the same
population of migrants and their children” (2013: 154). However, he does not specify what
conditions make which state to win the competition over migrants’ allegiance. After all, the
state-centered approaches still undertheorize the interactive dynamics between sending and
receiving states and their relations both to the larger international state system and to migrants’
networks.

An Interactive process approach to Migrant Transnationalism
Building upon the state-centered approaches, especially an emerging body of scholarship
that understands migrants’ transnational ties in the triadic relationship between a sending state, a
receiving state, and a migrant group, I propose an interactive process approach as a sensitizing
analytical framework rather than a definitive theory with rigidly fixed benchmarks (Blumer
1954). It draws attention to the configuration and sequential interactions among four contexts: 1)
positions and development patterns of the sending and receiving states in the international state
system, the infrastructural power of states, more concretely – 2) diasporic bureaucracy of the
sending states characterized by the capacity to relate to and embrace emigrants overseas and 3)
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incorporative power of the receiving state characterized by the capacity to incorporate migrants
into the national body politic – and finally 4) the differentially mobilizing capacity of migrants’
networks and associations as its nodes.

Figure 1-2: Configuration among the International State System, Sending and Receiving States,
and Migrants’ Networks

Figure 1-2 summarizes the configuration among the international state system, sending
and receiving states, and migrants’ networks. In this framework, sending and receiving states
work as hinges of the interactions among the four contexts. Furthermore, not just the
configuration among them at a certain point, the timing and sequence of their interactions matter
a great deal. This is because migrants’ transnational ties emerge as a process, not as a congealed
state. Not only do different combinations of contexts but also different sequences of interactions
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yield varying configurations, which in turn affect migrants’ transnational ties with the
homelands.
The state-centered approaches have pointed out the changing relations of states to the
given international state system as an important factor that develops state-migrant relations
(Smith 2003a, 2003b, Zolberg 2008, Gamlen et.al. 2019). The positions and development
patterns of sending and receiving states within the international state system provide the
fundamental contexts for the formation of migrants’ transnational ties in two ways.
First, the development pattern of receiving state presents an opportunity structure into
which migrants are inserted. Especially, the timing of migrants’ entries in relation to the
economic development pattern of receiving state is decisive for their incorporation pattern in the
host country, which in turn set the context for the mobilizing capacity of migrants’ networks and
associations. Both Italian and Japanese migrants initially went into coffee plantations when they
migrated to Brazil. Italian migrants soon moved to urban centers including São Paulo city
whereas most Japanese migrants stayed in the rural hinterland because the different
socioeconomic opportunity structure changed between the two groups’ peak entry periods. In
addition, the difference in the local socio-economic contexts affected the way in which Italian
and Japanese migrants interacted with native Brazilians and organized their own social networks
respectively. I will return to this point when I discuss the mobilizing capacity of migrants’
networks below.
Second, development patterns of sending and receiving states shape their stances toward
migrants. In the 1920s and 1930s, the Brazilian government shifted its stance towards
immigrants in transition from an oligarchic regime to a nation-state. Meanwhile, Italian and
Japanese governments started actively engaging with their emigrants in Brazil as their positions
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in the international state system changed in the 1920s and they redefined their relations to
nationals overseas: Italy for the rise of Fascist government and Japan in search of a potential
source of cotton imports.
As the state-centered approaches point out, the sending and receiving states exercise their
infrastructural powers over migrants. However, its success is not guaranteed (Migdal 2001). Two
conditions can be taken into account: the balance of infrastructural powers between sending and
receiving states, and their relations to migrants’ networks. First, the receiving state does not
always ward off the diasporic bureaucracy of sending state. Depending on the degree of
infrastructural power of states and their stances toward the migrant groups, the diasporic
bureaucracy of sending state and the incorporative power of receiving state can take various
combinations. In the early 20th century, the Brazilian incorporative power was not fully
developed especially in peripheral regions. In fact, the Japanese diasporic bureaucracy benefited
from a power void of Brazilian incorporative power in the hinterland of São Paulo. In contrast,
the Italian diasporic bureaucracy did not meet such a power void in urban areas where Italian
migrants were concentrated, if not impossible to reach out to them.
Second, the success of states power also depends on the mobilizing capacity of migrants’
networks and associations. The emphasis on migrants’ networks has already become a common
sense in the field of international migration (Massey et al. 1987, Boyd 1989, Fawcett 1989, Faist
2000, Portes and Rumbaut 2001, 2014, Waldinger 2004). Of particular importance in the current
study is the intensity of migrants’ networks and the extent and scope to which the migrants’
associations accommodate collective goods to its members through the networks.
When migrants’ networks are intensive and their associations almost exclusively deliver
collective goods to the members, such as education, social welfare, and the access to distribution
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network of agricultural cooperatives, they are more likely to mobilize migrants because
withdrawal from the networks can penalize the enjoyment of collective goods. In this case,
collective goods take the form of what economists call club goods – a specific type of collective
goods, the access to which is non-rivalrous but excludable by membership (Buchanan 1965). On
the other hand, when migrants’ networks are dispersive and their associations do not
accommodate the collective goods, the migrants’ networks decrease its mobilizing capacity. In
this case, migrants may seek alternative sources of collective goods outside the networks such as
free market or other service providers including trade unions and a social welfare regime of
receiving state if available.
The intensity of migrants’ networks was affected by the local contexts of reception
(Portes and Rumbaut 2014). For instance, the Italian working-class migrants in urban centers had
opportunities to interact with native Brazilians and did not developed intensive co-national
networks. In contrast, the Japanese migrants in isolated rural peripheries had few such
opportunities and thus they had reasonable motivation to organize intensive social networks to
survive.
I emphasize the local, as opposed to national, contexts because the local contexts do not
necessarily reflect the national ones. This is especially important to consider the case of Japanese
migrants in relation to the racialization process in Brazil. They did not face substantial racial
discrimination in rural São Paulo despite the general racial prejudice against Asian migrants at
the national level.2 In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, a racial ideology called
2

This racialization process makes an interesting contrast with Japanese migrants in the US. In the case of Japanese
immigration to the US mainland, most migrants were inserted to the American West, where the dominant white
natives already seized a sociopolitical power over the region. The racial discrimination by the dominant natives
made Japanese migrants’ networks intensive (Azuma 2005, Minamikawa 2007). In any case, the key for the
mobilizing capacity of migrants’ networks is the intensity of networks induced by the local contexts of reception
more than the presence of racial discrimination or lack thereof while the discrimination can affect the intensity of
networks.
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branqueamento (whitening) was prevailing among Brazilian national elites (Schwarcz 1993,
Seyferth 1997, 2000, Koifman 2012, Truzzi 2012) and they portrayed Japanese migrants as the
yellow peril (Mita 1997, Takeuchi 2008). However, Japanese migrants were not discriminated by
local Brazilians in the rural hinterlands of São Paulo where dominant social relation was not yet
established. When the Japanese migrants settled in the rural area, the local Brazilians mainly
practiced subsistence economy, scattering around the area. While the Japanese migrants readily
organized their social life through the associational activities, the local people remained less
organized. Because of the weak social organization of the local Brazilians, the Japanese could
evade the racial discrimination at the local level. Rather, they looked down the local Brazilians
by regarding them as uncivilized and lazy people (Handa 1970: 297, Committee on 80 Years
History of Japanese Immigrant in Brazil 1991: 60-1). Therefore, we need to look at the specific
local context rather than projecting the general context of reception and racialization at the
national level onto the local one.
Combining the three parameters — the incorporative power of receiving state, the
diasporic bureaucracy of sending state, and the intensity of migrants’ networks — Table 1-1
presents four ideal types of migrants’ incorporation and transnational ties that are relevant to the
current analysis.3

3

Mechanically, there must be eight types combining three binary parameters. However, other types are either
unrealistic – consider, for instance, a Hobbesian state of nature type where there is no states’ infrastructural powers
whatsoever and no network formation between any individuals, or a Heart of Darkness-like situation where
intensive networks centered on a charismatic figure prevent any intervention of states’ infrastructural powers – or
simply not relevant to this study.
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Table 1-1: Types of Migrants’ Incorporation and Transnational Ties and Expected Outcomes
Type

Incorporative
power of
receiving state

Individualbased
assimilation

+

Diasporic
bureaucracies of
sending state

Degree of intensity Expected outcome
of migrants’
networks

-

dispersive

dissolution of ethnic/national
identity; incorporation into the
host society

Settlement
enclave

+

-

intensive

salience of ethic/national
identity; leverages ethnic
bargaining to advance
incorporation

Diasporic
exclave

-

+

intensive

salience of ethnic/national
identity; engagement with
transnational ties

intensive

salience of ethnic/national
identity; simultaneous
engagement with transnational
ties and with host society
institutions

Integrated
exclave

+

+

Individual-based assimilation occurs when the incorporative power of receiving state
works on dispersive migrants’ networks without the diasporic bureaucracy of sending state.
Migrants are incorporated into the host society’s mainstream on the individual basis and their
ethnicity becomes less salient as much as they acculturate into the mainstream. Their social
mobility in the host society largely depends on attributes and properties such as human and
social capital that each individual possesses.
Settlement enclave takes place when the incorporative power of receiving state reaches
out to intensive migrants’ networks without the intervention of the diasporic bureaucracy of
sending state. Migrants are incorporated into the host society as an ethnic group and leverage
their bargaining power to advance the incorporation into the host society towards upward social
mobility, based on their intensive networks.
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Diasporic exclave, as opposed to settlement enclave, closely connected to the sending
state with a high degree of institutional completeness (Breton 1964, 1991) to the extent as if a
migrant community were the territory of sending state surrounded by the territory of receiving
state (Heisler 1984, 1985),4 emerges when the incorporative power of receiving state is limited or
when it systematically prevents migrants from national incorporation, and the diasporic
bureaucracy of sending state embraces migrants’ intensive networks. Migrants engage in
transnational ties with the homeland with little involvement with host country institutions. They
maintain national identity within the territory of the host country.
Integrated exclave gets formed when both the diasporic bureaucracy of sending state and
the incorporative power of receiving state are exercised over intensive migrants’ networks.
Migrants engage in transnational ties with the homeland and in host country institutions insofar
as both sending and receiving states help migrants’ networks deliver collective goods to the
members. Migrants present themselves as national members to the sending state and ethnic
members to the receiving state.
I have to immediately add a crucial caveat: these heuristic types are snapshots to track the
flows of contexts over time. The empirical case rather unfolds as a process. Thus, not only are
mixed types possible but sequential order of elements matters. As Charles Tilly once noted, we
should recognize that “time matters – that when things happen within a sequence affects how
they happen, that every structure or process constitute a series of choice points” (1984: 14,
emphases original). As we will see below, for instance, the situation of non-elite Italian workers
can be characterized as a transition from individual-based acculturation to a settlement enclave.

4

The most prominent and quintessential exclaves in the contemporary world may be US military bases overseas.
Servicepersons and their families enjoy and rely on social infrastructures and institutions – police and fire
departments, hospitals, schools, supermarkets, and even currency – and directly brought from and connected to the
homeland, and maintain a minimum contact with the local society surrounding the base.
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But they were incorporated as workers not so much as an ethnic group because the Brazilian
corporatist regime provided an organizational basis to their hitherto dispersive networks. In
contrast, Italian upper- and middle-class formed an integrated exclave because they leveraged
their already intensive networks to bargain with Brazilian and Italian states.
On the other hand, the case of Japanese migrants seems to easily fit in a diasporic
exclave. Even in this case, the sequential order matters. First, which infrastructural power –
either Brazilian incorporative power or Japanese diasporic bureaucracy – reached out to the
Japanese migrants’ networks earlier affected the formation process of the Japanese diasporic
exclave. The Japanese diasporic bureaucracy embraced the networks of Japanese migrants earlier
than the Brazilian incorporative power arrived and entrenched them. Second, the different earlier
development of diasporic exclave brought about a downstream dynamism on the later stage. The
retreat of Japanese diasporic bureaucracy from Brazil by the outbreak of the Pacific War
triggered the dissolution of the Japanese diasporic exclaves in the state of São Paulo. However,
the impact of the retreat varied between local Japanese communities, depending on their
socioeconomic conditions, which was differently developed under the contextual configuration
in the preceding period. In the next chapter, I will argue that one community heavily dependent
on the exclave economy in the pre-war period underwent a rapid erosion of diasporic exclave
and violent conflicts among the community members in the aftermath of the war whereas the
other less dependent on the exclave economy experienced a gradual transition to a diasporic
exclave to a settlement enclave and saw no explicit violence after the war.

Timing of Italian and Japanese Incorporation into Brazilian Economy and Different
Settlement Patterns
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Both Italian and Japanese migrants initially settled in coffee plantations in the interior of
São Paulo. However, the timing of emigration, and a shift of São Paulo’s socioeconomic
structure and the redefinition of Brazilian development strategy affected how Italians and
Japanese were incorporated into the Brazilian economy, and where they settled, which in turn set
contexts for the form and scope of their networks and associations. Italian migrants, who came to
Brazil in the late 19th century, had fewer chances to become independent farmers in the rural
area. Hence a large portion of Italian migrants moved to São Paulo city and other local cities. In
contrast, Japanese migrants, who came in the early 20th century, were more able to become
independent farmers in the hinterlands. In 1920, 28% of Italian migrants lived in São Paulo city
but the Japanese in the city were less than 6% and have never exceeded 10% until the end of
World War II (Truzzi 2016: 23, Census Committee for the Japanese Immigrants in Brazil 1964,
vol.2: 426-7).

The Italians in the Urban Centers
The volume of Italian migration to Brazil rapidly increased around the time of Brazilian
slavery abolition in 1888 because coffee plantation owners demanded cheap labor force to
replace slaves (Hall 1969, Holloway 1980). The vast majority of Italian migrants initially settled
in coffee plantations as indentured farmers (colónos) but they soon moved out to urban centers in
the early 20th century (Trento 1989: 124). The utmost case was São Paulo city. Even in the
countryside, they gradually moved to the urban center of local cities. The harsh labor conditions
in the plantations and limited opportunities to be independent farmers in rural areas due to
socioeconomic dominance of plantation owners over local social life pushed Italian colonos to
the urban centers (Martins 1979, 1981, Durham 1966; Stolcke and Hall 1983, Stolcke 1986). For
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Italian plantation workers, emerging industrial jobs in the cities appeared less bad opportunities
than accepting an indentured status in the rural areas.

The Japanese in the Hinterland
In contrast, a vast majority of Japanese migrants settled in the newly developed rural
regions that had been undeveloped when Italians came to Brazil. They benefited from the decline
of the coffee economy and the redefined Brazilian economic strategy emerged after the peak
entry period of Italians. As the coffee plantation economy in the traditional cultivation zones
began to decline by the mid-1910s due to the soil impoverishment, Brazilian government
redefined its development strategy. It started developing hitherto uncultivated northeast
hinterlands by expanding the railroad’s reach, and by making land to farm available cheaply to
small farmers including migrants (Milliet 1941, Holloway 1980: 128, Font 2010: 23-6, Argollo
2016: 173-217. See also, Appendix B). The Japanese migrants took advantage of this chance of
being a landholder. They started acquiring small properties since the second half of the 1920s
(Saito 1961: 135-8, Census Committee for the Japanese Immigrants in Brazil 1964, vol.2: 478557, Taniguchi 2014).
That this new developmental strategy and conditions overlapped with increasing Japanese
immigration and decreasing Italian immigration explain why the Japanese settled in rural areas,
while Italians ended up in cities. The different settlement pattern between Italian and Japanese
migrants in turn set contexts for whether or not and how sending and receiving states
respectively engage with the migrant groups and the mobilizing capacity of migrants’ networks
and associations.
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Brazil’s Incorporative Power vis-à-vis Italian and Japanese Migrants
In the course of nation-building in the early 20th century, the Brazilian government tried
to incorporate both Italian and Japanese migrants into its body politic. The Italians were
susceptible to the Brazilian incorporative power, but the Japanese were not because of their
settlement locations and uneven development of Brazilian incorporative power. This section
compares the relation between the Brazilian incorporative power via-à-vis Italian and Japanese
migrants. Although a sizable portion of Italians settled in São Paulo city, Italian migrants also
lived in the countryside. Thus, the following pages examine Italians in the countryside as well.

The Italian: Cooptation by the Brazilian Incorporative Power
Italian migrants in the countryside initially had access neither to social welfare nor
political participation in the local social life in the late 19th century. They were subordinated to
the social order imposed by powerful coffee oligarchies (Rios 1958a: 306-7). However, as
Brazilian government started consolidating national institutions in the early 20th century, Italian
migrants in the countryside were co-opted by the expanding Brazilian incorporative power. First,
the emerging state institutions started intermediating labor conflicts between coffee oligarchies
and Italian agricultural workers in the 1920s (Font 2010: 138-143). For instance, the state
government of São Paulo created the rural labor relations board (Patronato Agrícola) to mitigate
labor conflicts between plantation owners and workers in 1911.
Table 1-2 presents the numbers of agricultural workers’ claims filed at the Patronato
Agrícola by nationality. Italian agricultural workers were one of nationality groups that filed
complaints at the Patronato Agrícola the most. They have often done so more than native
Brazilian workers during the 1920s. For the Italian workers, the state increasingly appeared as a
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guardian of their interest against powerful plantation owners. Second, soon after the revolution
of 1930, Vargas’s provisional government set up a local advisory board (Conselho Consultivo) in
various local municipalities, membership of which was open even to non-citizens. It opened up
an opportunity to participate in local politics for a few but successful Italian migrants (Truzzi,
Kerbaury, and Barbosa 2012). As a result, they were incorporated into the local political life.
After all, as Brazilian state institutions developed further, Italian migrants came to rely on them
as a sociopolitical guardian.

Table 1-2: Number of Agricultural Workers’ Claims Filed at the Patronato Agrícola by
Nationality, 1920-1930
1920

1921

1922

1923

1924

1925

1926

1927

1928

1929

1930

Brazilian

71
(10.0)

127
(17.6)

202
(26.7)

176
(13.9)

276
(27.4)

269
(21.9)

213
(15.9)

208
(19.2)

253
(21.3)

366
(26.8)

309
(13.4)

Italian

327
(46.2)

287
(39.7)

95
(12.5)

540
(42.6)

195
(19.4)

225
(18.3)

281
(21.0)

258
(27.8)

329
(27.6)

345
(25.2)

558
(24.2)

Japanese

0
(0.0)

0
(0.0)

1
(0.1)

0
(0.0)

13
(1.3)

2
(0.2)

4
(0.3)

18
(1.7)

n/a

n/a

33
(1.4)

Others

310
(43.8)

309
(42.7)

459
(60.6)

552
(43.5)

522
(51.9)

733
(59.6)

841
(62.8)

600
(55.4)

608
(51.1)

657
(48.0)

1406
(61.0)

Total

708
723
757
1268
1006
1229
1339
1084
1190
1368
2306
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)

Sources: Secretaria de Agricultura, São Paulo. 1920-1930. Relatório.
* Percentage is in parentheses.

A similar incorporation process proceeded with Italian industrial workers in São Paulo
city. The federal and São Paulo state governments initially confronted industrial migrant workers
with the repressive means (Hall and Pinheiro 1985: 103-4, Fausto 2016: 71). However, after
chronic labor strikes in the 1910s, Brazilian dominant class started offering cooptative means to
them in the late 1920s (Decca 1987:88-95). Most of all, the Vargas’ regime in the 1930s pushed
forward labor incorporation of industrial workers (Erickson 1977: ch.2, Conniff 1981). The
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Labor Ministry enacted a series of social welfare programs: minimum wage, the social security
system, paid holidays, maternity benefits, and so on. The Trade Union Law of 1931 legitimized
the trade unions and put them under the state control (Rodrigues 1979: ch.2, Collier and Collier
2002 [1991]: 172-3). In fact, the law facilitated the union organizing. Before the Revolution of
1930, the trade unions in São Paulo were weak because of the repressive means by Brazilian
dominant class. After the revolution, it is reported that about 200 unions were registered in the
state of São Paulo in 1934 (Alexander and Parker 2003: 57).

The Japanese: Weak Penetration of the Brazilian Incorporative Power
In contrast to the Italian case, Brazilian governments’ relation to oligarchs and Japanese
migrants’ geographical isolation made it difficult for the Brazilian government to insert its
incorporative power into the Japanese migrants’ networks. Despite the extension of social
welfare to urban workers, Vargas’ provisional government did not provide equivalent measures
to agricultural workers in the countryside (Rodrigues 1979: 79). The Vargas’ regime was
founded on heterogeneous political forces. While Vargas was urged to earn the support from the
growing urban strata, he also had to maintain an alliance with the rural oligarchies who were still
powerful. As mentioned earlier, Brazilian institutions did intermediate agricultural workers’
interests in the Italian case. However, I discovered little evidence that the Japanese agricultural
workers made the most of such institutions. For instance, Japanese migrants filed few claims at
the Patronato Agrícola. Throughout the 1920s, complaints filed by Japanese agricultural workers
have never exceeded 2% of total claims every year (See Table 1-2 above). I will discuss this
point in relation to their networks later.
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Table 1-3: Japanese schools and students in 1928 and 1932 in the state of São Paulo
1928

1932

Number of
Japanese
schools

Number of
students

Proportion of schools
with Brazilian
teachers

Number of
Japanese
schools

82

2976

34.1%

177

Number of
students
8995

Proportion of schools
with Brazilian
teachers
69.5%

Sources: Ryoukaku, Yoshishige (両⾓喜重). c.1928 “Report on the Education of Children
Overseas (在外邦人児童教育に関する報告)”, (DA-MFA, I-1-5-0-2_8_2), Burajiru Jiho 1933.
In addition, the Brazilian incorporative power failed to penetrate into Japanese migrants’
social networks. The education policy of São Paulo state was a quintessential case. In the 1910s,
the São Paulo government started consolidating the school system, eradicating ethnic educational
institutions. However, its enforcement was nothing more than lax (Demartini 1979: 332, Shibata
1997: 50). In 1918, the São Paulo government mandated ethnic schools to equip Brazilian
teachers to teach national curricula (Decree 2.994 of August 8, 1918). However, the government
could not allocate the teachers to Japanese schools in the rural area. In 1928, an inspector from
Japan to São Paulo observed that “the popular education in Brazil is not developed yet. 70% of
Brazilian people do not receive the education and leave their children without learning any
letters. […] In this present situation, it is imperative that the Japanese take a remedial measure to
carry out education for their children.”5 Table 1-3 shows the proportion of the Japanese schools
with Brazilian teachers in the state of São Paulo in 1928 and 1932. In 1928, the schools with at
least one Brazilian teacher consisted only 34.1%. In 1932, the proportion increased to about 70%
on paper. But in reality, a sizable portion of the Brazilian teachers did not attend to their duties.

5

Ryoukaku, Yoshishige (両角喜重). c.1928. “A Report on the Japanese Education in Brazil (在外邦人児童教育に
関する報告)”, (I-1-5-0-2_8_2, DA-MFAJ).
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In 1931, a Japanese consul complained that the São Paulo government did not send teachers to
the Japanese schools and thus Japanese teachers were making up for their vacancies in practice.6
In the case of Italian migrants in the countryside, successful Italians were gradually
incorporated into the local political sphere and the emerging Brazilian national institutions
appeared as a prominent guardian of the interests of Italian agricultural workers. In São Paulo
city, Italian industrial workers were also coopted by Vargas’s corporative government. In
contrast, Brazilian institutions failed to penetrate into Japanese migrants in the rural hinterland.
With little Brazilian incorporative infrastructure in the hinterland, Japanese migrants had to seek
out an alternative provider of social welfare.

Development of Italian and Japanese Diasporic Bureaucracies
Both Italy and Japan developed diasporic bureaucracies. Yet its impact varied: the Italian
diasporic bureaucracy embraced only upper- and middle-class migrants whereas the Japanese
diasporic bureaucracy embraced Japanese migrants more broadly across social classes. This
difference can be explained by different conjunctures of diasporic bureaucracy and the
mobilizing capacity of migrants’ networks between Italian and Japanese cases. This section
examines the development of Italian and Japanese diasporic bureaucracies and the next section
explores the organizational shape of Italian and Japanese migrants’ networks.

Italy: From Selective Diasporic Engagement to Fascist Embrace

6

“On the Schools Established by the Japanese in Brazil (在留邦人の設立する学校に関する件),” from Consul
Mitsuo Hamaguhi (浜口光雄領事) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Kijyuro Shidehara (外務大臣幣原喜重郎),
July 8, 1931, (I-1-5-0-1_002, DA-MFAJ).
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Until the rise of Mussolini in 1922, the Italian government regarded Italians overseas as
civilian ambassadors who would facilitate Italian trade interests with the countries where they
settled (Choate 2008: chs.1, 2). The Italian consulate extended its diasporic bureaucracy to
Italian emigrants in São Paulo to make them an agent of Italian interests. However, it did so
selectively. The consulate valued the upper- and middle-class Italians and supported their
associations (Castaldi 1960: 337-9, Bertonha 1998a: 56). In contrast, it was little interested in the
non-elite Italian workers (Biondi 2011: 64). It showed less interest in labor movements in the
1910s, which involved many Italian workers and in complaints from Italian agricultural workers
in the countryside (Rios 1958a: 332-5, Biondi 2000: 161). In short, Italian consulates
demonstrated contrasting diasporic engagements depending on migrants’ social class: an ardent
engagement with upper- and middle-class Italians in São Paulo city and a general indifference
towards matters of Italian workers.
Since Mussolini seized political power in the early 1920s, the Italian government
redefined its relation to nationals overseas, regarding them as colonial wealth supporting Italian
expansion in Africa and started organizing them across social classes (Cannistraro and Rosoli
1979, Gabaccia 2003: 141-4, Cook-Martín 2013: 58-59). The Italian diasporic bureaucracy not
only reinforced its control over the existing upper- and middle-class Italian associations but also
created fascist organizations designed for the working-class Italians (the National Recreational
Club or Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro) in the 1930s (Trento 1989: 329-30, Bertonha 1998b: 936). However, such fascist organizations failed to attract the Italian migrant workers (Trento 1989:
268-9). A chapter of fascist organizations in São Paulo city, where a vast number of Italian
workers were concentrated, attracted only 400 memberships in 1939 (Bertonha 2010: 67).
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Italian ethnic schools also failed to attract non-elite Italian while retaining upper- and
middle-class Italians. In 1924, soon after the rise of fascism in Italy, there were 87 Italian schools
with 10,626 students in the state of São Paulo. The number dropped to 28 with 4,455 students in
1937 (Bertonha 1998b: 128). The diasporic bureaucracy under the fascist government failed to
retain transnational commitments of the second-generation Italians. This decline is predictable
from the self-interest hypothesis of migrant transnationalism. However, upper- and middle-class
Italians were an exception. Italian nationalist education was sustained and rather intensified in
elite Italian schools in São Paulo city until the end of the 1930s (Bertonha 1998b: 122-9, dos
Santos 2001: 81-8: Franchini 2015).
In sum, upper- and middle-class Italians retained transnational ties with Italy through
their associations and intensified them with the rise of Fascist government. In contrast, working
class Italians were already incorporated by Vargas’s corporatist regime when the Italian
government endeavored to organize them with the fascist organizations such as Opera Nazionale
Dopolavoro. The Italian diasporic bureaucracy lagged behind the Brazilian incorporative power
in embracing working class Italians.

Japan: From Hesitant Diasporic Engagement to Cross-class Integration
Similar to the Italian case, the Japanese diasporic bureaucracy was underdeveloped until
the 1920s. Until then, the primal destination of Japanese emigration was the US. The emigration
to Brazil was a side story of Japanese emigration policy. However, when the US shut down
immigration from Japan in 1924, the Japanese government rapidly shifted its attention to Brazil
(Haraguchi 1997, Iikubo 2003, Endoh 2009: ch.3). The failure of the emigration project to the
US overshadowed the fundamental tone of Japanese diasporic bureaucracy towards emigrants in
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Brazil. It was hesitant to openly engage with Japanese migrants in Brazil. In this respect, the
Japanese consulate’s relationship to Japanese schools is suggestive. In 1930, a consulate
determined not to provide subsidies to the Japanese ethnic schools if they would not be endorsed
by the Brazilian authorities.7
However, when the Japanese government found interests in the cotton production by the
Japanese migrants, the Japanese diasporic bureaucracy over them grew in full. The cotton
industries played a main economic driver for the modernization process of Japan and the
government had always sought new import sources of raw cotton to avoid dependency on a few
limited countries (Beckert 2015: 342-3, 401-8). When the US and India raised tariffs on cotton
due to the emerging protectionism in the early 1930s, the Japanese farmers in Brazil increasingly
appeared to be a strong potential cotton exporter to Japan. In 1934, the consulate took a
leadership to organize the Japanese farmers in Brazil by forming a central federation of their
agricultural cooperatives. With a boom of cotton production among the Japanese farmers, the
number of affiliated households increased to approximately 5,000 (Seabra 1977: 33).8 By the late
1930s, the Japanese consulate in São Paulo achieved the vertical integration of the Japanese
associations with the consulate on the top.
Both Italian and Japanese governments initially implemented their diasporic
bureaucracies partially: Italy only targeted upper- and middle-class migrants and Japan hesitated
to embrace its nationals after all. However, as their positions in the international state system
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“On Schools Established by the Japanese in Brazil (在留邦人の設立する学校に関する件)”, from Consul Mitsuo
Hamaguhi (在サンパウロ領事浜口光雄) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Kijyuro Shidehara (外務大臣幣原喜
重郎), July 8, 1931, (I-1-5-0-1_002, DA-MFAJ).
8
The economic sphere is not the only area through which the Japanese consulate organized Japanese migrants. It
organized community associations and ethnic schools as well (Negawa 2013, Shibata 1997, see also “On the
Meeting of the Representatives from Japanese Associations across the State of São Paulo (各地日本人会代表者会
議に関する件)”, from Consul General in São Paulo Kozo Ichige (在サンパウロ総領事市毛孝三) to the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs Kouki Hirota (外務大臣広田弘毅), October 15, 1937, (K-3-2-2-2, DA-MFAJ)).
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shifted, both states redefined the relations with the nationals since the mid-1920s. Both used
ethnic associations as the medium of diasporic embrace. But the consequences were contrasting:
the Italian diasporic bureaucracy failed to gain working class Italians’ engagement whereas the
Japanese diasporic bureaucracy successfully organized its nationals across social class. To
consider the success and failure of diasporic bureaucracy, the mobilizing capacity of Italian and
Japanese migrants’ networks must be examined next.

Success and Failure of Diasporic Bureaucracy vis-à-vis Italian and Japanese Migrants’
Networks
The success of the diasporic bureaucracy of sending state largely depends on the
mobilizing capacity of migrants’ networks and associations as the nodes. Both Italian and
Japanese migrants formed their own associations as a means of mutual aids. Yet, the extent and
scope of their activities were different. Italian migrants’ networks and associations were divided:
while upper- and middle-class Italians formed intensive networks, working class Italians were
excluded from them and their networks remained dispersed. In contrast, Japanese migrants’
networks and associations in the hinterlands were intensive and integrated. Their associations
became the most salient social institution for most of them. The different socioeconomic
relations to Brazilian society derived from their geographical locations of settlement shaped the
intensity of their networks and its mobilizing capacity, which in turn affected their relationships
with Italian and Japanese diasporic bureaucracies, and with the Brazilian incorporative power.
As a result, they demonstrated different configurations for the transnational ties with the
homelands respectively: upper- and middle-class Italians demonstrated an integrated exclave; the
working class Italians showed labor incorporation into the Brazilian corporative regime via a
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transition from individual-based assimilation to a settlement enclave; and the Japanese in the
hinterland displayed a diasporic exclave.

Italian Division between Integrated Exclave and National Labor Incorporation
Italian migrants’ networks and associations were characterized by social class division
(Hutchinson 1958, Hall 2010). In local cities, a handful of successful Italians controlled the
mutual aid societies and took advantage of them to build a close relationship with the local
oligarchies who were still powerful in the rural areas (Furlanetto 2007, Truzzi et al. 2012: 13841, Truzzi 2016: 82-3). The membership to these mutual aid societies was substantially
inaccessible to non-elite Italians (Teixeira 2013). In São Paulo city, the class differentiation was
also salient. The upper- and middle-class Italians formed honor societies with support from the
Italian consulate (Trento 1989: 322). However, a mass of working-class Italians was excluded
from membership in such associations (Biondi 2000: 160). In short, Italian workers did not meet
ample opportunities to have a membership in mutual aid associations and were left with little
social welfare. In addition, class identity rather than coethnic identity characterized non-elite
Italian workers. While the Italian ethnic identity and class identity overlapped each other in the
urban social movements in the 1910s and 1920s, Italian workers took sides with class solidarity
rather than coethnic identity when the two were in conflict. For instance, in the 1924 Tenentista
Revolt, which was an urban class revolt led by junior army officers against traditional
oligarchies, a sizable proportion of Italian working class participated in the revolt and attacked
their warehouses of Italian upper- and middle-class (Fausto 1995: 19-20). In this context, the
labor incorporation by the Brazilian state appeared as a chance of gaining quasi-social
citizenship to them.
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It was against this background that the Italian diasporic bureaucracy started embracing
the Italians broadly in the late 1920s. It successfully embraced upper- and middle-class Italians
both in local cities and in São Paulo city through the already established associations.
Membership in such associations granted upper- and middle-class Italians prestige and brought
them profits through the trades with the homeland (Bertonha 1998b: 147-61). At the same time,
they also maintained ties to Brazilian dominant class to promote their interest in Brazilian society
(Rios 1958b: 516). The upper- and middle-class Italians formed an integrated exclave.
In contrast, the Italian diasporic bureaucracy failed to embrace Italian workers. First, it
had not been interested in the non-elite Italian workers before the rise of fascism. Second, Italian
ethnic associations had not included most of Italian workers to the membership. And third, the
Brazilian state incorporated the Italian migrant workers into the national corporatist regime.
When the Italian fascist government embarked on the full-fledged diasporic bureaucracy in the
mid-1920s, it did not have an organizational basis to embrace the working-class Italians. Their
settlement enclave was already entrenched by the Brazilian corporatist regime.

Japanese Diasporic Exclave in the Rural Hinterland
As the Italian migrants did, the Japanese migrants also formed their associations but in
isolated rural peripheries where substantial social relations and infrastructures were not yet
established. Under such a social environment, it was almost mandatory to cooperate with each
other (Handa 1970: 233-8, 251-2). As their own institutions such as community organizations,
schools, and agricultural cooperatives developed, the Japanese migrants in the rural hinterland
came to fulfill collective goods by themselves. In general, the Japanese community associations
(Nihonjin-kai) regulated the collective activities and intermediated their contacts with the
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broader Brazilian society outside their settlement (Cardoso 1995: 124-5, Saito 1959). At the same
time, Japanese migrants tended to avoid local Brazilians, viewing them as lazy and poor (Aoyagi
1953: 54-5, Handa 1970: 569). By so doing, the Japanese associations supplied the socioeconomic welfare to the members.9
The Japanese community association also controlled members’ activities by sanctions.
When a certain member of a Japanese community association broke the social order of the
settlement, the association warned him by a threat of expulsion. Although it was rare that the
expulsion was actually executed (see Brajiru Jiho 1928, 1930), the threat was sufficient to
regulate Japanese migrants’ behavior because the expulsion from the associational life
substantially meant a social death. For instance, agricultural cooperatives suppressed members’
violation of collective sales price by preventing the violators from using the shared agricultural
machineries.10 It was almost impossible that a Japanese farmer would independently carry out his
work without any help from his fellows in the agricultural fields (Saito 1959: 132). Under these
social conditions, collective goods were delivered to the community members only as club
goods.
It was in this social context that the Japanese consulate strengthened its diasporic
bureaucracy towards Japanese migrants’ community associations with an increasing interest in
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Both the Japanese diasporic bureaucracy in São Paulo and the Japanese migrants themselves expected community
associations, especially agricultural cooperatives, to work as a bulwark against the exploitation by native Brazilian
merchants in fact they did work as such. See, Aoki, Rinzo (青木林蔵). “Observations on the Japanese Agricultural
Cooperatives (2) (在伯邦人産業組合所見 (二))”, June 1932 (移 1 (D3), reel #17, MJE-NDL), “On the
Rationalization of the Economy of Cotton Growers (綿作者経済の合理化に関する件)”, from the Consul General
Kozo Ichige (在サンパウロ総領事市毛孝三) to the Japanese-Brazilian Central Cooperative (日伯産業組合中央
会), August 23, 1937, File “Matrials on the Relationship between the Japanese-Brazilian Central Cooporative and
the Japanese Consulate General in São Paulo (日伯産業組合中央会と聖市総領事館との関係資料)” (MHIJB).
10
“Memorandum of the 6th General Meeting of the Japanese-Brazilian Central Cooporative (日伯産業中央会第六
回総会メモ)”, c.1939, (移 1 (D3), reel #9, MJE-NDL).
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cotton production.11 Encouraged by the consulate support and orientation, the cotton production
became a boom among Japanese small farmers in the newly developed hinterlands. While the
cotton production consisted of 15% of the total Japanese production in those hinterlands in 1932,
it increased up to 53% in 1942 (Census Committee for the Japanese Immigrants in Brazil 1964,
vol.2: 668-71). Furthermore, the Japanese diasporic bureaucracy reinforced the mutual
dependency among Japanese migrants by encouraging the organizing of agricultural cooperatives
among them and creating their federation with the consulate on the top.
In the previous section, I find little evidence that the Brazilian incorporative power
coopted Japanese migrants. Their highly intensive collective life in the hinterland suggests a
plausible reason. On the one hand, Japanese associations accommodated quasi-socialcitizenship-like club goods to the members. On the other hand, members’ deviation from
collective regulation leads them to sanction. Because of these positive and negative incentives,
the Japanese migrants stayed away from Brazilian incorporative measures.
The Japanese consulate and the federation of agricultural cooperatives channeled the
export of cotton to Japan. The federation controlled all the sales of cotton produced by Japanese
migrants. In 1940, the federation sold about 82% of their cotton to the Japanese trade
companies.12 Through the socio-economic formation centered on cotton production and export,
the Japanese migrants’ settlements in the hinterland practically constituted a diasporic exclave
directly connected to Japan.
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“On the Funding for the Japanese Agricultural Cooperatives in Brazil (在伯邦人産業組合金融資金融通申請に
関する件)”, from Japanese-Brazilian Central Cooperative (日伯産業組合中央会) to the Consul General in São
Paulo, Kozo Ichige (在サンパウロ総領事市毛孝三), April 27, 1936 in File “Matrials on the Relationship between
the Japanese-Brazilian Central Cooporative and the Japanese Consulate General in São Paulo (日伯産業組合中央
会と聖市総領事館との関係資料)”, (MHIJB).
12
Miyao, Atsushi (宮尾厚). “On Application for Licensed Quotas of Cotton (許可申請に関する件)”, October 14,
1940 (移 1 (D3), reel #45, MJE-NDL).
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The Japanese migrants supported Japanese war efforts because their intensive networks
and its relations to the Brazilian incorporative power and to the Japanese diasporic bureaucracy
did not offer an alternative option other than taking part in the campaign. First, their
geographical and social isolation in the hinterland attenuated the penetration of the Brazilian
incorporative power into their settlements. Second, their social networks anchored in ethnic
associations were practically the only channel to the enjoyment of club goods. And third, the
Japanese government exercised its diasporic bureaucracy under such social conditions. When the
government redefined its emigrants in Brazil as a potential resource of national development, the
Japanese diasporic bureaucracy reorganized Japanese migrants' associations in a vertical
structure by providing subsidies and orientations. As the combination of these factors
transformed the Japanese migrants’ settlements into a diasporic exclave in the late 1930s, the
Japanese migrants broadly engaged in diasporic supports to the homeland’s war efforts. When
the Brazilian incorporative power later strengthened, its effects to the Japanese migrants in the
rural areas were largely attenuated by the already entrenched diasporic exclave.

Conclusion: Towards a Configurational Understanding of Migrant Transnationalism
This chapter sought to explicate the varying form and breadth of migrants’ transnational
ties with their homelands by comparing the salient manifestations of diasporic engagement of
Italian and Japanese migrants in the state of São Paulo in early 20th century. In response to the
diasporic mobilization campaign of their homelands, the Japanese migrants showed a broader
diasporic engagement across social classes whereas the Italian migrants displayed a divided
engagement by social class. The comparison of the two cases posed theoretical challenges to
agency-centered and state-centered approaches to migrant transnationalism. I argued that the
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interactions among four contexts are important for accounting for the different form and breadth
of migrant transnationalism. They are: 1) positions and development patterns of sending and
receiving states within the given international state system, 2) the diasporic bureaucracy of the
sending state, 3) the incorporative power of the receiving state, and 4) the mobilizing capacity of
migrants’ networks and their associations as its nodes.

Table 1-4: Modes of Italian and Japanese Migrants’ Incorporation and Transnationalism
Italian migrants
Upper- and
middle-class
Mode of migrants’ incorporation and
transnationalism

integrated
exclave

Infrastructural
power of states

labor incorporation

Japanese
migrants
diasporic
exclave

early arrival and urban settlement

late arrival
and rural
settlement

Diasporic
bureaucracy of
sending state

selective
diasporic
embrace

belated and failed
fascist embrace

hierarchical
organizing

Incorporative
power of
receiving state

growing
connection with
the Brazilian
dominant class

labor organizing
earlier than Italy’s
fascist embrace

weak and
hindered

intensive

from dispersive to
intensive due to
Brazil’s labor
organizing

intensive

Timing of arrival and settlement
location

Configuration
of contexts

Working-class

Degree of intensity of migrants’
networks

Table 1-4 summarizes the different configurations of these contexts between Italian and
Japanese migrants in the state of São Paulo. The two cases showed a contrasting pattern in their
socio-geographical settlements. Because of the timing of their arrivals to Brazil vis-à-vis the
development of the Brazilian national economy, many Italian migrants settled in urban centers
whereas most Japanese migrants settled in rural areas in the hinterland. Their different settlement

58

locations set the context for the form and scope of migrants’ networks and associations. Italian
migrants in local cities and in São Paulo faced the division of social class. The geographical and
social isolation of Japanese migrants strengthened their mutual dependency despite the actual
differentiation in social class.
The different settlement locations also affected the ways in which the infrastructural
power of sending and receiving states – Italian and Japanese diasporic bureaucracies and
Brazilian incorporative power – engaged with the migrant groups. Although the Brazilian
government exercised its incorporative measures toward Italian and Japanese migrants, the
former was more susceptible to them than the latter. At the same time, both Italian and Japanese
diasporic bureaucracies tried to embrace their own nationals in São Paulo. However, their
consequences differed significantly. The Italian diasporic bureaucracy succeeded to maintain ties
with upper- and middle-class Italians but failed to embrace the working-class Italians. In
contrast, the Japanese diasporic bureaucracy successfully organized Japanese migrants in a
hierarchical manner.
In this respect, different mobilizing capacity of Italian and Japanese migrants’ networks
affected the extent to which the infrastructural power of sending and receiving states can
embrace each migrant group. Italian migrants’ networks and associations were fragmented by
social class. Upper- and middle-class Italians formed an integrated exclave. The Italian diasporic
bureaucracy embraced them through their associations. Working-class Italians’ networks were
initially dispersive and unorganized. It was the Brazilian corporatist regime that organized them.
When the fascist government started organizing working-class Italians, they had already been
incorporated into the Brazilian corporatist regime. In contrast, the hierarchically organized
Japanese migrants formed a diasporic exclave, which further reinforced their diasporic
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engagement with the homeland. In short, the Italian and Japanese migrants manifested the
different degree of diasporic engagement with the homelands as a result of the different
configuration of these contexts.
Within this interactive process framework, I underline two key points. First, the role of
sending and receiving states can be highlighted in shaping migrants’ diasporic engagement with
the homelands. Under the given international state system, both sending and receiving states
strategically embrace their claimed nationals. The balance of their infrastructural powers creates
a tension between migrants’ incorporation process into the host society and their transnational
ties with the homelands. The sending and receiving states compete with each other to embrace
the same group of people whom they respectively claim as their nationals (Cook-Martín 2013).
Second, the interactions among the four contexts take place as a process. Thus, timing
and sequential order of events matters more than just a certain snapshot configuration at a given
moment. In the cases of Italian and Japanese migrants in early 20th century São Paulo, timing
and sequence mattered in two senses. First, the timing of their arrivals to São Paulo in relation to
the Brazilian development pattern made a difference in their settlement location and in turn in
the form and scope of their networks and associations. Second, the attention to the sequential
order among the infrastructural power of sending and receiving states and migrants’ network
formation made it possible to trace various patterns in transnational ties and incorporation
process among Italian and Japanese migrants. A clear contrast stands between Italian workingclass migrants and Japanese migrants. The Brazilian incorporative power reached out to the
Italian working-class earlier than the Italian Fascist government started extending its diasporic
bureaucracy to them. As a result, the Italian diasporic bureaucracy was foreclosed to embrace
them. In contrast, the Japanese diasporic bureaucracy embraced Japanese migrants in the
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hinterland earlier than the Brazilian incorporative power grew sufficiently to reach out to the
rural areas. Because of the earlier arrival of Japanese diasporic bureaucracy, the Japanese
diasporic exclaves endured. These timing and sequential dynamics generated upstream branching
points in the variations in Italian and Japanese transnational ties.
To this point, one may suspect that the cases of Italian and Japanese migrants in São
Paulo in the early 20th century are rare exceptions to the general patterns of migrant
incorporation and transnationalism because they were cases at the time when the notion of the
nation was still in the making and the state institutions that underpin the notion had not yet fully
developed, and also because the diasporic exclave is not a common type of migrants’ social
organization. Yet I do not think they were exceptions. An interactive process approach to
migrant transnationalism has a broader implication beyond the cases of Italian and Japanese
migrants under current concern. For instance, the case of Koreans in post-WWII Japan
demonstrates a case in which the receiving state, Japan, fostered the exclusion and the
repatriation of Korean residents to North Korea and the latter embraced its nationals in Japan
with success (Morris-Suzuki 2007, Kim 2016). In this case, the social exclusion of migrants in
the host society created a diasporic exclave. Also in the case of West Germany in the Cold War
era, the West German government invited teachers from Turkey to teach in the German public
schools in the hope of facilitating their eventual return to Turkey, and the Turkish government
actively cooperated with the initiatives of West Germany (Van Wyck 2017). In this case, both
the sending and receiving states collaborated to form another type of diasporic exclave. In short,
it is not exceptional that the diasporic bureaucracy of the sending state embraces its nationals
abroad. Its success largely depends on the configuration of contexts in which migrants are
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embedded. An interactive process approach helps to further our understanding of migrants’
transnationalism and incorporation.
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CHAPTER 2
DIVERGENT DISSOLUTIONS OF DIASPORIC EXCLAVES:
INTRA-GROUP CONFLICTS AMONG JAPANESE MIGRANTS IN BASTOS AND
REGISTRO IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE PACIFIC WAR
Chapter Summary
In the immediate aftermath of the Pacific War, a large number of Japanese migrants in the state
of São Paulo claimed Japan had won the war, while others accepted it had lost. This eventually
resulted in intra-group conflicts. Why and how were Japanese migrants attracted by the claim of
Japanese victory? Why and how did the conflicts occur? To these questions, earlier
historiographies have provided cultural accounts, arguing that those who had a strong patriotic
attachment to Japan attacked those who did not. By drawing on different responses of two rural
communities – Bastos and Registro – to the Japanese defeat, I argue that the disjuncture between
local economic and organizational bases caused the weakening of community associations’
legitimacy, which led to the conflicts. In the long run, Japanese diasporic exclaves dissolved and
shifted settlement enclaves. However, Bastos and Registro demonstrated two different courses of
the dissolution: Bastos saw violent conflicts among Japanese residents because of a widening
disjuncture of its socioeconomic and organizational bases whereas Registro did not see the
violence because it sustained coherence between socioeconomic and organizational bases.
Introduction
The Emperor Hirohito announced the surrender of Japan to the Allies through the radio
broadcasts on August 15, 1945. This was the first time that Japanese common people listen the
voice of the emperor. While the emperor delivered his speech in the formal classical Japanese
that few common people could easily understand, the Japanese in Japan readily accepted the
emperor’s declaration and embraced the defeat (Dower 2000). However, the situation was more
complicated in the case of the Japanese in Brazil. A group of Japanese migrants who did not
believe the surrender of Japan (deniers or kachi gumi) emerged in the state of São Paulo. Their
proportion was substantive: a 1952 survey reported that 85.5% of the Japanese migrants did not
believe Japanese defeat one week after the end of the war (Izumi 1957: 82). It is understandable
that the confusion of information and communication made them doubt the defeat, especially
given Brazilian government’s restrictive measures such as bans on ethnic associations and
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newspapers during the war period. Most Japanese migrants in Brazil did not have an opportunity
to directly listen to the Emperor’s radio speech on his acceptance of the defeat. Even those who
had such an opportunity clandestinely listened to the unclear speech transmitted through a weak
shortwave radio signal (Maeyama 1982, Miyao 2003).
However, the belief of Japanese victory was persisted beyond the immediate days after
the war. It was crystalized in an ultra-nationalistic secret society named Shindo Renmei (League
of Imperial Subjects’ Way). The following December, they circulated pamphlets to compatriots
to propagate their belief of Japanese victory. The front page started with a somewhat sentimental
remark: “The Japanese nation certainly believes that the motherland must never be defeated.
But… We are awed and sob, knowing the amount of blood the motherland sacrificed. […] We
devotionally follow the imperial subjects’ way”.1 The fact was that Japan had lost the war. Those
who accepted its defeat (accepter or make-gumi) traveled around Japanese communities in the
hinterland of São Paulo to announce the fact: “The surrender was venerably decided by His
Majesty the Emperor. […] It was His Majesty’s great will that laid down the arms, saving the
possibility of national rebuilding just moments before the total eradication of the nation.”2
Interestingly, both accepters and deniers employed the same symbolism, the Emperor’s
authority, to legitimize their opposing claims: deniers implicitly referred to their loyal
subjecthood to the Emperor; accepters explicitly deployed the name of Emperor. Despite, or
precisely because of, the shared cultural symbolism, the opposition between deniers and
accepters eventually escalated into violent conflicts, including 23 homicides and 86 injuries by
1947 (Miyao 2003: 65-72).

1

“Imperial Subjects’ Way (臣道),” no.1 (December 1945), 移 1 (D3), reel #36, MJE-NDL.
Miyakoshi, Chibata (宮腰千葉太). c.1945. “Draft for Announcement of Japanese defeat to Local Communities
(地方巡回実情報告草稿).” MHIJB.
2
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Why did a substantial number of Japanese migrants maintain the belief of Japanese
victory beyond the days of confusion immediately after the war? Why did they split up into
deniers and accepters and resulted in the intra-group conflicts between them? The prior studies
have provided three interrelated accounts: cultural, organizational and socioeconomic. While
they differ in emphases, they commonly regard the rise and persistence of deniers represented by
Shindo Renmei as a prominent manifestation of the durable diasporic nationalism. However,
they tend to overgeneralize cultural values shared by Japanese migrants. Additionally, they
overlook local variations of the intra-group conflicts between deniers and accepters, treating the
conflicts as the phenomenon encompassing all Japanese communities in the state of São Paulo.
If deniers and accepters shared the nationalist symbolism, how can cultural values
explain the rise of conflicts between them? Did the conflicts encompass all Japanese
communities? I focus on the two rural communities of Japanese migrants, Bastos and Registro,
that showed contrasting responses to the Japanese defeat despite sharing many community
characteristics (for their geographical locations, see Appendix C). Whereas the intra-group
conflicts between deniers and accepters increasingly spread in Bastos, Registro saw no
organizational rise of deniers represented by Shindo Renmei and thus no violence. To the
questions above, I respond that the shared cultural values themselves cannot explain not only
conflicts between deniers and accepters but also the difference between Bastos and Registro
because Japanese migrants in both places maintained Japanese cultural values to more or less a
similar extent. Instead, I argue that the rise of Shindo Renmei and the intra-group conflicts can
be better understood by the structural disjuncture, or lack thereof, between economic and
organizational bases of local Japanese communities.
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In the pre-war period, both Bastos and Registro were diasporic exclaves (see Chapter 1)
supported by the Japanese diasporic bureaucracy but with different degrees of reliance on the
exclave economy. When the Japanese diasporic bureaucracy retreated from Brazil in 1941,
Bastos underwent a rapid dissolution of diasporic exclave and suffered from an unstable
economy during the war period. In contrast, the retreat of Japanese diasporic bureaucracy did not
damage the economic basis of Registro because it relied less on the exclave economy.
In Bastos, the rapid erosion of the exclave economy damaged the legitimacy of
community associations, especially that of agricultural cooperative, since its legitimacy was
mostly derived from the capacity to provide the members club goods such as the access to the
distribution network of agricultural products via export quotas to Japan, which became
dysfunctional as the Japanese diasporic bureaucracy left Brazil. As a result, the community
associations became unable to sustain cohesion among the members in the aftermath of the war
and failed to prevent the penetration of Shindo Renmei’s influence into the community. In
contrast, the Japanese community in Registro could not rely on the exclave economy largely due
to its agri-geographical conditions unsuitable for export-oriented products such as cotton. Thus,
the retreat of the diasporic bureaucracy did not damaged Registro’s economic basis already
oriented towards the Brazilian domestic market. During the war period, the agricultural
cooperative in Registro successfully maintained and even strengthened their legitimacy over the
community members, supported by a flourishing agricultural economy. As a result, Shindo
Renmei failed to penetrate its influence into the Japanese migrants in Registro, tearing down the
legitimacy of the agricultural cooperative.
The following pages first examine whether or not and how prior studies successfully
explain the rise of Shindo Renmei and the intra-group conflicts between deniers and accepters.
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Second, I reconsider the weights of the three factors used in prior explanations and reformulate
the causal configurations among them, centered on the changing relations of economic and
organizational lives of rural Japanese communities. And third, I analyze the cases of Bastos and
Registro with a sustained attention to economic and organizational lives of Japanese farmers and
their agricultural cooperatives.

Culture, Organization, and Social Economy: A Critical Review on the Prior Studies of the
Intra-group Conflicts between Deniers and Accepters
Prior studies on the intra-group conflicts among Japanese migrants over the defeat or
victory of Japan in the war provide three interrelated explanations: the first relies on cultural
values shared by Japanese migrants, the second focuses on their organizations and networks, and
the third emphasizes their socioeconomic backgrounds. However, they overstate the impact of
shared cultural values. Even the organizational and socioeconomic arguments conflate their own
distinct explanatory factors with the cultural factor. By analytically distinguishing the three
explanatory components, this section shows how they fail to explain the rise of Shindo Renmei
and the intra-group victory-defeat conflicts.

Cultural Argument
The cultural argument emphasizes the role of cultural values shared by Japanese migrants
although it is rarely presented in its purest form except some earlier studies and journalistic
writings (Miranda 1948, Tigner 1954, Takagi 1970, Fujisaki 1974, Nakadate 1988). The most
common explanation argues that the intra-group conflicts between deniers and accepters were the
extension of diasporic nationalism formed in the pre-war era. Japanese migrants in Brazil have
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been internalized “Japanese spirit (nihon seishin)” centered on the idea of emperor worship
(Maeyama 1972: 169-170, see also Wago 1939). When the war was over, they could not accept
Japanese defeat that contradicted their nationalistic belief of Japanese victory (Mita 1978, 2009:
ch.4, Maeyama 1982). As a result, they attacked co-nationals who claimed Japan’s defeat as
traitors. Strangely, the cultural argument does not clarify who accepted Japan’s defeat. However,
according to its logic, those who did accepted the defeat must have internalized the Japanese
spirit less.
The shared cultural values may explain the socio-psychological background of deniers
represented by Shindo Renmei. However, it faces two challenges. First, it is hard to verify the
extent to which Japanese migrants shared such cultural values in common ex ante. As the prior
studies demonstrate by analyzing propaganda pamphlets issued by Shindo Renmei and some
members’ diaries (Maeyama 1982: 166-174, Lesser 1999: ch.5, Hatanaka 2002: ch.3, Miyao
2002: 20-55), it is plausible that the core members had such nationalistic mindsets. However, this
does not prove that their followers also had the same mindsets.
Yet, being unobservable does not automatically imply being implausible. I do not reject
that Japanese migrants shared the cultural values. However, an inconvenient fact is that accepters
also appealed to the same “Japanese spirit.” Whereas deniers claimed that those with the
“Japanese spirit” must believe in the victory, accepters appealed that those with the “Japanese
spirit” must accept the defeat “manly” and gracefully (Maeyama 1996).
In this respect, an analytical distinction between cultural idiom and ideology is helpful
(Skocpol 1994, see Sewell 2005: ch.5 for a similar conceptual distinction between culture as
system and culture as practice). The former has a more general, anonymous, and less articulated
existence whereas the latter has a more concrete and specific content employed by identifiable
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actors. Ideological entrepreneurs can construct different, even conflicting ideological arguments
deriving from same cultural idioms. As deniers and accepters competed over the interpretation of
the same Japanese nationalistic cultural idioms, why did many Japanese migrants were attracted
to deniers’ appeal, not that of accepters? The cultural argument does not provide an answer to
this question.3 In sum, the cultural argument may explain the general tendency among Japanese
migrants but does not account for the conflicts among them.

Organizational argument
The organizational argument points to Japanese associations and networks as crucial
factors sustaining the diasporic nationalism among Japanese migrants (Willems and Saito 1947,
Tigner 1961, Maeyama 1979, 1982, Hatanaka 2002: ch.4). It argues that their broad and
intensive networks organized by the diasporic bureaucracy in the pre-war era worked as the
infrastructural basis for the diffusion of Japanese nationalistic cultural idioms. Certainly, the
Brazilian authorities shut down the formal organizations in Japanese diasporic exclave as
diplomatic relation with Japan broke down in 1942. However, Japanese cultural values were
more durable than formal organizations. Their diasporic exclave was sustained by informal
networks. It was then that secret societies, the most prominent and organized of which was
Shindo Renmei, emerged and reorganized Japanese migrants (Maeyama 1979: 598-599). In
addition, the Brazilian government’s restrictive measures further reinforced Japanese migrants’
cohesion (Kumasaka and Saito 1970: 168-169, Handa 1970: 625-641, Reichl 1995, Dezem 2000,

3

Literature on framing contests in the studies of social movements tackles this issue. However, they failed to
identify factors that shape the contest outcomes. They imply the tautological ex post legitimation: the frame that won
wide support was the influential frame (Benford and Snow 2000). From a different perspective, the post-structuralist
discourse analysis also approaches the same issue. It does not also identify ex ante conditions of why a certain
specific ideology gains hegemony over others (Howarth 2000, Laclau 2005).

69

Takeuchi 2008, Shizuno 2010). In the aftermath of the Pacific War, the rumor of Japan’s victory
was rapidly and broadly spread through the informal networks and made the majority of
Japanese migrants believe in it.
However, the organizational argument faces a challenge: it may account for the rise of
Shindo Renmei but cannot explain conflicts. For a conflict to emerge, there must be at least two
engaging parties. If the Shindo Renmei was so influential and broadly spread among Japanese
migrants, why did the intra-group conflicts between deniers and accepters occur in the first
place? The organizational argument would argue that those Japanese who stood outside the
informal networks became accepters. Even if that was the case, the organizational argument
leaves a crucial question unanswered because it conflates the informal networks with cultural
values: why were some Japanese migrants not involved in the secret societies? And where did
they stand on Japan’s defeat or victory in the war?

Socioeconomic argument
Socioeconomic argument may offer an answer to the questions above. It emphasizes the
socioeconomic differentiation among Japanese migrants. Leaders of local Japanese communities
had already established a stable economic basis and, as representatives of the communities, they
had frequent contacts with native Brazilians including public authorities. Additionally, limited
but emerging urban dwellers also had constant contacts with the wider Brazilian society. They
were relatively assimilated to the Brazilian society (Willems and Saito 1947: 150, Maeyama
1979: 601). In contrast, non-elite Japanese farmers, especially renters, sharecroppers, and
indentured workers, were economically unstable and relied on the nationalistic cultural value to
motivate their morale for living. They thought that their hard efforts under severe socioeconomic
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conditions would pay off when Japan would win the war and then they would be able to return to
the homeland with pride (Vieira 1973: ch.9, Mita 1978). When the war was over, they were
attracted by Shindo Renmei’s propaganda compatible with their wishful thinking. In short, the
socioeconomic argument accounts for the factional divide by the socioeconomic differentiation
between local leaders and urbanized migrants on the one hand and non-elite agricultural migrants
on the other.

Table 2-1: Socioeconomic Differentiation among Japanese Migrants in 1942 and Their
Involvements in Shindo Renmei in circa 1945
Region*

Non-elite farmer Distribution of
ratio against
Japanese migrants
landowner in
by region in 1945
1942

Involvements in Shindo Renmei in circa
1945
Listed number of
associates (%)

Estimated
proportion of
associates within
region**

Alta Paulista

0.9

22.3%

44,350 (39.4)

24.4%

Noroeste

0.9

24.8%

39,500 (35.1)

19.6%

Sorocabana

0.8

13.2%

21,500 (19.1)

20.0%

Araraquara and Borda do
Planalto

4.6

9.3%

5,900 (5.2)

7.8%

São Paulo city and its
environs

1.7

20.0%

250 (0.2)

0.2%

Vale do Paraíba

1.8

1.3%

1,100 (1.0)

10.1%

Coastal

1.0

4.2%

0 (0.00)

0.0%

Other

1.9

5.1%

0 (0.00)

0.0%

Total

1.2

100.00%

112,600 (100.00)

17.0%

Sources: “Relação de Representantes de Filiais da Sociedade ‘Shindo Renmei’.” (DEOPS-SP
collection, fls.2316-2318, vol.10, CENB), Census Committee for the Japanese Immigrants in
Brazil 1964, vol.2: 426-429, 716-719.
* For geographical location of each region, see Appendix C.
** For the estimation procedure, see Appendix D.

To examine this socioeconomic argument, I turn to available statistical data. First, the
socioeconomic argument, if valid, must predict that regions with a higher non-elite farmer ratio
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presented a higher level of involvement in Shindo Renmei. The leftmost column on Table 2-1
represents non-elite farmer (renter, sharecropper, and indentured worker) ratio against
landowners in 1942. Three regions indicate higher ratios: Araraquara and Borda do Planalto
(4.6), São Paulo City and its environs (1.7), and Vale do Paraíba (1.8), except “other” category.
However, the three regions did not indicate higher levels of Shindo Renmei involvement (the
rightmost column on Table 2-1). Instead, three regions with a roughly even landowner to nonelite farmer ratio indicated higher level of involvement in Shindo Renmei: Alta Paulista (24.4%),
Noroeste (19.6%), and Sorocabana (20.0%). Moreover, the Coastal region did not demonstrate
any observable involvements in Shindo Renmei.
Second, the socioeconomic argument also points out that rural location made Japanese
farmers more susceptible to Shindo Renmei’s appeal. Indeed, the proportion of Shindo Renmei
associates within São Paulo city and its environs was low. In contrast, the three regions with
higher proportion of Shindo Renmei associates – Alta Paulista, Noroeste, and Sorocabana – were
the less-developed northwestern hinterland regions. Here again, the Coastal region stands an
inconvenient case to this association. It does not indicate any observable involvement in Shindo
Renmei even though it was agriculture-dominant rural region.4 In short, the available statistical
data cast doubt on the validity of the socioeconomic argument.
More importantly, the socioeconomic argument, despite its apparent emphasis on the
socioeconomic conditions, conflates non-elite Japanese farmers’ status with Japanese cultural
values. However, as discussed above, cultural idioms are open to multiple interpretations. Due to

4

The Coastal region covers a narrow area along the coastline (see Appendix C). However, the majority of Japanese
migrants were demographically concentrated in Vale do Ribeira area, the center of which was Registro. Even in
1959, 67% of Japanese migrants in the Coastal region lived in Vale do Ribeira area and only 19% of them lived in
urban zones within it despite the accelerating urbanization process in Brazil (Census Committee for the Japanese
Immigrants in Brazil 1964, vol.2: 7).
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this conflation, the socioeconomic argument is pushed back to the initial challenge that the
cultural argument faces: why were the Japanese farmers mobilized by a specific ideological
articulation of cultural idioms, and not by another?

The prior studies do not fully explicate the course of the intra-group conflicts between the
deniers and accepters. The cultural and organizational arguments may account for psychological
and organizational backgrounds of the rise of deniers represented by Shindo Renmei. However,
they do not explain the divide and conflicts among Japanese migrants. While the socioeconomic
argument points to class differentiation among them, their demographic distribution does not
support this claim. The problem lies in the conflations between the cultural factor and other
explanatory components. All in all, the three arguments overemphasize the impact of Japanese
cultural values in the emergence and development of the conflicts between deniers and accepters.
A notable consequence of this overemphasis is that the prior studies face difficulty to
account for Japanese migrants’ changing social orientation after the conflicts calmed down.
Overall, Japanese migrants started incorporating into the Brazilian society in the post-war period.
The prior studies view this process primarily as the consequence of their purposive mental shift
en masse from diasporic to incorporative ones (for the clearest formulation, see Maeyama 1996).
Here lies a question. On the one hand, they account for the rise of deniers and Shindo Renmei by
durable Japanese cultural values. On the other hand, they turn to Japanese migrants’ purposive
agency to explain their incorporation into the Brazilian society. However, they do not explain
why Japanese cultural values were durable and constraining at one point but not so much at
another.
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I do not claim that Japanese cultural values did not count at all. Nor do I claim that
people’s motivations did not matter for the conflicts between deniers and accepters and their
aftermath. Cultural values can affect one’s motives that, in turn, guide his or her actions.
However, cultural values are not the only factor that affects one’s agency. I contend that the
overemphasis on the cultural factor and its generalization keep us from properly acknowledging
the organizational and socioeconomic factors. Above all, the overemphasis of cultural factor
obscures local variations of the conflicts. Distinct effects of organizational and socioeconomic
factors on these local variations become clearer when I compare Bastos and Registro later.

A Corrective View: The Retreat of Japanese Diasporic Bureaucracy and Varying
Economic and Organizational Lives of Japanese Migrants
While the three factors that the prior studies pose cannot fully explain the rise of Shindo
Renmei and the intra-group conflicts between deniers and accepters, I do not reject them. Rather,
I reconsider the explanatory weight of each factor and their causal configuration assigned by the
prior studies. First, I do not reject the possibility that Japanese migrants shared nationalistic
cultural values. But I doubt the cultural values as the fundamental precondition of the rise of
Shindo Renmei and the conflicts. I suggest that the ideological association between Japanese
cultural values and the belief of Japan’s victory was a product of the conflicts themselves,
articulated and crystalized through the course of events. Second, I do not reject an explanatory
role for Japanese migrants’ diasporic exclave. However, I do not view the diasporic exclave as
the crystallization of Japanese migrants’ cultural values, nor see the endurance of the Japanese
diasporic exclave as a cause of the conflicts. Instead, I argue that its rapid dissolution was a
significant factor that divide Japanese migrants into the two factions, deniers and accepters.
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Third, I do not refute the socioeconomic differentiation among Japanese migrants. Yet, I do not
hastily equate the Japanese agricultural workers’ socioeconomic conditions with their sociopsychological state. Instead, I pay sustained attention to the changing socioeconomic conditions
themselves that encompass Japanese migrants.
Thusly reconsidering the three factors, I argue that the rise of Shindo Renmei and the
intra-group conflicts between deniers and accepters can be better understood by the structural
disjuncture between economic and organizational bases of local Japanese communities. The
difference of socioeconomic conditions in the pre-war period eventually affected the legitimacy
of local Japanese associations over the community members in the aftermath of the war. Of
particular importance is agricultural cooperatives’ capacity to deliver the members membership
benefits or club goods (Buchanan 1965) crucial for their economic stability, such as agricultural
facilities, supplements, and most importantly, the distribution network of agricultural products.
This capacity varied across local communities of Japanese migrants during the war period
largely depending on their reliance on exclave economy. The communities with the diminished
capacity failed to maintain its legitimacy over the community members whereas those with the
sustained capacity did not.
Bastos and Registro represent these two different types of Japanese diasporic exclave in
the state of São Paulo. In the pre-war period, both Bastos and Registro were diasporic exclaves
supported by the Japanese diasporic bureaucracy. A significant difference between them was
their socioeconomic conditions: Bastos relied on an export-oriented exclave economy while
Registro didn’t. This difference eventually led them to different processes of the dissolution of
diasporic exclave. Figure 2-1 summarizes the dynamics that produced their different responses to
Japan’s defeat and the eventual intra-group conflicts.
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Figure 2-1: Different Dynamics of the Dissolution of Diasporic Exclave in Bastos and Registro

In the pre-war period, Bastos enjoyed an export-oriented exclave economy whereas
Registro struggled to establish a stable economic basis. This difference in the two places were
contingent upon their agri-geographic features: Bastos’s soil was suited for cotton production
while Registros' wasn’t. While the Japanese diasporic bureaucracy supported the two places, its
retreat from Brazil in 1942 affected them differently. The sudden loss of the dominant export
destination entailed by the retreat destabilized the economic basis of Bastos whereas it did not in
Registro. The retreat of the diasporic bureaucracy rather facilitated Registro’s economy to
penetrate into the Brazilian domestic market through the extended connection with another
Japanese agricultural cooperatives.
This difference in the economic basis affected the organizational basis of each
community. In Bastos, the capacity of the agricultural cooperative to provide the community
members club goods important to secure their economic stability represented by the distribution
network of products via export quotas to Japan diminished significantly. As a result, its
legitimacy to unite the community members was damaged when Bastos faced a critical economic
crisis in the aftermath of the war. In Registro, the agricultural cooperative could keep delivering
the members club goods such as the distribution network of the products penetrating into the
Brazilian domestic market and thus could sustain its legitimacy and control over the community
members.5 When Shindo Renmei tried to mobilize Japanese migrants in the two communities,

5

This implies that the Japanese community associations with a stable legitimacy could unite the members either
under the belief of victory or defeat of Japan. Although the evidence is limited, the case of Presidente Prudente
suggests a case in which the local leadership organized the Japanese residents under the belief of Japanese victory.
According to the police records, an influential Japanese who was the president of Japanese Association (Nihonjinkai) in the pre-war era formed a secret society in the aftermath of the war. The secret society was based on the
former Japanese Association and succeeded to organize the majority of community members, except a very few.
Although some members of the secret society blackmailed a few Japanese residents, it did not escalate to violent
incidents. See, “Testemunha de Iwao Ban,” April 26, 1946 (DEOPS-SP collection, fls.1080-1081, vol.5, CENB),
“Testemunha de Akira Takahashi,” April 29, 1946 (DEOPS-SP collection, fls.1158-1159, vol.5, CENB),
“Testemunha de Kyoshi Inoue,” May 2, 1946 (DEOPS-SP collection, fls.1238-1239, vol.5, CENB).
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the community leaders in Bastos could not prevent the penetration of Shindo Renmei into the
community members whereas those in Registro could. Bastos saw the escalation of conflicts
between deniers and accepters and it resulted in violence. Registro, in contrast, did not see such
an escalation even though some residents must hold a deniers’ view personally. Different
responses to Japan’s defeat in Bastos and Registro were the consequence of these different
dissolution processes of diasporic exclave.
In sum, the Japanese communities that relied on exclave economy, represented by Bastos,
underwent a rapid disjuncture between their economic and organizational bases with an
increasingly declining legitimacy of community associations, whereas those with less reliance on
exclave economy, represented by Registro, experienced a gradual shift from a diasporic exclave
to a settlement enclave (see Chapter 1) with the sustained legitimacy of the community
associations. In the long run, Japanese diasporic exclaves eventually dissolved and shifted
toward settlement enclaves. However, the ones undergone a rapid dissolution had to pay a big
price in the form of violent conflicts.
This point aligns with the broader theoretical argument developed in the previous
chapter: migrants’ transnational engagement with the homelands largely depends on the
changing configuration among global socio-economic, state-institutional, and migrant-network
contexts. A change in the state-institutional context (the retreat of the diasporic bureaucracy)
affected migrants’ associations and networks (the legitimacy of community associations)
differently depending on socio-economic conditions (the reliance on exclave economy). The
local Japanese migrants’ communities that heavily relied on the exclave economy in the pre-war
period were more susceptible to the changing Brazilian and Japanese developments within the
international state system during the war period than those that didn’t. This transformation of
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contextual configuration eventually led Japanese diasporic exclaves to different patterns of the
dissolution.

Comparison between Bastos and Registro in Relation to the Rise of Shindo Renmei and the
Conflicts between Deniers and Accepters
This section compares two communities of Japanese migrants — Bastos and Registro —
and their contrasting responses to Japan’s defeat. It is certain that Shindo Renmei gained many
Japanese migrants’ involvement and the intra-group conflicts between deniers and accepters
intensified mostly in the regions where their large majority lived. Yet, this does not automatically
confirm the causal factors drawn solely from the characteristics of these positive cases. Negative
cases, even if they are anomalous, enable us to reconsider the effect of existing factors and offer
new insights for the rise of Shindo Renmei and the victory-defeat conflicts (Rogowski 2004).
Bastos and Registro are such strategic sites for comparison. Bastos is located in Alta
Paulista region that was one of demographic centers of Japanese migrants in the pre-war period.
In contrast, Registro is located in the Coastal region that was a demographic periphery in terms
of the populational distribution of Japanese migrants.6 In this sense, Registro represented an
exceptional case. Also, we should be cautious to regard Bastos as the microcosm of Japanese
diasporic exclaves in the northwestern hinterland. Nevertheless, Bastos and Registro showed
contrasting responses to Japan’s defeat despite sharing most of characteristics that the prior
studies claimed as the causes of the rise of Shindo Renmei and the intra-group conflicts: the
substantial proportion of Japanese migrants in Bastos were mobilized by Shindo Renmei and
resulted in violent incidents including a homicide and eight injuries, whereas Japanese migrants

6

Only 4.2% of Japanese migrants lived in the Coastal region in 1945. See Table 2-1.
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in Registro were not mobilized by Shindo Renmei and no explicit violence occurred.7 The
comparison between the two communities make us to revise prior theorizing and develop a more
plausible account of these cases.
First, I will examine the demographic composition of old and new migrants in the two
because Bastos and Registro formed in different times. I also examine if Bastos and Registro had
the community characteristics that the prior studies claimed as the causes of the rise of Shindo
Renmei and the conflicts between deniers and accepters. In short, the two communities shared all
the community characteristics. Despite all this, the conflicts escalated in Bastos while Registro
did not see such an escalation. Then, second, I analyze how the relationship between economic
and organizational bases in the two communities changed before and after the retreat of the
Japanese diasporic bureaucracy and show the structure disjuncture of the two bases better
explains the difference between Bastos and Registro concerning the conflicts between deniers
and accepters.

Old and New Japanese Communities and Their Demographic Composition
First of all, I point out that demographic compositions of Bastos and Registro at the end
of the war were more or less similar even though the former was established much later than the
latter: 1916 for Registro and 1929 for Bastos, a 13-year difference in lengths of settlement in
Brazil. With this information, one may suspect that this difference can explain their different
responses to Japan’s defeat: Japanese migrants in Registro were old timers and they already lost
interests in the homeland’s affairs; those in Bastos were newer arrivals and thus they had a
stronger patriotic attachment to Japan as the self-interest hypothesis of migrant transnationalism

7

“Testemunha de Isawao Ueno,” April 6, 1946 (DEOPS collection, fls.144-145, vol.1, CENB).

80

would theorize (Portes 2001, Alba and Nee 2003, Waldinger 2015). However, the length of
settlement per se does not account for their different responses because both places had a more
or less similar mixed demographic composition of old and new migrants due to the domestic
migration of Japanese migrants between Japanese local communities during the 1920s and
1930s.
On the one hand, Registro’s population growth was unstable in the early years. Due to the
booming coffee and cotton economies in the northwestern hinterland, many Japanese settlers
moved to the hinterland (Handa 1970: 354, Vazemi 2011: 30). Between 1917-1931 period, about
48% of families that had once settled in Registro left for the other regions (Burajiru Jiho 1933:
27). In 1931, 314 Japanese families remained in Registro. The newer Japanese migrants started
to settle again in the late 1930s when Registro found tea and other agricultural products as major
commodities. In 1938, the number of Japanese families recovered to 467 (Registro Japanese
Youth Federation 1938b). On the other hand, the colonization company of Bastos initially
planned to recruit all settlers directly from Japan. However, it failed to attract such new
emigrants in Japan. As a result, they recruited from the old migrants who came to Brazil earlier.
Between 1929 to 1938 period, 1,130 families settled in Bastos. Among them, 70% were old
migrants who came from other regions in Brazil (Mizuno 1955: 31-32, 54, 81).
In short, both Registro and Bastos had a mixture of old and new migrants. Thus, the
length of communities’ history does not explain the different responses to Japan’s defeat
between them.

Shared Community Characteristics of Bastos and Registro in the Pre-war Era
1) Shared Japanese Cultural Values
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The prior studies assume that the shared Japanese cultural values were the major factor of
the phenomenon in question. Nevertheless, it is hardly determinable if and to what extent
Japanese migrants in Bastos and Registro were internalized such cultural values in the pre- and
during war period due to data limitation. As noted in the previous section, it is difficult to
observe inside people’s hearts and minds especially in the historical context. Certainly, both in
Bastos and Registro, Japanese migrants have annually commemorated Emperor’s birthday in the
pre-war period (see, Burajiru Jiho 1931, Registro Japanese Youth Federation 1933). Moreover,
residents in both communities participated in patriotic donation campaign to Japan (Burajiru
Jiho 1933, 1937).8 The prior studies take these and other nationalistic, somewhat ritualistic,
collective actions as manifestations of Japanese cultural values shared by the Japanese migrants
(Maeyama 1972, 1984, Negawa 2013: 95-110).
However, the exercise of the nationalistic collective actions does not automatically evince
participants’ voluntary engagement motivated by their own value-commitments. As discussed in
the previous chapter and I will show concrete instantiations in Bastos and Registro later, the
Japanese community organizations in the rural areas of São Paulo could exercise social control
over the members by sanctions because they regulated the access to club goods. While I do not
reject the possibility that the community members voluntarily participated in the nationalistic
collective actions, I cannot also reject the possibility that they reluctantly participated in them,
being afraid of potential sanctions — for instance, the exclusion from the enjoyment of
agricultural cooperative’s facilities and distribution network — if not participated. After all, we
should be cautious to view these collective actions in Japanese communities as the evidence of

8

In the case of Registro, even elementary school pupils were mobilized to the patriotic donation campaign (Registro
Japanese Youth Federation 1938a). Although I did not find a concrete evidence, it is highly plausible that school
pupils in Bastos were also mobilized to the donation campaign.
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cultural values shared by Japanese migrants. Rather, it is safe to understand them simply as the
evidence of institutionalized practices. By so doing, we can look at the organizational and
institutional foundations on which the community members enact those collective actions in
Bastos and Registro respectively.

2) Formation of Diasporic Exclave and the Constraints by the Brazilian Government
In regard to the organizational and institutional factors, the prior studies point out
specifically two aspects of community life that allegedly contributed to the events leading up to
the conflicts between deniers and accepters: the formation of diasporic exclave led by the
diasporic bureaucracy of the homeland, and constraints imposed by the Brazilian government on
the Japanese communities. These characteristics were present both in Bastos and Registro.
Both Bastos and Registro were typical diasporic exclaves. They were developed by semiofficial Japanese colonization companies as a part of diasporic bureaucracy.9 In both places, they
prepared basic infrastructures such as roads, clinics, agricultural facilities, and community
organizations, and gave technical and moral guidance through these community organizations
with subsidies from the Japanese Consulate General in São Paulo city (Matsumura 1922, Mizuno
1955: 20-24). Japanese migrants in both places could enjoy social and economic advantages
derived from the collective life of diasporic exclave.
For instance, as the agricultural cooperative of Bastos accommodated agricultural
facilities and distribution network, the members affiliated to the cooperative increased year by
year. It built cotton mill factories available to the members (Mizuno 1955: 61-63) and developed

9

Bastos by Burajiru Takushoku Kumiai (the Colonization Corporation of Brazil) and Registro by the Kaigai
Kougyou Kabushiki Kaisha (the Oversea Development Corporation).
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an export channel of cotton to Japan through the diasporic bureaucracy.10 When it was initially
founded in 1933, about a half of Japanese families in Bastos were affiliated. In 1939, however,
practically all the Japanese families had the membership to enjoy growing collective advantages
(Mizuno 1955: 67-68, 95). In addition to positive incentives, the community organizations in
Bastos also exercised negative sanctions. They sometimes expelled unruly residents from the
community when they found necessary (Mizuno 1955: 18, 47).
In a similar vein, the agricultural cooperatives in Registro grew as they provided club
goods to the community members. While the cooperative of Registro was established with 221
affiliated families in 1928, it was in poor shape due to weak agricultural production and poor
management until the mid-1930s. In 1937, the membership decreased to 85 families. Still, the
diasporic bureaucracy continued to support the Japanese farmers in Registro, providing
agricultural facilities and guidance to establish stable production bases (Crissiuma 1934: 113,
Vazami 2011: 27-30). As the farmers in Registro found a growing prospect in tea production in
the late 1930s, an agricultural cooperative, which developed the access to the broader Brazilian
domestic market as we will see later, grew strong and many Japanese farmers sought affiliation
with it to take advantage of club goods (Committee for Sixty Years History of Registro 1978: 8591, 101-106).11
Second, increasing constraints by Brazilian government affected both Bastos and
Registro in the same manner. Since 1937 when the full-fledged nationalist Estado Novo regime
was established, the Brazilian government strengthened the constraints over migrant
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Miyao, Atsushi (宮尾厚). “On Application for Licensed Quotas of Cotton (許可申請に関する件)”, October 14,
1940 (移 1 (D3), reel #45, MJE-NDL), Rocha, Eduardo Lusada. “Relatório sobre Alta-Paulista e Noroeste ao
Delegado de Ordem, Política e Social,” April 27, 1942 (Prontuário 8342 “Nipônismo,” vol.1, AP-ESP).
11
This agricultural cooperative named Cooperativo Agrícola de Cotia is different from the one formed in 1928. As
we will see later, it was initially formed in Cotia, a small town located in the outskirt of São Paulo city. During the
war period, it expanded its influence to set up a brunch in Registro.
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communities in addition to existing nationalization policies towards them. For instance, it banned
the teaching of foreign languages in 1938. Especially after Brazil broke diplomatic relations with
the Axis countries, its restrictive measures extended to many areas of activities: bans on ethnic
association; publications in foreign languages; meetings using foreign languages; political
discussion in the public space; travels without a pass; and moving without an advance notice to
the local authorities. However, these measures did not squash Japanese migrants’ associational
activities. As the prior studies point out, they were maintained as informal networks. In this
respect, agricultural cooperatives were the key. The Brazilian government allowed them to
operate while shutting other Japanese organizations because the government could not ignore the
agricultural production made by Japanese migrants (Taniguchi 2014).
Local Japanese communities used the agricultural cooperatives as a shield for their
associational activities. In Bastos, the leaders of the Japanese Association (Nihonjin-kai), which
was the decision-making body of the general community affairs, overlapped with those of the
agricultural cooperative in the pre-war period (Mita 1999: 95). After the Nihonjin-kai shut down
in 1938, the community’s social functions were concentrated in the agricultural cooperative.12
The first generation migrants who were in charge of community organizations officially
relegated their positions to the second-generation members who had Brazilian citizenship by
birth but practically continued to manage the cooperative’s activities behind them. While the
teaching of Japanese language to the children was prohibited, it was maintained as clandestine
classroom at night (Mizuno 1955: 270). Again, the situation in Registro was almost the same as
Bastos. The agricultural cooperative in Registro practically functioned as the center of
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“Relatório sobre Atividades Nipônicas no Município de Guararapes,” March 17, 1942 (Prontuário 8342
“Nipônismo”, vol.1, AP-ESP). See also, Mita 1999: 114-116.
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associational activities after the other community organizations shut down. Also, the teaching of
Japanese continued to be carried out in a clandestine form.13
In sum, Bastos and Registro shared organizational and institutional characteristics that the
prior studies claimed to cause the rise of Shindo Renmei and the intra-group conflicts. Both in
Bastos and Registro, a diasporic exclave was formed by the diasporic bureaucracy in the pre-war
period. Community organizations exercised social control over the members through the
provision of club goods represented by the access to distribution network of agricultural products
and agricultural facilities. While the Brazilian government strengthened constraints on their
activities, the informal networks helped to maintain a social cohesion among Japanese migrants
both in Bastos and Registro. They practiced collective actions mentioned above such as the
annual commemoration of Emperor’s birthday and patriotic donations under such an institutional
opportunity structure centered on the community organizations and informal networks.

3) Socioeconomic Differentiation and Contact Opportunities with the Native Brazilians
The class differentiation and contact opportunities with the native Brazilians were the two
conditions that the socioeconomic argument claims to produce the factional divide among the
Japanese migrants. Here again, Bastos and Registro indicated almost the same characteristics:
both communities had the class differentiation among Japanese residents; a small but sizable
portion of non-Japanese residents lived in both communities.
First, both Bastos and Registro had class differentiation in terms of land ownership. As
mentioned above, both communities were developed by colonization companies. Initially, they

13

“Agreements in the School Council Meeting (学校協議会長会議ニ於ケル申合),” c.1937. 102-14, Eiji
Matsumura collection (松村英治関係資料), MJE-NDL. See also, Fukasawa 2014: 155-156.
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planned to sell plots to independent Japanese farmers to maintain relatively equal social
relations. However, as they gradually developed, class differentiation became visible.
Early in 1933, four years after the establishment of Bastos, 104 out of 829 Japanese
families (13.1%) were renters and sharecroppers there (Mizuno 1955: 53). The proportion of
renters gradually grew as the cotton economy flourished in Bastos. Pushed by the cotton boom in
the 1930s, a sizable number of Japanese farmers switched from a polyculture farming in a selfowned plot to a monoculture farming of cotton in a leased plot to maximize a short-term profit
(Mizuno 1955: 63-64, Mita 1978: 43-44). The proportion of renters among the Japanese farmers
in Bastos grew to approximately 30% in 1941 (Mizuno 1955: 114).
Similar to Bastos, social class differentiation seemed to grow large in Registro. Although
the statistical data were not available, some studies suggest that when some of Japanese settlers
left Registro due to the economic stagnation by the mid 1930s, the remained farmers acquired
vacant plots. As the economic conditions recovered with the growth of tea production in the late
1930s, they started leasing the plots to those coming from other regions (Müller 1980: 50-57,
Hatanaka 2002: 84-85). A notable fact in this context is that only landowners could participate in
the meetings of community associations (Vazemi 2011: 40). In this respect, the social
discrepancy between the landowners and other lower status residents was more salient in
Registro than in Bastos.
Second, both Bastos and Registro had a limited but sizable portion of non-Japanese
residents. Although both communities were initially expected to be Japanese colonies par
excellence, it was practically impossible to exclude non-Japanese residents from the two places.
Native Brazilian merchants and agricultural workers who worked with or under the Japanese
farmers also lived there. Bastos had 2,034 (30.4%) Brazilians out of 6,696 total residents in 1935

87

(Mizuno 1955: 54). In contrast, Registro had 1,672 (35.1%) Brazilians out of 4,763 total
residents in 1938.14 Certainly, having Brazilian residents within the communities does not
automatically indicate frequent social interactions between Japanese and Brazilian residents. Nor
does it mean that all the Japanese residents had same frequency of contacts with the Brazilians.
The crucial point, however, is that only Bastos underwent the rise of Shindo Renmei and the
victory-defeat conflicts despite that both communities had more or less similar proportion of
Brazilian residents.

Table 2-2: Occurrence of Conflicts between Deniers and Accepters and Local Community
Characteristics of Bastos and Registro
Shindo Renmei’s influence and the conflicts between
deniers and accepters
Demographic composition of old and new migrants
Cultural
argument

Bastos

Registro

+

-

Mixture of old and new migrants

Shared cultural values

Pre-war diasporic
Community
bureaucracy
characteristics
that the prior Organizational Brazilian government’s
restriction on migrants’
studies
argument
activities
claimed as the
causes of the
Development of informal
intra-group
networks
conflicts
Class differentiation
Socioeconomic
Contact opportunity with
argument
native Brazilians

Directly unobservable
+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

Table 2-2 summarizes the presence and absence of community characteristics of Bastos
and Registro that the existent historiographies pose as the causes. All in all, they shared all the
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“The Overview of Iguape Colony at the End of 1938 (昭和一三年末現在イグアペ植民地一般情勢一覧表),”
財 0015-03650, NAJ.
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community characteristics that the prior studies claim caused the rise of Shindo Renmei and the
intra-group conflicts between accepters and deniers. Notwithstanding, it was only in Bastos that
some residents were mobilized by Shindo Renmei and the conflicts broke out. It was not the case
that Shindo Renmei activists were not interested in Registro which was located in a periphery of
São Paulo state. They came to Registro to establish a branch. In addition, some residents in
Registro actually believed Japan’s victory. Nonetheless, Shindo Renmei activists failed to
organize Japanese residents there. Now, I will turn my focus to the different trajectories of
economic development and their effects on the social organizations in Bastos and Registro.

Changing Economic Basis Vis-à-vis Organizational Basis in Bastos and Registro
1) Bastos: Rapid Erosion of Exclave Economy and Its Effect on the Legitimacy of Agricultural
Cooperative
In the 1930s, Bastos was known for its cotton production. However, it underwent
unstable economic times once the cotton production declined. The rise and fall of economic
prosperity of Bastos was highly susceptible to the changing Brazilian and Japanese developments
within the international state system.
Initially, the colonization company in Bastos planned to cultivate coffee as the major
product of Bastos.15 However, the São Paulo government prohibited new coffee crops to stabilize
coffee price in the international market in 1932. At the same time, Japan started seeking cotton
import from Brazil during the same period. As a result, the colonization company in Bastos
guided the Japanese farmers to cultivate cotton as the main agricultural product (Mizuno 1955:
61-64). Figure 2-2 represents cotton production in Bastos. In 1930, Bastos produced about
15

Journal of Federation of Overseas Emigrant Cooperatives (海外移住組合連合会誌), no.2, Ohno Rokuichirou
collection (大野緑一郎関係文書), reel R84, MJE-NDL.
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66,000kg of cotton. The amount of cotton production rapidly grew. In 1939, Bastos produced
approximately 8,597,000kg, which was about 130 times more than in 1930. Moreover, its value
share in the entire community revenue was significantly high. During the late 1930s, over 70%
of total revenue of Bastos came from cotton sales.

Figure 2-2: Cotton Production in Bastos, 1930-1946

Sources: Staff Office of GAT Movement 1936: 5, 1937: 6-7, 1938: 8-9, 1939: 8, 1941: 12-15,
Mizuno 1955: 61-63, 132, 142.
* Data are missing in 1942 and 1943.

However, the economic development of Bastos declined rapidly in the 1940s. Especially
after the Japanese diasporic bureaucracy retreated from Brazil in 1942, the Japanese cotton
producers suddenly lost the major buyer of the cotton.16 They found silk as the major substituting
product. Farmers did not need large-scale investments to switch from cotton to silk production.
Moreover, the breakout of the Pacific War helped the development of silk industry in Bastos.

16

There was also an agri-engineering reason. Soil fertility diminished significantly in the late 1930s. It was
suggested by the decline of cotton yield per an acreage. Despite the increase in the net amount of cotton production,
its per unit yield decreased 42% from 1935 to 1941 (Mizuno 1955: 63, 110).
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The price of Brazilian silk in the international market increased significantly because the silk
supply from Japan, which was the then largest supplier in the world (Ma 1996), suddenly
stopped. Figure 2-3 represents silk production in Bastos. In 1939, the Japanese migrants in
Bastos produced about 44,000kg of raw silk. In 1946, the amount increased to about 870,000kg,
which was 20 times more than in 1941. Nevertheless, it was not the case that the silk industry
sustained Bastos’s economic development in a constant manner. Immediately after the Pacific
War, news about the return of Japanese silk to the international market made the price of
Brazilian silk fall sharply (Mizuo 1955: 130-131). Bastos underwent a serious economic
downturn with the overproduction of quasi-unmarketable silk.

Figure 2-3: Silk Production in Bastos, 1939-1949

Sources: Mizuno 1955: 110, 132.
* Data are missing in 1942 and 1943.

These shifts in the economic conditions destabilized the legitimacy of the agricultural
cooperative in Bastos. When the economy was in a good shape, the agricultural cooperative
could maintain its legitimacy over the community members because it was capable of providing
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them club goods, especially the access to the distribution network of agricultural products,
exclusion from which could deteriorate their economic stability. Even during the war period, it
successfully kept the Japanese migrants out of the influence of nationalistic secret societies,
backed by the growing prosperity of silk production. For instance, some Japanese farmers in
Bastos formed a secret society named the Association of Imperial Rule Assistance (Taisei
Yokusan Doushi-kai) around 1942. In response, the leaders of the agricultural cooperative fired
11 employees who were affiliated with the Association and expelled its leaders from Bastos.
With the intervention of the agricultural cooperative using the threat of exclusion from the
enjoyment of club goods, the residents of Bastos got back to normal (Mizuno 1955: 118-120).
At the same time, however, the cohesion among the community members sustained by
the legitimacy of the agricultural cooperative started dissolving as the economic conditions
fluctuated in the late 1930s. The agricultural cooperative increasingly became incapable to
provide the members club goods, especially the access to distribution network of agricultural
products, which underwrote the agricultural cooperatives’ legitimacy over them. First, due to the
decline of cotton production, about 25% of the Japanese settlers left Bastos by 1941 (Mita 1999:
118). Second, the agricultural cooperative failed to prevent the members to sell cotton apart from
its distribution network. And third, Japanese farmers started withdrawing their deposits from the
banking department of the agricultural cooperative due to credit instability (Mizuno 1955: 123124). While the rise of silk industry temporarily halted this tendency, the fall of silk price in the
immediate aftermath of the war decisively damaged the legitimacy of the agricultural
cooperative.17 The agricultural cooperative in Bastos had to lay off its employees in a large scale.

17

In addition, an additional investment in the silk industry by the agricultural cooperative of Bastos during the war
period exaggerated its financial crisis in the immediate aftermath of the war. In 1944, the agricultural cooperative,
backed by the booming silk production, started building a new silk factory, raising investments from its members.
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In addition, due to the financial stringency, it became unable to pay the affiliated farmers in time
for their silk delivery. In the end, a substantial number of members withdrew from the
agricultural cooperative (Mizuno, 1955: 132-137). The intra-group conflicts between deniers and
accepters among the community members occurred in this context.

2) Registro: A Gradual Transition from Diasporic Exclave to Settlement Enclave
In contrast to Bastos that found its major economic basis in cotton production, Registro
failed to develop competitive agricultural products during its early years. Thus, it had to seek
alternative products that would sustain its economic basis and eventually developed a variegated
polyculture production system that cultivates multiple agricultural products by the late 1930s.
While the development of polyculture economy was contingent upon its agri-geographical
conditions rather than deliberately planned by the agricultural cooperative in Registro, this
unintended development kept Registro from the damaging impact of the sudden retreat of the
Japanese diasporic bureaucracy on its economic life and also helped its agricultural cooperative
to sustain its legitimacy over the members, further developing its distribution network of
agricultural products penetrating into the Brazilian domestic market.
Registro is located in a humid forest area by the Ribeira de Iguape river. When a
colonization company formed the community of Japanese migrants in Registro in 1916, it had a
plan to harvest rice crops as the main product securing the community’s economic foundation.
However, the agri-engineering and geographical conditions of Registro prevented its steady
growth. While Registro region was known for rice production long before the settlement of
Japanese migrants, the Japanese migrants soon found that the specific geographical location of

However, the sudden fall of silk price after the war made the agricultural cooperative impossible to recompense the
investments (Mizuno 1955: 124-125).
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Japanese community that the colonization company purchased was not ideally suited for rice
production. In addition, they also found that rice production made lower profits than initially
expected. First, there was no rice mill plant until 1922. The Japanese farmers in Registro had to
rely on Brazilian mills outside the community by paying additional costs. Second, the market
demand for rice was not sufficiently developed in Brazil. As a result, they had to seek alternative
products that would supplement rice production (Committee for Sixty Years History of Registro
1978: 56-59, Vazemi 2011: 34-35).
One of such alternative products was coffee. The colonization company initially hesitated
to cultivate coffee because the humid climate of Registro was not suitable for coffee cultivation.
However, as it became clear that rice production would not be able to sustain community’s
economy, it started encouraging coffee production for the Japanese farmers by calling on an
agricultural engineer from Japan in 1922. In the early 1930s, a large majority of Japanese
farmers cultivated coffee as the main product (Handa 1970: 354). However, as time went by, it
became evident that the coffee quality in Registro was inferior to that of northwestern hinterland.
The coffee production gradually went obsolete in the middle of 1930s. As mentioned earlier, a
large portion of Japanese migrants left Registro by this period.
In the late 1930s, tea production gradually grew as a major competitive product in
Registro. The colonization company also made a large investment to encourage tea production.
With the growth of tea industry, Japanese migrants who had once settled in the northwestern
hinterland started to resettle in Registro since the late 1930s. Eventually, tea production became a
leading agricultural industry during the war period. However, the tea production did not
dominate Registro’s economy.18 Threatened by unsuccessful commercialization of rice and

18

In the post-war period, the tea production became a leading but one of multiple agricultural products in Registro.
In 1962, tea accounted 60% of total agricultural revenue in Registro (Executive Committee for Fifty Years

94

coffee until the early 1930s, the Japanese farmers have spontaneously pursued polyculture
production in the pre-war period.

Figure 2-4: Agricultural Revenues in Registro, 1931-1938

Sources: Burajiru Jiho Sha 1933: 27, Registro Japanese Youth Federation 1933b: 27, Oversea
Development Cooperation (海外興業株式会社). c.1937. “The Overview of Iguape Colony at the
End of 1936” (財0015-03650, NAJ), Oversea Development Cooperation. c.1939. “The Overview
of Iguape Colony at the End of 1938” (財0015-03650, NAJ).
* Data are missing in 1932, 1934, 1935, and 1937.

Figure 2-4 represents agricultural revenue in Registro in the 1930s. Although data on
multiple years are missing in the figure, it roughly indicates the general tendency of agricultural
productions there. Whereas cotton accounted nearly 80% of Bastos’s revenue in the late 1930s,
there was not such dominant product in Registro during the same period. Certainly, tea
production was growing. However, it accounted 30% of the total agricultural revenue in 1936

Commemoration Festival of Registro Colony (レヂストロ植民地開設五拾年祭祭典実行委員会), ed. 1963.
Overview on the Current Registro County (レヂストロ郡現勢概覧). Registro: s.n. Available at VE801-575, MJENDL).
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and 25% in 1938. Another notable feature in Registro was the sizable share of “other” category
in the agricultural revenue. It included a variety of vegetables and fruits shipping for the
Brazilian domestic market. They accounted 36% of the total revenue in 1938. In short, after
failing to form a monocultural economy centered on rice and coffee productions, Registro has
developed a polyculture farming system with the growing tea production in the late 1930s.
Social organization of the Japanese migrants in Registro has developed against these
economic backgrounds. Registro’s economic trajectory different from Bastos minimized the
damaging impact of the retreat of the Japanese diasporic bureaucracy. Whereas the retreat
exposed Bastos to the economic instability, it rather facilitated Registro’s economy to penetrate
into the Brazilian domestic market through the extended connection with another Japanese
agricultural cooperative.
When the Japanese migrants suffered from economic stagnation in the 1920s and 30s, the
colonization company supported their search for alternative products. It encouraged the farmers
to organize the agricultural cooperative and also provided facilities and technical guidance to
them. When the Japanese diasporic bureaucracy left Brazil, the agricultural association in
Registro was once shut down as the Brazilian authorities regarded it as a part of the Japanese
diasporic bureaucracy (Committee for Sixty Years History of Registro 1978: 85-91). However,
another agricultural cooperative, which was initially formed in Cotia, a small town in the outskirt
of São Paulo city (see, Appendix C), took over most of functions that the original agricultural
cooperative had played and kept organizing the Japanese migrants in Registro. This
organizational transition occurred because of the retreat of Japanese diasporic bureaucracy.
In the pre-war period, the Japanese diasporic bureaucracy demanded Japanese
agricultural cooperatives not to extend the activities beyond their own communities to avoid
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potential competition between them. However, once the diasporic bureaucracy retreated from
Brazil, such restrictions were practically abandoned. As a result, the agricultural cooperative in
Cotia, which had a strong distribution network connected to São Paulo city, started expanding its
activities to other neighboring Japanese communities. On the other hand, the Japanese farmers in
Registro needed the distribution network to the market after the colonization company left the
community. In addition, the agricultural cooperative of Cotia as an organization officially
accredited under the Brazilian labor law had access to essential materials such as gasoline and
fertilizers controlled under the war-time rationing regime. In sum, the agricultural cooperative of
Cotia could provide the access to essential club goods to the farmers in Registro. During the war
period, over 300 Japanese families in Registro were affiliated with it (Andoh 1959: 145-146,
Committee for Sixty Years History of Registro 1978: 101-102, 106). Within these economic and
organizational contexts, the Japanese migrants in Registro saw the end of the war.

Conflicts between Deniers and Accepters in Bastos and Registro and Their Aftermath
Escalation of Conflicts in Bastos and Latent Conflicts in Registro
On August 15, 1945, Japan declared its defeat in the Pacific War. The news soon spread
among the Japanese migrants in Brazil. However, they did not accept it immediately. Some of
them formed secret societies and kept claiming that Japan had won the war. The agricultural
cooperatives in Bastos and Registro notified the news of Japan’s defeat to the residents. In this
respect, they had contrasting reactions from community members respectively.
In Bastos, the agricultural cooperative attempted to calm down the residents. On August
15, Ikuta Mizobe, a managing director of the agricultural cooperative, immediately circulated
pamphlets to the neighborhood leaders with his signature, that informed the Japanese defeat and
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requested the Japanese residents in Bastos to “avoid any thoughtless behavior” (quoted in Neves
1960: 361). Ten days after the circulation of the pamphlet, a secretary of the agricultural
cooperative wrote to Mizobe as follows in reporting community members’ responses to the
pamphlet:
There is no Japanese who did not wish and believe in Japan’s victory. We also have
patriotic feeling as strong as any other Japanese. But we are, by mistake, treated as antipatriots. If it was a personal criticism, it would be still acceptable. But there is no reason
to be criticized in the name of the agricultural cooperative. […] I am trying to avoid
antagonism, but the situation is, instead of getting better, is deteriorating and unbearable
(quoted in Mita 1999: 163).
This report suggests two things. First, it is not the fact that the leaders of the agricultural
cooperative were not patriotic to Japan and readily accepted its defeat for that reason. Their
patriotic feeling towards the homeland was compatible with the acceptance of the defeat. This
fact casts doubt on the existent cultural explanation that equates Japanese nationalistic values
with the denial of the defeat.
Second, the agricultural cooperative failed to control those who did not believe the defeat
by its enforceable authority. Rather, the antagonism between accepters and deniers ran deep in
Bastos. This contrasted with the successful suppression of the ultra-nationalistic group during the
war. As discussed above, the agricultural cooperative prevented the spreading influence of a
secret society named the Association of Imperial Rule Assistance by expelling its associates
from Bastos during the war period. In the aftermath of the war, in contrast, the agricultural
cooperative in Bastos could not calm down the tension within the community. Due to the crisis
of its agricultural economy immediately after the war, it was unable to control members anymore
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neither by benefits derived from club goods nor by threats of exclusion from their enjoyment.
Instead, Shindo Renmei gradually expanded its influence over the community members and
consolidated the community members who did not accepted Japan’s defeat in Bastos.
Since the first pamphlet did not convince residents to accept the defeat, the leaders of the
agricultural cooperative once again circulated another pamphlet with copies of Imperial Rescript
of Surrender in October 1945. The pamphlet was signed by old leaders in São Paulo city who
had had direct relationship with the Japanese diasporic bureaucracy and employed the Emperor’s
authority to legitimize their announcement of Japan’s defeat. The pamphlet cited a message from
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan:
The imperial government and subjects decided to face such an extremely difficult
situation with the dignity of Japanese nation by respectfully accepting the Emperor’s
venerable wish addressed in the rescript on 14th August. We homeland government and
nation who share the same feelings with you greatly expect our compatriots overseas to
share the same decision that we made.19
However, this pamphlet caused hardened suspicion and resentment for deniers influenced by
Shindo Renmei rather than changing their attitude. Agitators of Shindo Renmei claimed that the
pamphlet was fake, fabricated by unfaithful and anti-patriotic accepters (Mizuno 1955: 155). By
this time, the antagonism between deniers and accepters has been already entrenched. Since early
1946, activities of Shindo Renmei became openly active. They sent multiple blackmail letters to
the leaders of accepters in the agricultural cooperative. In March 1946, a small group of Shindo
Renmei members assassinated Mizobe, the managing director of the agricultural cooperative
who circulated the initial pamphlet informing Japan’s defeat. The following April, they sent
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“Memorandum for the Announcement of the End of War (終戦事情伝達趣意書)” c.1945. MHIJB.
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bombs to several accepters and injured them (Mizuno 1955: 156-157). The agricultural
cooperative could not prevent the escalation of violent conflicts in Bastos.
In contrast to Bastos, historical records about the development of intra-group conflicts
between accepters and deniers are limited in Registro. However, some evidences suggest that
some community members believed Japan’s victory personally, and also activists of Shindo
Renmei visited there to mobilize the Japanese residents. An old Japanese migrant in Registro
recalled that he met a second-generation Brazilian Nikkei acquaintance in the immediate
aftermath of the war: “He was in military uniform and found us. He saluted us, saying ‘now I
came back from the Italian campaign.’ I was really happy to see him back alive. […] But in those
days, I believed in my own mind that Japan had actually won the war” (quoted in Fukazawa
2014: 156). Another Japanese migrant remembered, “guys from Shindo Renmei came to Sete
Barras and Quilombo [peripheral districts of larger Registro] to establish the branches. But they
failed to close the deal” (quoted in Fukazawa 2014: 157). Unlike Bastos, some Japanese
migrants’ beliefs in the victory of Japan and the mobilization efforts by Shindo Renmei did not
culminate into the violent conflicts between deniers and accepters in Registro. The conflicts
remained latent.
A noticeable difference between Registro and Bastos is residents’ response to the
pamphlet that informed Japan’s defeat. In Registro, the agricultural cooperative of Cotia, which
strengthened its influence over Japanese farmers during the war period, provided community
members the same pamphlet that was circulated in October 1945 in Bastos (Andoh 1959: 166167, Miyao 2003: 62). Unlike Bastos, however, there was no explicit repercussion against the
leaders of the agricultural cooperative. As suggested above, some residents must not trust the
pamphlet. However, they neither showed their thoughts openly in the public nor were mobilized
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by ultra-nationalistic secret societies such as Shindo Renmei. In contrast to Bastos where the
agricultural cooperative’s legitimacy and control over the members was largely undermined as it
became unable to deliver club goods to them the after the war, the agricultural cooperative in
Registro sustained its enforceable authority over the members as it could guarantee the access to
its distribution network connected to the broader Brazilian domestic market.

Two Pathways of Incorporation into the Brazilian Society in the Aftermath of the Conflicts
The conflicts between deniers and accepters among Japanese migrants marked the
dissolution of Japanese diasporic exclaves in Brazil. By the mid-1950s, the conflicts were
gradually settled by the interventions of Brazilian police. Since then, the Japanese migrants
started following two major pathways: the transition from diasporic exclave to settlement
enclave; and the process of individual-based assimilation.
As we have seen, the transition from a diasporic exclave to a settlement enclave already
started in the pre-and during-war years in Registro. Bastos also followed this transition process
after the conflicts calmed down. Japanese migrants in Bastos reorganized agricultural
cooperative centered on egg farming. They started developing sales networks penetrating into the
Brazilian domestic market (Mizuno 1955: 149-151). In both places, the Japanese migrants sought
an upwardly mobile pathway, making the most of the collective advantages of ethnic networks
and associations (Yasuda 1969, Makabe 1999, Taniguchi 2014).
In parallel with the transition from a diasporic exclave from a settlement enclave, some
Japanese migrants started following an individual-based assimilation process as well. In the
1950s, a considerable number of Japanese migrants in the rural areas started moving to urban
centers, especially São Paulo city. While the proportion of Japanese migrants living in São Paulo
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city had never exceeded 10% until the end of the war, it increased to 24% in 1958 (Census
Committee for the Japanese Migrants in Brazil 1964, vol.2: 6, 426-427). They sent their children
to Brazilian educational institutions and helped them to incorporate into the mainstream middleclass (Maeyama 1973, 1990). Those in the rural regions also pursued the individual-based
assimilation. Especially, successful farmers developed their own distribution network and did not
necessitate that of agricultural cooperatives anymore. In the pre-war period, as we saw in the
cases of Bastos and Registro above, almost all Japanese farmers had affiliation in Japanese
associations. However, those affiliated with the associations decreased to 41% among
agriculturalists and 31% among non-agriculturalists in 1958 (Census Committee for the Japanese
Migrants in Brazil 1964, vol.2: 314, Cardoso 1995: 126).
Even in Registro, where the agricultural cooperative once played a significant role to
expand the distribution network connected to the broader Brazilian domestic market, the
membership of agricultural cooperative declined as farmers eventually developed their own
distribution network. In the mid-1970s, the number of memberships in the agricultural
cooperative of Cotia decreased to one third of that in the war period (Committee for Sixty Years
History of Registro 1978: 106).
Also in Bastos, the memberships in agricultural cooperatives declined. The direct cause
of the decline is the hyperinflation in the 1980s. The agricultural cooperatives in Bastos could
not financially sustain themselves (Committee for Eighty Years History of Bastos 2010: 151153). Since then, the activities of agricultural cooperatives have never recovered to the former
level. I did not systematically study the social background of this decline of agricultural
cooperatives in Bastos after the hyperinflation. Yet, a story of a successful egg farmer, Yasuo,
suggests growing disadvantages, rather than advantages, of agricultural cooperative especially
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for successful farmers.20 Yasuo’s family has been running poultry farming since his
grandfather’s generation. When his grandfather started the business in the early 1950s, he joined
an agricultural cooperative. However, when Yasuo took over the family business, he left the
agricultural cooperative. Yasuo told me:
When the business was still small, the agricultural cooperative gave us advantages. It
guaranteed us stability in purchase [of chicks and feedstuff] and sales [of eggs]. But when
the business grew large and when we could develop sales routes by ourselves, the
membership in the agricultural cooperative became more of burden than benefit, such as
a commission to the cooperative. Also, when other farmers are not doing good, the
cooperative covers their debts and even jeopardizes our business in the end.
Yasuo still holds membership in a Japanese cultural association in Bastos. However, he told me
that he was feeling bothersome to participate in its activities.
In the long-run, Japanese migrants and their descendants in Bastos and Registro are
incorporated into the Brazilian society. Ironically, club goods of the agricultural cooperatives
deriving from the group cohesion diminished as individual members made a successful
socioeconomic advancement in both places.21 In this respect, the self-interest hypothesis of
migrant transnationalism holds true (Portes 2001, Alba and Nee 2003, Waldinger 2015).
However, Bastos and Registro followed two different paths to reach to the same point in the
migrant assimilation process. Bastos, which underwent a rapid transition with a structural
disjuncture between economic and organizational bases, went through the violent conflicts

20

I visited Bastos in June 2017 and had opportunities to listen to his and other Japanese farmers’ life histories.
In this respect, Ostergren documented a parallel decline of transnational ties in the case of highly intensive
Swedish immigrant community in Minnesota in the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Ostergren 1988). According
to his account, the transnational ties started declining when the urbanization process, especially new economic
opportunities opened up by the railroads connecting to the outside of the community, penetrated into the community.
21
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among the community members whereas Registro, which made a gradual transition to settlement
enclave, prevented such violent conflicts.

Conclusion
The intra-group conflicts among Japanese migrants between deniers and accepters
occurred in the aftermath of the Pacific War. To explain these violent conflicts, the prior studies
offer the three interrelated arguments: cultural, organizational, and socioeconomic. However,
they tend to merge the cultural factor with other factors and overgeneralize the impact of cultural
factors in the rise of ultra-nationalistic secret societies represented by Shindo Renmei and the
intra-group conflicts between deniers and accepters among Japanese migrants. As a result, they
failed to explain the local variations of the conflicts. This deficit becomes clear when comparing
the two Japanese communities: Bastos and Registro. Bastos and Registro shared the community
characteristics that the prior studies claimed as the causes of the conflicts. Despite these shared
characteristics, Shindo Renmei succeeded to mobilize Japanese migrants and eventually the
intra-group conflicts broke out in Bastos whereas Shindo Renmei failed to do so and the violent
conflicts did not occur in Registro.
A significant difference between the two communities was their socioeconomic
conditions in the pre-war period. In particular, communities’ reliance on the exclave economy
matters to the subsequent dissolution of diasporic exclave in the two places: Bastos underwent a
rapid dissolution of diasporic exclave whereas Registro experienced a gradual transition from
diasporic exclave to settlement enclave.
Both Bastos and Registro maintained intensive diasporic exclaves in the pre-war period,
supported by the Japanese diasporic bureaucracy. However, the sudden retreat of the diasporic
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bureaucracy affected the two communities differently. While the retreat destabilized Bastos’
exclave economy that relied on cotton export to Japan, it did not negatively affect Registro’s
economy because Registro developed a variegated economy oriented towards the broader
Brazilian domestic market. Correspondingly, the legitimacy of agricultural cooperatives over the
community members, which was largely derived from its capacity to provide the community
members club goods best represented by the access to the distribution network of agricultural
products, declined in Bastos whereas it was sustained in Registro. When the news of Japan’s
defeat reached both communities, the agricultural cooperative in Bastos failed to keep the
community members from the influence of Shindo Renmei’s mobilization. The agricultural
cooperative in Registro, in contrast, succeeded.
The Japanese diasporic exclaves started dissolving when the diasporic bureaucracy
retreated from Brazil. After the conflicts between deniers and accepters were settled to a large
extent, they started moving to urban centers and pursuing an upwardly mobile incorporation into
the Brazilian mainstream. Even those who stayed in the countryside lost pressing interests in
ethnic associational activities as they achieved socio-economic success. In the long run, the
Japanese migrants’ interests shifted from the homeland to the host society. However, two
different unfolding processes of the intra-group conflicts in Bastos and Registro indicate that
there are multiple pathways leading to a same point in the process of migrant incorporation,
depending on the contextual configuration preceding to the dissolution of diasporic exclave.
Bastos, which experienced a rapid erosion of its diasporic exclave, had to pay a big price in the
form of violent conflicts whereas Registro, which made a gradual transition to settlement
enclave, escaped this fate.
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CHAPTER 3
UPWARDLY MOBILE RETURN AND OTHER PATHWAYS INTO EARLY ADULTHOOD:
DIVERGENT LIFE TRAJECTORIES OF YOUNG BRAZILIAN NIKKEIS IN
CONTEMPORARY JAPAN
Chapter Summary
This chapter analyzes the divergent life trajectories of four Japanese Brazilian youths in Japan.
Their pathways to early adulthood diverged including a shallow slope incorporation into the
working-class life in Japan and an upwardly mobile return to Brazil. The prior theoretical
perspectives – migrant transnationalism, institutionalism, and cultural approaches – cannot fully
explicate such divergent trajectories. One shortcoming is the static understanding of their agency.
I argue that the school contexts and the migrant bargain channel the development of Nikkei youths’
agency conceptualized as the dynamic relationship between their social belonging and possible
self. Their agency in turn provides a decision framework for the choices ahead and their pathways
diverge in the transition to early adulthood.
Introduction
Yukari, Taina, Stella, and João were the children of Brazilian Nikkei ethnic return
migrants in Japan. They share most socioeconomic and family backgrounds: all of their parents
work in an unstable labor sector and are not fluent in Japanese. Nonetheless, their pathways into
early adulthood widely diverged (see Figure 3-1). Yukari is an upwardly mobile bicultural
striver. She started her school career at a Brazilian school but switched to the Japanese school
system and is now a college student in Japan. Taina is a transnational straight-arrow, whose
constant enrollment in the Brazilian school helped her to pursue an upwardly mobile return to
Brazil. Both Stella and João switched from Japanese to Brazilian schools in childhood.
Nevertheless, their pathways to early adulthood diverged. Stella is a transnational secondchancer, whose factory experience made her seek an upwardly mobile return to Brazil. João is a
bicultural shallow-sloper (Smith 2008), who holds a modest job at a factory in Japan.
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Figure 3-1: Divergent Life Trajectories of the Four Nikkei Youths in Japan

Most theories of immigrant assimilation presume migrants arrive at a destination country
with a sojourner mentality but gradually assimilate themselves into the host society. However,
the story may deviate from this typical assimilation pattern when the sojourner mentality finds an
institutional anchor that connects it to the homelands. In this respect, Brazilian Nikkeis in Japan
are a prominent case because Brazilian schools work as such an institutional anchor that helps
them to retain the transnational engagement with the homeland, and create the possibility of
upward mobile return migration to Brazil among the children of Nikkei raised in Japan.1 Those
schools were initially formed by Brazilian Nikkei parents’ initiatives in the mid-1990s in the
regions where they are concentrated such as the Tokai region (see Appendix A). Since the early
2000s, the Brazilian government started accrediting them under the Brazilian educational system.

1

Brazilian Nikkeis in Japan are also a case of ethnic return migration (Joppke 2005, Tsuda 2009). Although the
Japanese immigration regime treats them as Japanese descendants and offers a special residential visa status, they
are culturally Brazilian (Tsuda 2003).
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Some Brazilian Nikkei parents send their children to Brazilian schools in Japan in hoping
eventual return to Brazil. Yet the story does not end here. As João’s case demonstrates, not all
graduates of Brazilian schools in Japan return to Brazil but a sizable portion of them stay in
Japan. In addition, there are Brazilian Nikkei youths who are enrolled in Japanese schools like
Yukari. In sum, the Nikkei youths in Japan demonstrate a wide range of life trajectories
including a shallow slope incorporation into the working-class life in Japan and an upwardly
mobile return to Brazil. How does the upwardly mobile return to Brazil grow to be a practically
achievable option to young Brazilian Nikkeis in Japan? Why it is feasible for some youths and
not for others? What make some Nikkei youths choose to settle in Japan? More broadly, what
mechanisms diversify their life trajectories: some more transnational whereas others more
incorporative? I argue that we can understand these divergent life paths by examining how the
school context, the migrant bargain, and migrant youths’ agency interact and shape their choices
ahead to early adulthood.
The case of Nikkei youths in Japan may be exceptional in that few migrant groups have
an exclave institution connected to the sending country (Heisler 1984, 1985) such as Brazilian
schools, and only a minority of Nikkei youths is enrolled in Brazilian schools in Japan.2
Nevertheless, the Nikkei case is strategic and sociologically important for analyzing migrant
youths’ diverging life trajectories for two reasons. First, it offers an upwardly mobile return
pathway to the homelands that some Nikkei youths actually takes. This social mobility pattern
has not been documented in the existent literature on the second-generation migrants that focuses

2

There were 72 Brazilian schools with roughly 4,700 students in Japan (Kojima 2013: 93, Li and Shibuya 2015: 51)
in 2011. In contrast, the Japanese National Census of 2010 registered 27,233 Brazilians in the 5-19 years old range.
Given these numbers, it is estimated that about 18% of Brazilian youths in Japan are enrolled in Brazilian schools.
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on their socioeconomic mobility only within the host societies.3 Second, in addition to the
upwardly mobile return pathway, young Brazilian Nikkeis in Japan demonstrate various patterns
of social mobility including a shallow slope incorporation into the working-class life in Japan
and an upwardly mobile incorporation into the Japanese mainstream. Given these wide variations
of life pathways into early adulthood, none of prior theoretical perspectives systematically
explain them. Guided by the gap between the prior theoretical predictions and empirical reality
of Brazilian youths in Japan, this chapter elaborates the micro-agency side of the interactive
process approach to migrant transnationalism. It underscores interactions between the school
context, the migrant bargain, and the Nikkei youths’ agency defined as the dynamic relationship
between their social belonging and possible self. The Nikkei youths in Japan develop varying
social belonging, interacting with the school context and the migrant bargain. As they progress
through adolescence, their social belonging guides their decisions in relation to multiple possible
selves ahead to early adulthood. As a result, their pathways diverge widely.
Based on biographical and comparative analytical logics (Heimer 2001, Smith 2014), this
chapter compares four Nikkei youths’ life trajectories – Taina, Yukari, Stella, and João – in order
to make sense of their varied trajectories. I organize them into two sets of paired comparison:
Taina and Yukari, and Stella and João. My case analyses follow two steps. First, the comparison
of Taina and Yukari mainly analyzes the impact of different school context between Japanese
and Brazilian schools and the migrant bargain consistent with each school context on the
development of their agency. The school difference, however, does not fully explain crossborder divergence of Brazilian school graduates’ pathways. Second, the comparison of Stella and

3

To name a few, Portes and Rumbaut 2001, Suárez-Orozco and Suárez-Orozco 2001, Kasinitz et al. 2002, SuárezOrozco, Suárez-Orozco, and Todorova. 2008, Telles, Ortiz, and Moore 2009, Louie 2012, Crul, Schneider, and Lelie
2012, Lee and Zhou 2015, and Gonzales 2016.
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João analyzes how different migrant bargains affect their agency within the same Brazilian
school context.
In the following pages, first, I examine the fit between the prior theories on assimilation
and transnationalism of the second-generation migrants and the case of Nikkei youths in Japan.
Second, I sketch out how school context sorts the Nikkei youths into different social mobility
tracks and how the migrant bargain affects the development of their social belonging. And third,
I show how their agency guides the decisions leading up to early adulthood by analyzing the four
Nikkei youths’ life trajectories.

The Nikkei Youths in Japan as an Inconvenient Key Case for Theories of Assimilation and
Transnationalism
To understand migrant youths’ diverging pathways, there are three influential theoretical
approaches: migrant transnationalism, and institutionalism, and neo-cultural approaches. The
prior studies have heatedly debated about the second-generation migrants’ incorporation paths
into host societies on the one hand and their engagement with cross-border practices on the other.
However, it is uncommon that the two branches of research have a theoretical dialogue with each
other. A unique characteristic of Nikkei youths in Japan is that they demonstrate a wide variety
of life trajectories ranging from the incorporation into Japanese society to the cross-border return
to Brazil. Below I examine how the three existent perspectives fail to explain these divergences
and demonstrate how my interactive process framework can do so in the next section.

1) Migrant Transnationalism
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Studies on migrant transnationalism have discussed the inter-generational succession of
transnational ties with the homelands. Major studies document that migrants’ cross-border ties
decline as the center of their social networks shift from the homelands to the host societies over
time, and thus they are barely transmitted to the subsequent generations (Portes 2001, Kasinitz et
al. 2002, Levitt and Waters 2002, Rumbaut 2002, Alba and Nee 2003, Waldinger 2015). This
tendency is consistent with Yukari and João’s settlement pathways among the four primary cases
of this study. However, the general decline of transnational ties among the second generation
migrants does not account for why some young Nikkeis like Taina and Stella choose a return
pathway to Brazil despite that they have spent almost their entire lives in Japan.

2) Institutionalism
First, institutionalist argument draws attention to the effect of institutional contexts such
as schooling system and labor market on their incorporation pattern (Faist 1995, Crul and
Vermeulen 2003, Crul and Schneider 2010, Crul 2013, Alba and Foner 2015). Second, it also
points to the effect of coethnic associations on their transnational ties. Building on the notion of
institutional completeness (Breton 1964), it argues that the children of migrants are more likely
to engage in transnational practices when they contain themselves in coethnic associations such
as ethnic schools (Levitt 2002, Brubaker et al. 2006: ch.9, Kim 2016: ch.2). In sum,
institutionalism underlines the effect of institutional contexts on migrant children’s life
trajectories and explain their transnational ties as well.
Institutionalism may explain the general bifurcating patterns between Brazilian Nikkei
youths in different school systems: Japanese and Brazilian schools. Brazilian schools in Japan
institutionally cultivate an upwardly mobile return option for their students by preparing them for
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higher education in Brazil (Haino 2005, Kojima 2013, LeBaron von Baeyer 2015: ch.5,
Yamamoto 2016: ch.3). In contrast, Nikkei youths enrolled in Japanese school system see such
an option neither desirable nor achievable. However, institutionalism does not account for
variations among the graduates of Brazilian schools. Among the three Brazilian school graduates
in this study, João chose to stay in Japan despite his enrollment in Brazilian school while Taina
and Stella chose to return to Brazil.

3) Neo-cultural Approaches
Unlike classical culturalists who tend to essentialize culture inherent to an ethno-racial
group, neo-culturalists focus on the mechanism by which varying cultures of mobility emerge
out of relevant contexts. The most prominent is segmented assimilation theory. It highlights the
impact of inter-generational acculturation patterns, which are shaped by context of reception,
parents’ human capital, and community coherence, on the social mobility of the children: an
upward assimilation into the mainstream through consonant acculturation; another upward path
via selective acculturation; and a downwardly mobile path to the marginalized social strata via
dissonant acculturation (Portes and Zhou 1993, Zhou 1997, Portes and Rumbaut 2001). Another
study addresses the varying success frame across migrant groups (Zhou et al. 2008, Lee and
Zhou 2014, 2015). Depending on immigrant selectivity and ethnic resources, migrant groups
develop varying understandings of success and strategies with which their children thrive. As a
result, social mobility patterns of the children of migrants diverge at the intergroup level. In sum,
the neo-cultural approaches pay attention to the formative mechanism of cultures of mobility that
motivate the children of migrants to different pathways.
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The neo-cultural approaches may predict that the Nikkei youths in Japan follow a
downwardly mobile pathway with a modest understanding of success. Although most of the firstgeneration Brazilian migrants came to Japan with a special residential visa designed for the
Nikkei, the segmented labor market pushed them into unstable labor sectors controlled by labor
brokers (Higuchi and Tanno 2003, Tsuda and Cornelius 2004). The job instability hinders them
from forming a coethnic community with fruitful social capital and ethnic resources (Kajita et al.
2005, Takenoshita 2013). Additionally, the first-generation Brazilian Nikkeis are with limited
Japanese fluency in general. These group characteristics predict Nikkei youths’ downward or
horizontal assimilation. In fact, they are among the lowest educational achievement migrant
groups in Japan (Higuchi and Inaba 2018). Furthermore, as we will see later, my informants who
took shallow slope or horizontal assimilation into the Japanese society viewed their pathways as
success compared to their parents.
The neo-cultural approaches, however, have two limits to explain the Brazilian Nikkei
youths in this study. First, inasmuch as they focus on intergroup variations in the culture of
mobility, they do not explicate the intragroup divergence of the four Nikkei youths’ life
trajectories despite their shared socioeconomic and family chrematistics. Second, and more
importantly, they do not take into account the variability of Nikkei youths’ agency over time.
They posit that a young migrant sticks to a certain culture of (either upward or downward)
mobility over the entire life course once he or she adapts to it in childhood (Smith 2008, 2014).
However, as we will see later, Nikkei youths’ agency changes dynamically over the life course.

In short, none of the three theoretical approaches account for the full range of the four
Nikkei youths’ diverging pathways in this study. The case of Brazilian Nikkei youths in Japan
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offers an inconvenient puzzle to the prior approaches to the children of migrants. One shared
shortcoming is the static understanding of migrant youths’ agency. They treat the agency as a
“homunculus” (Abbott 2016: 246, see also Douglas and Nay 1998) or a mere physiological
medium that constantly translate the causal factors claimed by the prior approaches (either the
center of social networks, institutional contexts, or cultures of mobility) into a certain outcome.
The prior approaches presume that as if the agency was fully formed from the inception and does
not vary across persons in different context or within the same person over time. However, our
human agency is not a fixed entity but a process changing through time, reflecting on the past
and projecting on the future in relation to the present (Emirbayer and Mische 1998, McAdams
2013, Abbott 2016). It varies as individuals take different life trajectories and build different
sense of the self. Especially, the youth evolves a sense of the self during the adolescence period
(Erikson 1968, Rindfuss 1991, Shanahan 2000). Thus, migrant youths with different sense of the
self may respond differently even in the same contextual condition. While all the claimed factors
matter in the divergence mechanism of the four Nikkei youths’ trajectories in this study, they do
so in relation to migrant youths’ agency changing over time. Below I propose the interactive
process approach that better explains the wide divergence of the Nikkei youths’ life trajectories
in this study.

The Nikkei Youths in the Interactive Dynamics: School Context, Migrant Bargain, and
Processual Agency over the Life Course
The micro-agency side of the interactive process approach to migrant transnationalism
underscores the process through which contextual conditions and agency interact with each
other. For contextual conditions, I specifically pay attention to the school context and the migrant
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bargain. For agency, I underscore its temporal and evolving nature, which is defined by the
dynamic relationship between social belonging and possible self. Social belonging represents
one’s sense of belonging to subcultures. Possible self expresses one’s future self-images. The
Nikkei youths develop their social belonging, interacting with the school context and the migrant
bargain, and reflect their sense of self such as a transnational straight-arrow in Brazilian school
like Taina or a bicultural striver in Japanese school like Yukari. In turn, the varying relationship
between their social belonging and possible self provides a decision framework for the choices
ahead to early adulthood with different meaning and weight. Consequently, their pathways
diverge widely in terms of not only social but also transnational mobility.

1) School context
The different school context between Japanese and Brazilian schools and their relations
to labor market institutionally channel Nikkei youths’ life trajectories. Japanese and Brazilian
school systems are different both in curricula and in their relations to the larger societies.
Japanese public school system offers a standardized national education for the students. It more
or less incorporates them into the Japanese society. In contrast, Brazilian schools offer education
based on Brazilian curriculum. They are designed to help the students to go back and
reincorporate themselves into the Brazilian society.
As Brazilian Nikkei youths progress from childhood to adolescence, the institutional
bifurcation effect becomes salient. During childhood period, the Nikkei youths can transfer
between the two school systems as Yukari, Stella, and João demonstrate. However, high school
entrance puts an end to this transferability. In the Japanese school system, compulsory education
finishes at the lower secondary education level. To move up to upper secondary education,
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students have to take admission exams (usually at the age of 15). This stands as a barrier for the
students in Brazilian schools because they are not prepared to take the Japanese admission
exams. Once Nikkei youths pass over the high school entrance age, it becomes extremely hard to
move across the institutional wall between the two school systems. In fact, both Flora and Aline,
the two young Nikkeis who appeared in the opening anecdotes in the very beginning of this
dissertation, affirmed the difficulty to transfer from Brazilian to Japanese school. Flora came to
Japan at age of 14. To her, Brazilian school was the only possible option because she was not
prepared to take Japanese high school admission exams in a year: “I had no Japanese proficiency
to enter a Japanese [high] school.” Similarly, Aline faced the difficulty of changing school. She
came to Japan at age of nine. Her parents put her in Brazilian school with the plan to return in
two years. However, their stay in Japan prolonged. Aline once considered to transfer to Japanese
school at the middle school age when she found her parents had not prepared for the return to
Brazil. However, she gave up the transfer: “those [young Nikkeis] in the Japanese school speak
Japanese very well because they study there since the beginning, but I didn’t. […] And it’s very
difficult [to pass the admission exam] and then I ended up staying in Brazilian school.”
This bifurcation of school tracks after high school is consequential for Nikkei youths’
pathways to early adulthood. Linguistic and academic proficiency that students cultivate through
each school system is of particular importance, not to mention school credentials. For Nikkei
students in Japanese schools, two pathways are salient: some move up to Japanese higher
education; others work in service or manufacturing industries. In general, those who go up to
higher education are limited compared to the native Japanese students largely due to the shortage
of human and social capital (Takenoshita et al. 2013, Higuchi and Inaba 2018). Nevertheless, as
we will see in Yukari’s case, some Nikkei students cultivate academic motivation and
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competence by relying on extra-family mentorship (For the role of the extra mentorship for
disadvantaged migrant children, see Stanton-Salazar 2001, Smith 2008b, Louie 2012). On the
other hand, the pathway to Brazilian universities is practically unachievable to them. In fact,
none of my nine informants who were in Japanese school system even imagined such a return
pathway to Brazil.
In contrast, most Nikkei students in Brazilian schools do not see the pathway to Japanese
higher education as achievable. This is because Brazilian schools do not offer them academic
and linguistic resources to pass the Japanese university exams. Instead, two pathways are salient:
incorporation into unstable labor sectors in Japan; and upwardly mobile return to Brazil. There is
no systematic statistical data available. But in 2016, the owner of a large Brazilian school group
with over 1,200 student enrollments, mentioned that roughly a half of their graduates goes back
to Brazil to prepare for the higher education and the other half works as haken workers (unskilled
temporary workers controlled by labor brokers) and in other equivalent labor sectors in Japan.4
In contrast, those graduates who go to Japanese higher education including vocational schools
are only 1%.
However, the school context alone does not determine Nikkei youths’ pathways. First, it
does not account for why some Brazilian school students like João stay in Japan whereas others
return to Brazil. Second, there is more than one trajectory that leads to a certain pathway. For
instance, Stella’s return to Brazil is such an in-between trajectory. Stella had once worked as a
haken worker but eventually returned to Brazil. School context tells little about Nikkei youths’
agency that makes such track changes.

4

A principal of another middle-size Brazilian school tole me a bit different distribution in 2016: approximately 35 to
40% of their graduates go back to Brazil and the rest stays in Japan.
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2) Incorporative and transnational migrant bargain
Combined with the school context, the migrant bargain — that children make up parents’
sacrifice by meeting their expectation — helps some children of migrants to achieve upward
social mobility despite the disadvantageous socioeconomic and family backgrounds (SuarezOrozco and Suarez-Orozco 2001, Smith 2006, 2008, Suarez-Orozco, et al. 2008, Zhou et al.
2008, Louie 2012, Lee and Zhou 2015). This insight is gained predominantly from the US
context and the literature presumes that both migrant parents and children together aim at success
in the host society.5 However, it is not always the case that they share the same goal of migrant
bargain. Especially in the case of the Nikkei youths in Japan, where Brazilian schools are one of
educational options, the goal of migrant bargain can be bidirectional: either children’s
incorporation into the Japanese society or their return to Brazil. Thus, I posit two orientations of
migrant bargain goal: incorporative and transnational.

Table 3-1: The Migrant Bargain, the School Context, and Expected Outcomes of Child’s
Pathways
Migrant bargain
Effect type

Parents’
orientation

Child’s
orientation

School contexts

Congruent
incorporative

incorporative

incorporative

Japanese school upward mobility in Japan

Congruent
transnational

transnational

transnational

Brazilian school upward return to Brazil

Incongruent
transnational

incorporative

transnational

Japanese school child’s upward return to Brazil
is impeded

Incorngruent
incorporative

transnational

incorporative

Brazilian school child’s upward mobility in
Japan is impeded

5

Expected child’s outcome

Perhaps for this reason, the existent literature uses the term “immigrant bargain.” Instead, I use “migrant bargain”
to avoid the teleological connotation that the term “immigrant” implies.
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Table 3-1 represents varying combined effect of parents’ and child’s orientations of
migrant bargain and the school context on the child’s pathways.6 The consonant incorporative
effect: the child takes an upwardly mobile pathway in Japan when a Nikkei youth keeps
incorporative bargain with the parents in the Japanese school context. The consonant
transnational effect: the child takes an upward return to Brazil when a Nikkei youth keeps the
transnational bargain in the Brazilian school context. The dissonant transnational effect: the
child’s upward return to Brazil is impeded when the parents aim at the incorporative goal while
the child holds a transnational orientation in the Japanese school context. The dissonant
incorporative effect: the child’s upward mobility in Japan is impeded when the parents aim at the
transnational goal while the child has an incorporative orientation in the Brazilian school context.
Certainly, consonant and dissonant effects of the migrant bargain conceptually overlap
with two inter-generational acculturation types — consonant and dissonant — in the segmented
assimilation model. However, the effect of the migrant bargain changes over time whereas the
segmented assimilation model assumes that the effect of inter-generational acculturation endures
once set in place. A consonant transnational or incorporative effect at one time can turn to be
dissonant at another time and vice versa. As noted above, the Nikkei youths can change the
school context at least by the beginning of high school. Furthermore, both sides of migrant
bargain can also change. For one thing, the parents’ orientation may change because most of
them came to Japan as a target earner and their migration plan oscillates between settlement and
return (Tsuda 1999a, Yamanaka 2000). For another, the children’s orientation also can change
because they may have different future self-image at different times over the life course. A

6

Three binary parameters mechanically generate eight combinations in total. I exempted four types because it is
unlikely that the parents send their child to the school incompatible with their orientation of migrant bargain at least
initially.
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Nikkei child who envisions his or her future in Brazil in early childhood may come to wish his or
her career in Japan in adolescence. This is because the children of migrants develop their agency
over time.

3) Migrant youths’ agency as the dynamic relationship between social belonging and possible
self
I conceptualize the Brazilian Nikkei youths’ agency as the dynamic relationship between
social belonging and possible self. Social belonging is one’s sense of belonging to multiple
subcultures, which in turn cues possible selves – representations of the self in the future (Markus
and Nurius 1986) – with different meanings and weights. The concept of social identity has often
been employed to grasp one’s agency. However, it tends to unnecessarily imply uniqueness and
stability albeit human agency is not fixed on a single social identity (Brubaker and Cooper 2004).
Instead, the notion of social belonging can shed light on the multiplicity and variability of Nikkei
youths’ agency. The Nikkei youths can simultaneously belong to multiple subcultures to varying
degrees. Furthermore, one’s social belonging changes as one progresses through the life course.
In the transition to early adulthood, Nikkei youths’ social belonging provides a decision
framework to choose a certain pathway among multiple possible selves. I operationalize these
dynamics by three steps. First, I identify four subcultures relevant to the Nikkei youths in Japan.
Second, I consider one’s social belonging as a configuration of multiple subcultures. Third, I
conceptualize the manner by which the Nikkei youths choose a certain pathway to early
adulthood as the relationship between their social belonging and possible self.

Four subcultures in the context of Brazilian Nikkei youths in Japan
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Four subcultures are particularly relevant to the Nikkei youth in Japan: middle-class
mainstream, bicultural striver, Brazilian haken, and transnational striver. One’s social belonging
emerges from the contexts in which one is embedded. Thus, these subcultures point to idealized
combinations among the school context, the migrant bargain, and the pathways to which the
Nikkei youths can aspire. Below I characterize the four subcultures by six traits: migrant bargain,
school, language, friend and social networks, work, and ethnic identity (see Table 3-2).

Table 3-2: Four Subcultures and Their Traits in Six Social Domains for Brazilian Nikkei Youths
in Japan
Subcultural types

Social
domains

Middle-class
mainstream

Bicultural striver

Brazilian haken

Transnational
striver

Migrant
bargain

Children keep the
incorporative
bargain with the
parents

Children keep the
incorporative migrant
bargain with the help
of extra support

Children fail to
keep the migrant
bargain with the
parents

Children keep the
transnational bargain
with the parents

School

strong
competency; host
society school

Moderate to high
competency; host
society school

weak academic
strong competency;
competency; often ethnic school
resulted in drop-out

Host country
dominant
monolingual

Bilingual

Semilingual

Language
Friend and
social
networks
Work

Ethnic
identity

Home country
dominant
monolingual

Dominantly native Both native and
friends,
coethnic friends

Friends in the same Dominantly coethnic
subcultural group friends

Career job in the
host society

Career job either in
the host society or
ethnic enclave

unskilled job in the Career job in the
haken labor market homeland society

Attenuated ethnic
identity

bicultural identity

Racialized ethnic
identity associated
with the haken
labor

Maintained national
identity

Middle-class mainstream: When a child keeps the incorporative migrant bargain with the
parents, she is expected to achieve upward mobility in the host society. Both parents and the
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child learn the language and culture of host country and eventually abandon those of their
homelands. The child studies on par with the native peers and make friends with them. As the
child succeed academically through mainstream institutions and eventually become middle-class,
her ethnic salience becomes attenuated.
Bicultural striver: When a child keeps the incorporative migrant bargain with the help of
external-family supports, it can help him to attain upward mobility in the host society without
stripping off the parents’ language and culture even if parents’ incorporative orientation of
migrant bargain is weak or absent. The child finishes high school and above, and gets a career.
He maintains both native and coethnic friends and display a bicultural identity.
Brazilian haken: Segmented assimilation model associates the downward mobility
pathway with the rainbow underclass, all too few members of which engage with work (Wilson
1996, Waldinger and Feliciano 2004). Brazilian haken (unskilled temporary job controlled by
labor brokers) addresses an ethnicized working class pathway that offers a living wage but out of
which it is difficult to advance and the sense of entrapment. Luis, a young Nikkei informant who
works as a haken worker put it as follows: “We Brazilians are entrapped in the haken loop. It is
inherited from parents to sons and daughters… That’s our life in Japan.” When a child fails to
hold up her end of the migrant bargain (either incorporative or transnational), she is predicted to
follow a parallel, if not downward, mobility pathway to the haken labor market where Brazilian
Nikkei workers are disproportionately concentrated. The parents do not learn host society’s
language and culture and fail to monitor the child. The child also fails academically at school and
often result in school drop-out. She makes friends with those sharing the same subculture. She
gets an unskilled haken job and perceive her ethnic identity in relation to the haken labor.
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Transnational striver: When a child keeps the transnational migrant bargain with the
parents, he is likely to take an upwardly mobile return path to the parents’ homeland. The
migrant family utilizes the exclave institutions such as ethnic schools to maintain children’s
language and cultural understanding of the homeland. Their social networks do not extend
beyond the coethnic networks and those in the home country. The child seeks a career in the
homeland instead of the host country. His national identity is that of homeland.
These subcultures are not mutually exclusive. The Nikkei youths, like everyone else, can
belong to several subcultures simultaneously. For instance, a Nikkei youth may feel belong to
Brazilian haken and bicultural striver simultaneously because he is motivated to study hard with
the extra mentorship even while being exposed to the oppositional subculture at school. Another
Nikkei youth may find her social belonging both in transnational striver and Brazilian haken as
she is enrolled in Brazilian school without a strong motivation to return to Brazil. Thus, I will
look at which configuration of subcultures becomes predominant at different periods in the life
course.

Possible selves in relation to social belonging
Yet, Nikkei youths’ social belonging does not directly determine the pathway they take
because they also possess multiple possible selves that inform future pathways. Psychology
literature points out that we take action for achieving a certain future self only when certain
conditions are met (For detailed review, see Oyserman and James 2009, 2011). I focus on two
conditions relevant and significant to the current study: desirability drawn from balanced
formation of positive and negative possible selves; and achievability derived from the connection
between the current sense of social belonging and future possible selves.
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First, when an individual develops both positively desirable and negatively undesirable
possible selves, one is likely to achieve the desirable self. Certainly, to have a desirable self is the
prerequisite for its realization. However, such a desirable self alone is not enough to sustain
one’s motivation. An undesirable possible self of which one is afraid is also needed. For
instance, when a Nikkei youth wishes to be a college student in Japan, such a desirable self may
remain just as a whimsical dream without an undesirable self, for example a haken worker, that
motivates him to avoid it and make the desirable one real.
Second, a desirable possible self must be achievable, and an undesirable possible self
must be avoidable. Otherwise, an individual is not motivated to pursue the desirable possible self
and/or to avoid the undesirable possible self. For instance, when a Nikkei youth views becoming
a lawyer in Brazil as unachievable, she would not pursue such a possible self even if it is
desirable. Similarly, when a Nikkei youth sees a future as a haken worker as inevitable, he would
not dare make effort to avoid it even if it is undesirable.
Desirability and achievability (and avoidability) of possible selves are all relative to one’s
social belonging. Thus, the same pathway of upward return to Brazil, for instance, means
different things to Nikkei youths with different configuration of social belonging. It can mean a
desirable and achievable pathway to a Nikkei youth who studies in Brazilian school with a strong
sense of transnational striver. The same pathway can mean an unachievable and even undesirable
pathway to another Nikkei youth who studies in Japanese school and feels belong to middle-class
mainstream and bicultural striver. Likewise, a haken job may appear inevitable to a Brazilian
school student who does not find her social belonging in transnational striver and bicultural
striver. Rather, the same student may convince herself that a haken job is more desirable than
returning to Brazil only with a Brazilian high school diploma. In this way, Nikkei youths’ social
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belonging offers a decision framework with which they judge which possible selves are
desirable, undesirable, achievable, or inevitable.
In sum, The Nikkei youths in Japan develop the different social belonging, interacting
with the school context and the migrant bargain over time. In the transition to early adulthood,
they choose a certain pathway among multiple possible selves, each of which has a different
weight and meaning in relation to their social belonging. As a result, Nikkei youths’ life
trajectories diverge widely.

Four Nikkei Youths and Their Diverging Pathways
This section compares life trajectories of four Nikkei youths in Japan: Taina, Yukari,
Stella, and João. While they share most socioeconomic and family backgrounds in common,
their life trajectories significantly diverged at early adulthood. To highlight how the school
context and the migrant bargain affect the development of their social belonging and how it
guides their choice in the transition to early adulthood, I present the four cases in two coupled
comparisons: 1) Taina and Yukari, and 2) Stella and João. The first comparison of Taina and
Yukari analyzes how Japanese and Brazilian school contexts with the consistent migrant bargain
respectively affect their agency. The second comparison of Stella and João analyzes diverging
choices within the same Brazilian school context, focusing on the different migrant bargains,
especially the timing of dissonance: Stella chose to return to Brazil whereas João chose to stay in
Japan.

1) Taina and Yukari: Institutionally Channeled Life Trajectories in Contrast
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Taina and Yukari’ cases are largely predictable from the perspective of institutionalism.
Both of them have been in Japan for almost their entire lives, and their parents’ socioeconomic
and cultural backgrounds are similar, i.e., factory workers with weak Japanese fluency. However,
Taina returned to Brazil to take university entrance exam whereas Yukari is studying in a
Japanese college. They differ in an important aspect: Taina graduated from Brazilian school in
Japan whereas Yukari graduated from Japanese high school.

Taina, a transnational straight-arrow
Taina came to Japan at age of three with her parents. Since then, she has been in Japan
for almost her entire life. Initially, her parents planned to stay and work for a few years and then
go back to Brazil. Therefore, they put Taina in a Brazilian child-care program soon after they
arrived Japan. Taina moved up to elementary, middle, and high school section of the Brazilian
school and returned to Brazil upon the graduation. Taina’s life trajectory can be characterized as
a transnational straight-arrow in developing her sense of transnational striver predominantly (see
Figure 3-1 above).
Taina's enrollment in Brazilian school has curved the scope of her social networks. In
stark contrast to Taina’s immersion in coethnic social networks centered around her Brazilian
school, she has not developed meaningful social connections with Japanese natives. Throughout
her almost life-long settlement in Japan, Brazilian school was the only educational institution
that Tania has been enrolled. She has not had Japanese friends. “All my friends are Brazilians. I
know some Japanese, no, actually two outside the school. I am taking a private English lesson
and they are with me. But we don’t talk so much. And also, I don’t understand what they are
talking about.” When she is in need of communicating with the Japanese, she relies on other
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Brazilian friends. Although her Japanese fluency was limited, she worked at a fast food
restaurant after school. I wondered how she managed to work with such limited Japanese
fluency. Taina replied, “many [Brazilian] friends are working there. So, I don’t need to talk to
Japanese staff. They [her Brazilian peers] help me.” Encompassed by social relations
predominantly centered on the Brazilian school, Taina’s social world in Japan was enclosed in
the Brazilian institutional exclave.7
While Taina’s family stayed in Japan unexpectedly longer than they initially planned, she
held up her end of the transnational migrant bargain well. Taina’s mother has always encouraged
Taina and her older sister to keep studying and achieve their goal in Brazil. While Taina’s
mother did not want her daughters to stay in Japan: “I decided to make my daughters study in
Brazil because I didn’t want them working in the factory.” Taina’s mother was afraid of her
daughters working in the factory as a haken worker like herself. Her anxiety was reflected in
Taina’s understanding of factory work in Japan. Contrasting herself with other Brazilian youths
working in factories, Taina said, “they are just stuck by money at hand, they are not doing what
they like. I don’t like to be like them. I want to do what I really like.” She regarded the haken
pathway as an option that would rather hamper her ambition and should be avoided.
Academically and linguistically, the advantage of returning to Brazil was clear to Taina.
Teachers in her school assessed that Taina was one of the brightest students in the school. She
has never fallen from the top grade of the cohort. Taina liked studying: “I think I like everything
[subjects] but I like biology the most,” and she had a dream to be a doctor in the future. With her
good grades at school and her language dominance in Portuguese, Taina viewed universities in
Brail as the most desirable and achievable option: “Because of my language, studying in

7

This experience is not unique to Taina. For the students in Brazilian school, especially for those with weak
Japanese fluency, it is common not to develop meaningful relationship with Japanese people.
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Brazilian university is much easier [than studying in anywhere else]. I know it is difficult
because medical schools are very competitive. So, I have to study a lot.” In addition, her older
sister’s return to Brazil and her confidence in academic study alleviated Taina’s anxiety about
her new life in Brazil, where she had never been to since she was three years old: “I am anxious
a bit if I can adapt to Brazil. But my sister told me about that [life in Brazil]. Also, study
materials mustn’t be different from what I have studied [in her school]. So, I am not that
anxious.” In contrast, Taina did not imagine herself studying in Japanese university: “It must be
cool. But because I don’t speak Japanese, Japanese universities are difficult to me. I haven’t
considered such an option.” She viewed the upwardly mobile path through higher education in
Japan simply unachievable if not desirable. Now, she is preparing for university entrance exams,
living with her older sister in the state of Paraná, Brazil. Among the available future pathways,
Taina chose the most desirable and achievable one.

Yukari, an upwardly mobile bicultural striver
Yukari was born in Japan and has never been to Brazil since then. Like Taina, Yukari’s
parents initially put her in a Brazilian elementary school program with the hope of return. Unlike
Taina, Yukari made a school track change from Brazilian to Japanese school in childhood. As of
fall 2018, Yukari was a third-year college student in Japan. Her life trajectory can be
characterized as an upwardly mobile bicultural striver, a composite of bicultural striver and
middle-class mainstream (see Figure 3-1 above).
During the early childhood period, Yukari’s salient social belonging was transnational
striver. Living in a public housing area with a mixture of Japanese native and foreign-born
households, Yukari had both Japanese and Brazilian friends when she was a little child.
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However, Yukari’s contacts with Japanese friends eventually waned when her parents put her in
a Brazilian elementary school. “All the friends at school talked in Portuguese. So did I naturally.
[…] When I was in Brazilian school, it was so natural to me. So, I didn’t doubt my situation.”
Consistent with her parent’s wish of return, Yukari “vaguely sensed” — as she put it — that her
family would go (back) to Brazil in a few years.
However, Yukari faced a series of challenges toward the end of her childhood. First, her
parents got divorced. Second, her mother temporarily lost her job at a factory. Due to these
contingent events, Yukari’s mother could not afford the tuition of Yukari’s Brazilian school. In
the late childhood period, Yukari stayed at home, working on workbooks by herself while taking
care of her little sister, without any schooling.8 During this period, Yukari was exposed to the
threat of downward mobility: unstable family structure, isolation both from mainstream and
ethnic institutions and social networks. However, the threat was avoided as Yukari’s mother
sought help from a Japanese civil society organization. Being worried about Yukari’s
unschooling, her mother contacted a migrant supporting non-profit organization offering an
adaptation program to Japanese school. Yukari remembered the moment when her mother
suggested the non-profit: “It didn’t matter wherever it was if I could study.” Stayed away from
any learning opportunities for a while, Yukari seized on the opportunity and thrived with the help
of the mentors in the organization. After attending the organization about one year, Yukari was
eventually enrolled in a Japanese middle school.
Yukari was motivated to study and eager to move up to high school when she started the
middle school. However, Yukari’s lack of Japanese school experience until then worked against

8

Since the Japanese Ministry of Education officially interprets that children without Japanese citizenship are
exempted from the framework of compulsory education, unschooled foreign children are often not tracked by the
Japanese school authorities (Sakuma 2006, Miyajima 2014).
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her. Yukari was worried if she was able enough to pass the Japanese high school entrance exam.
“I wanted to go to a full-time high school if I could. But as I have been to [Japanese] school only
one year, my classroom teacher suggested me an evening high school.” Being afraid of failing
the entrance exam, she followed the teacher’s suggestion. Yukari’s evening high school did not
provide academically favorable conditions to motivate her studying. Yukari recalled that most of
her classmates were not academically motivated. She observed: “they [Yukari’s classmates] were
playing with phones even when teachers were giving lesson. […] I guess they were
overwhelmed and gave in to such a mood.” It was not uncommon that students dropped out of
school. Yukari noticed “most of them [dropouts] went to factories … as haken”. In addition,
teachers at the school were not so much supporting: “I haven’t received specific supports from
the teachers. […] A career guidance teacher gave me some supports, lending me college
brochures and workbooks but my classroom teacher was … not supportive, to be honest.” The
evening high school institutionally exposed her to the haken subculture.
Looking at Yukari’s exposure to the haken subculture, the neo-culturalist approaches may
anticipate her downwardly mobile prospect. However, the exposure to the subculture does not
automatically result in its embrace. Yukari prevented it by extra-family mentorship at the nonprofit organization. Even after entering the evening high school, Yukari was involved in the nonprofit organization as a volunteer: “They helped me when I was in such a hard time. So, I
thought I could help them [Brazilian children in the organization].” At the nonprofit
organization, she came to know a handful of other Nikkei Brazilian youths’ “success stories”:
“Back then, Alice [a senior Nikkei volunteer staff] was also working at [organization name
deleted], and she told me about how her college life was and that made me want to go there,
too.” Yukari’s migrant bargain with her mother was not as salient and clear as Taina’s. Yukari’s
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relationship with her mother does not seem conflictive: “My mom told me I should do what I
believe.” However, she also told me that her mother often expressed her wish of return to Brazil
even now. Instead, the extra-family and -school mentorship that Yukari has received from
mentors, especially Alice, at the non-profit organization, played a significant role in helping her
to perceive the pathway to college in Japan not only desirable but also achievable, and not to
embrace the haken subculture as inevitable. Upon graduating from high school, Yukari passed
the entrance exam for the same college Alice was in.
As Yukari moved up the Japanese school system, her traits in transnational striver were
attenuated and she saw a return path to Brazil as unachievable. Although she speaks Portuguese
fluently, she is less comfortable when she writes and not confident to pass the admission exams
of Brazilian universities. The attenuation of transnational striver traits is not limited to
academically successful students like Yukari. Gilberto is such a case of academically modest
Nikkei students in Japanese school. He came to Japan at the age of ten. He graduated from the
same evening high school as Yukari. Gilberto is now working as a carpenter in a local builder.
He described his social belonging as follows: “My dad told me, ‘the factory work in Japan was
over.’ […] He said we’d be able to earn more in Brazil now. I guess he said so because he didn’t
finish high school. But I am different [from his father]. So, I feel my place is here [Japan].” In
the case of Gilberto, neither the migrant incorporative bargain nor the extra mentorship was
strong. He did not possess the context that relativized his evening school context closely
associated with the Brazilian haken subculture. Nonetheless, he did not take the pathway to the
haken labor. He has once worked in a factory when he graduated from the middle school and
came back to the Japanese school track. When Gilberto entered the evening high school, he told
me as follows:
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Until recently, I thought I was fine [with a haken job]. I didn’t mind if I’d do the same
thing my dad was doing. We ain’t poor, and I’d be fine with that. But as I started
working, I got aware, ‘Ok, this is what my dad told me… He was right.’ […] I thought I
wouldn’t have to do such a job if I go to high school and I wouldn’t be like my dad…
For Gilberto, the main frame of reference is his father’s social position in Japan as a haken
worker. As a young carpenter, Gilberto perceived that he was doing better than his father and did
not consider the return to Brazil desirable.
Now, Yukari is following an upwardly mobile trajectory without stripping off Brazilian
cultural heritage. As of fall 2018, she was in the third year of the college. She continued
volunteering at the nonprofit organization. Her current social networks were centered on the
college, where the majority of her friends were native Japanese. In contrast, Yukari’s contacts
with high school friends were fading, not to mention friends from the Brazilian elementary
school. While Yukari felt connected to her relatives who went back to Brazil via social network
services such as Facebook, she envisioned her future career in Japan. “I feel rather mixed, both
Brazilian and Japanese if you ask, I feel connected to both.” When I asked Yukari about her
future plan, she replied that she wanted to build her career making the most of her bilingual skill.

Taina and Yukari’s Agency in Contrast
Taina and Yukari share two conditions in common: almost life-long settlement in Japan
and their parents’ socioeconomic status as unskilled haken worker. If migrants’ transnational ties
decline over time as the major studies on migrant transnationalism predict, both Taina and
Yukari must have weakened their transnational ties with Brazil. If parents’ socioeconomic and
acculturation levels affect children’s social mobility as the neo-culturalist approaches predict,

132

both of them should have followed a downward mobility path in Japan. However, both of them
are successfully developing their educational careers but in different countries: Taina in Brazil
and Yukari in Japan. They have developed different levels of agency through different school
contexts with the consonant transnational migrant bargain in Taina’s case and with the
incorporative extra-family and -school mentorship in Yukari’s case.

Table 3-3: The Development of Taina’s and Yukari’s Social Belonging at the Three Life Stages
Life stage

Taina

Subcultural
types and
salient traits

(I) childhood

(II) adolescence

(III) early adulthood

Middle-class
mainstream

None

none

none

Bicultural striver

None

none

none

Brazilian haken

None

none

none

Transnational
striver

migrant bargain,
school, language,
school, friend and
social networks,
ethnic identity

migrant bargain,
school, language,
friend and social
networks, ethnic
identity

school, language,
friend and social
networks, work,
ethnic identity

Middle-class
mainstream

None

none

school, friends and
social networks, work,
ethnic identity

Bicultural striver

language

migrant bargain,
language, friend
and social
networks, ethnic
identity

school, language,
friend and social
networks, work,
ethnic identity

Brazilian haken

school, friend and
social networks

school, friend and
social networks

attenuated

Transnational
striver

migrant bargain,
school, language,
friend and social
networks, ethnic
identity

attenuated

attenuated

Yukari
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Table 3-3 shows the development of Taina’s and Yukari’s social belongings at the three
life stages. Taina’s life trajectory is a quintessential case of the straightforward transnational
pathway. Her school and family contexts (the continuous enrollment in Brazilian school with
parents’ sustained encouragement to return) in concert made her sense of transnational striver
salient and other subcultures latent, and that in turn informed her several possible selves with
different valence in the transition to early adulthood. First, the haken pathway in Japan was
undesirable to her. It signaled a negative possible self that she perceived certainly avoidable with
her good academic standing in the Brazilian school. Second, higher education in Japan appeared
unachievable if not desirable. In contrast, third, Taina viewed her positive possible self —
desirable and achievable — in the upward return path to Brazil. In the transition to the early
adulthood, Taina returned to Brazil to take such a pathway.
Yukari’s life trajectory is an upwardly mobile bicultural striver. First, Yukari’s traits in
transnational striver were attenuated as she transferred from Brazilian to Japanese school.
Second, Yukari’s high school context exposed her to the haken subculture. However, third, the
extra mentorship enhanced the sense of bicultural striver and helped her to see not only that the
downward pathway to the haken labor market was avoidable but also that college in Japan was
desirable and achievable. As she moved up to the college and socialized with native Japanese
friends, her social belonging in middle-class mainstream grew as well.
The school difference between Japanese and Brazilian schools made some pathways
achievable and others not: Taina saw transnational striver as her predominant social belonging
whereas Yukari felt belong to middle-class mainstream and bicultural striver. However, the
school context did not fully determine their pathways. Especially, Yukari successfully took an
upwardly mobile pathway despite the disadvantageous school context. Having multiple contexts
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is the key to understand Yukari’s upwardly mobile prospect. This can be accentuated by
contrasting Yukari with Gilberto. Yukari and Gilberto graduated from the same evening high
school. While Yukari could relativize her evening school context by the extra support and
mentorship from senior Nikkei youths, Gilberto did not have such an opportunity. He rather
perceived his carpenter job desirable to compare to his father’s haken job.

2) Stella and João: Divergent Social Trajectories of Brazilian School Students
Both Stella and João were enrolled in Brazilian high school in Japan. Like Taina and
Yukari, Stella and João have been in Japan for a long time. Their parents’ socioeconomic
backgrounds are also similar to Taina and Yukari’s. Notwithstanding, Stella took a return path to
Brazil whereas João chose to stay in Japan. The comparison between Stella and João analyzes
how the different migrant bargain, especially the timing of dissonance, affects their agency even
within the same Brazilian school context and consequently led them to different pathways in the
transition to the early adulthood.

Stella: a transnational second-chancer
Like Taina, Stella came to Japan when she was a little child. However, she dropped out
from Brazilian school and worked as a haken worker once. Now, she is a college student in
Brazil. Stella is a transnational second-chancer, a composite of transnational striver and Brazilian
haken (see Figure 3-1 above).
Like many other Brazilian migrants in Japan, Stella’s parents had a plan to return to
Brazil after working a few years. Therefore, they wanted to send Stella to a Brazilian school.
However, there was no Brazilian school nearby. So, they put Stella in a Japanese childcare
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program. Stella’s enrollment in the Japanese school system helped her learning Japanese and
making Japanese friends. However, when she was in the sixth grade in Japanese elementary
school, her parents made her transfer to a Brazilian school. Stella’s parents were urged by two
concerns. First, they worried that it would be trouble if Stella would not have sufficient
proficiency in Portuguese when they went back to Brazil. Second, and more importantly, Stella’s
parents were afraid that Stella would fail in the Japanese school system:
We [Stella, her father, and a teacher at Japanese elementary school] had an opportunity to
talk about my future plan. My teacher mentioned to my dad that it’s by chance possible
that I wouldn’t be able to go to college in Japan. Then, my dad got afraid of such a case
happening and … he took me out [of the Japanese school].
Failing Japanese school is a pressing anxiety to Brazilian families in Japan. As Taina’s mother
mentioned above, this anxiety is closely associated with the fear of making the child a haken
worker. When Stella’s parents sensed such a possibility, they placed their hope for Stella’s
success in the upwardly mobile path in Brazil through Brazilian school in Japan.
Stella recalled, “it was bad to me because I had learned in Japanese and my parents put
me in the Brazilian school, then I had to learn everything again [in Portuguese] from scratch.
That made me confused.” Despite her initial confusion, Stella kept the transnational migrant
bargain well. Stella’s parents have always encouraged her to go college. Moreover, Stella shared
the fear of being a haken worker with her parents: “I had a friend, a Brazilian girl who has done
Japanese school all the way. […] She finished high school and she was working in the factory.
[…] She told me that she found that the chance to go to college was really limited to foreigners
yet.” Although Stella lagged behind two years of academic progress when she was transferred to
the Brazilian school, she studied hard to catch up.
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However, unlike Taina, Stella’s return pathway to Brazil was bumpy. When Stella moved
up to the second year of Brazilian high school, her parents reconsidered their plan and decided to
settle in Japan. This plan change was largely derived from their waning prospect in Brazil. Stella
explained to me that “it’d be difficult if they [Stella’s parents] returned to Brazil. […] He
[Stella’s father] told us, ‘I don’t know if we can secure a good life in Brazil, having a nice house,
enjoying travel once in a while, and all the things that we have in Japan if we return.’” Having
been in Japan for over 10 years, Stella’s parents’ initial plan of return increasingly dimmed.9
“My dad was 47 and my mom was 45 then. What could they do for these ages if they
went back to Brazil? Because there is no good job for old people. Well…, neither in Japan
though…” Looking back from now, Stella understands her parents’ decision but it made her
confused and disappointed initially. “I had studied hard because I believed we would return to
Brazil one day. My parents always told me, ‘you should go to university and get a good job,’ and
I followed them. But if we stayed in Japan, it’s meaningless to study so hard [in Brazilian
school].” By then, Stella’s and her parents’ future orientations were consistent. Her parents had a
plan to go back to Brazil and Stella has kept the transnational migrant bargain by studying hard.
When her parents changed the plan to settle in Japan, their expectations suddenly came at odds
with each other. The transnational migrant bargain was broken not by Stella but by her parents.
At that point, Stella’s upwardly mobile path in Japan appeared unachievable since she has
not made effort for that orientation. She was fluent in Japanese but not confident in Japanese
academic writing: “If I had been enrolled in Japanese school all the way and if my Japanese had
been fully developed, I would have done college in Japan. […] But I’ve already left Japanese
school. I’d have had to study all over again [if Stella tried Japanese university].” Stella initially

9

This episode does not indicate Stella’s parents’ determination of permanent settlement in Japan. According to
Stella, the possible prospect in Brazil often comes up in their conversation as of 2018.
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perceived the pathway to the factory as undesirable: “I’ve heard how it worked; I knew it’s not
an easy thing”. However, when both the upwardly mobile return to Brazil and the upwardly
mobile incorporation in Japan seemed unachievable to Stella, she came to see the haken labor
inevitable. Stella increasingly lost motivation to study, dropped out of the school, and started
working in a factory.
The haken labor in the factory signaled Stella an ambiguity. First, Stella learned that the
haken labor was not as unacceptable as she thought initially at least in terms of wage: “It’s good
because I earned well, earned more than my mom because I worked on a four for two [4 team 12
hours] shift. It’s quite tough though.” Stella enjoyed a relative economic independence from her
parents. On weekends when she had a day off or two, she went to night clubs with her friends
and partied all night. During this period, Stella was exposed to the haken subculture and
embraced it, but only partly.
Stella: “Everybody [Brazilian youths in the factory] initially think, like; let’s work hard,
save money, and go back to Brazil. Everybody initially thinks in that way. But they turn
to be like, ‘well, whatever, I can live with this way, I can earn money, go to a night club,
drink booze, and buy a car…’ They end up being like that.”
Author: “Did you think so too?”
Stella: “I did… but not so much. I haven’t always gone out with my friends because I was
tired [coming back from the factory].”
As the citation above shows, second, the haken labor wore her out physically and mentally. The
actual experience of the routinized haken labor made her strongly reaffirm its undesirability
rather than fully embracing it: “I didn’t want to keep that life forever because I felt like I was
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nobody in the factory. So, I told my dad, ‘I fed up with this, I want to study, I want to be
someone.’”
After working in the factory for a year, Stella grabbed a second chance option in the
return pathway to Brazil. The weariness and the sense of stagnancy Stella felt in the routinized
haken labor are certainly the major reason for such a decision. More importantly, she could
choose the second-chance return option because she has once invested herself to develop her
social belonging in transnational striver.
The contrast with Steven, another Brazilian school graduate who works as a haken
worker, makes this point clear. When Steven was in the final year of high school, he perceived
the haken job in the factory as undesirable: “Earning money [in Japan] is easy if you work in a
factory. But once you enter, and if you don’t have specific goals, time just passes. […] You earn
money quick and spend them quick. […] You can’t develop your skills. I have seen my dad
doing difficult.” Nevertheless, he anticipated that he would work in the factory upon the
graduation: “I am not a good student. It’s obvious. Like, I don’t take note in class. I haven’t
studied seriously.” This means neither that Steven saw the return to Brazil undesirable nor that
he disregarded his parents’ investment in his education: “One day, I want to show my dad that
the days he paid money to my school were not waste of time”. But he perceived that entering
Brazilian university was unachievable. As of early 2019, almost two years after his graduation,
Steven kept working as a haken worker in Japan.
In contrast to Steven, Stella has made efforts to make the upwardly mobile return to
Brazil possible by the high school period. Even though she once gave up such a pathway due to
the dissonant migrant bargain, the actual haken experience reactivated her sense of transnational
striver and made her perceive the return pathway to Brazil not only desirable but still achievable.
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Stella went back to Brazil, got a high school graduation certificate, passed vestibulares
(Brazilian university admission exams), and started studying pedagogy in a public university in
the state of Paraná. Looking back from the current stage of her life, she appreciated her parents’
investment in her education in Brazilian school: “I took only public universities’ exams because
my dad has paid my tuition since I was little child. If I was accepted to a private university, I’d
burden him again. So, I studied really hard. And I made it.”10

João: a bicultural shallow sloper
João’s early school trajectory is similar to Stella’s halfway. João came to Japan when he
was a little baby. He had been in a Japanese elementary school until the third grade. His parents
put him in a Brazilian school to prepare him to go back to Brazil. Unlike Stella, João chose to
stay in Japan after finishing Brazilian high school. Whereas Stella (and Taina as well) found a
desirable future self in the upwardly mobile return to Brazil as compared to the haken worker’s
life in Japan, João drew an opposite idea from a comparison of possible selves between Japan
and Brazil. While João works in a factory in Japan now, his employment position is stabler than
other Brazilian haken workers. In addition, João is now married with a Japanese woman and
naturalized to Japanese citizenship recently. Like Gilberto, João makes a shallow slope mobility
into the Japanese mainstream, developing his social belonging both in bicultural striver and
Brazilian haken (see Figure 3-1 above).
When João was transferred to the Brazilian school, his migrant bargain with the parents
was not as consonant as Stella’s. “My parents asked me which school [either Japanese or

10

In general, public universities are considered to offer higher quality education than private ones in Brazil.
Additionally, public universities basically offer free education. For these reasons, it is more difficult to get accepted
to public universities.
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Brazilian] I preferred. But in practice I had no choice. They pressured me to say, ‘I want to go to
Brazilian school.’” In contrast to his parents, João perceived the idea of returning to Brazil rather
remote and odd. “I think I am Brazilian. I cheer for the Brazilian national football team. If I find
a Brazilian flag on the street, I feel proud. But I have grown up in Japan. So, it was strange to me
when my parents encouraged me to go back to my own country.” Unlike Stella (and Taina)
whose social networks were enclosed in the Brazilian institutional exclave, João maintained the
social networks extended to the Japanese society even after moving to the Brazilian school.
Although the students were prohibited to speak Japanese at school, João found some classmates
who were also fluent in Japanese and formed a peer group with them. “It was almost like a Japa
[Japanese] community in the Brazilian community.” He recalled that they have often enjoyed
talking in Japanese, hiding from teachers. Based on this peer group, João also extended his
networks to Japanese friends outside the school through his basketball activity.
This does not mean that João did not like his school life in the Brazilian school.
Author: “So, did you want to go back to Japanese school?”
João: “I’d admit that I’ve enjoyed my school life after all. It was okey.”
João’s school story was centered on peer group friendship. On contrary, João had a distant
feeling towards Brazilian school’s academic aspect: “When I was in elementary and middle
school, I wasn’t conscious about what I was studying [such as Brazilian history and literature].
But as I moved up from to the high school, I wondered ‘is it helpful to study these stuff?’” João
assessed that he was not an academically-motivated student: “I don’t like studying. I have never
submitted homework at school.” While João’s own personality might play a part, it is the case
that he failed to motivate himself to study because the study contents of Brazilian school did not
correspond to his social belonging.
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[In Brazil,] you can secure a decent job only if you graduate from university. My dad told
me as such. So, my parents have always insisted me, ‘study hard and go to university.’
But I am in Japan. So, I wondered ‘do I have to go to university? I can feed myself even
without a college degree [in Japan], can’t I?’
Unlike Stella, João did not keep the transnational migrant bargain despite his parents’
encouragement and has not developed the sense of transnational striver.
João was certain that he would stay in Japan after the graduation. To him, the upwardly
mobile return to Brazil was neither desirable nor achievable. However, at the same time, the
upwardly mobile path to the Japanese higher education also appeared unachievable to him: “I
can speak Japanese […], I can read to a large extent, but if I was asked to compose an essay in
Japanese, I can’t. If someone suggested me a Japanese university, my reaction was like, ‘Wait! I
haven’t studied in the Japanese curriculum at all!’” In contrast, João viewed the haken labor in
Japan as an ambivalent path. On the one hand, it was undesirable compering to the desirable but
unachievable upwardly mobile path to the Japanese mainstream: “I was thinking that those who
enter factories were the losers. Anyone can do such an easy line work. […] My parents have
repeatedly imprinted on my mind that haken is the loser’s job.” On the other hand, the haken
labor in Japan was more desirable than going back to Brazil only with a high school diploma: “If
you go to Brazil without a college degree, you can’t expect any employment opportunity. […]
Sure, haken is unstable but you can feed yourself. […] After all, haken allows a good life even
for the Brazilian school graduates.” Towards early adulthood, João was caught by this
ambivalence of haken labor market as it was for Steven.
Nevertheless, unlike Steven, João did not take the path to the haken labor market. A
notable difference between them is that João was fluent in both in Portuguese and Japanese
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whereas Steven was only in Portuguese. It does not mean that João could find a stable job easily.
After the graduation, he has worked multiple part-time jobs for two years because he could not
secure a regular employment. Yet, the part-time jobs were better than a haken job to João: “I was
determined not to take a haken job even doing multiple part-time gigs.” However, due to the
instability and anxiety for the future, João eventually gave up his part-time work life and started
working in a factory not as a haken worker but as a directly employed part-time worker. He
assessed that he could find a direct employment position because he could speak the two
languages. “If you can’t speak Japanese, it is impossible to get a job other than a haken job. In
the first place, you can’t have an interview.” While João felt ambivalent towards his Brazilian
school, he appreciated it at least in terms of language. “I have a cousin. My family came to Japan
with her family. She had attended Japanese schools all the way and now working in a Japanese
company. But she cannot speak Portuguese. I don’t have a college degree, but I can speak both
languages. Looking back from now, my Portuguese fluency helped me to get promoted as a
translator in my workplace [and as a regular employee]. So, at least in this respect, I appreciated
my experience in the Brazilian school.” João is now married with a Japanese woman whom he
met at the workplace and naturalized to Japanese citizenship. “When we [João and his wife] got
married, we found that it’d be bureaucratically troublesome if our nationalities were different.
And I was sure that I would live in Japan forever. So, I naturalized.” He achieved a modest, but
an upwardly mobile path compared to haken jobs that his parents and some of his former
classmates took on.

Stella and João’s Processual Agency in Contrast
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Both Stella and João came to Japan when they were little. Their parents’ socioeconomic
backgrounds are more or less similar. Both of them transferred from Japanese to Brazilian school
in their childhood. Additionally, both of their parents offered the transnational migrant bargain.
However, their pathways diverged: Stella entered university in Brazil whereas João took a
modest but upwardly mobile shallow slope pathway in Japan.
Stella and João differed in three aspects. First, Stella’s ties with Japanese friends waned
when she transferred to Brazilian school whereas João maintained relationships with Japanese
friends. Second, Stella studied hard at Brazilian school, keeping the transnational migrant
bargain whereas João did not find positive meaning in study at Brazilian school and broke the
transnational migrant bargain with his parents despite their sustained encouragement to take an
upwardly mobile return path to Brazil. And third, related to the first two points and more
importantly, their side of the migrant bargain became inconsistent with the parents’ side at the
different stages in their life course. When Stella was transferred to Brazilian school, she kept the
transnational migrant bargain. It was in Stella’s adolescence that their future orientations became
at odds with each other. In contrast, João did not keep the transnational migrant bargain when he
was transferred to Brazilian school. João has not developed his social belonging in transnational
striver while in the Brazilian school.
The different timing of migrant bargain dissonance illustrates how they have developed
different sets of social belongings within the same Brazilian school context. Table 3-4 shows the
development of Stella’s and João’s social belonging in contrast. While Stella displayed the traits
of bicultural striver and transnational striver during the childhood period, the former traits were
attenuated as she made efforts to meet her parents’ expectation to return to Brazil. When Stella’s
efforts were suddenly blocked when her parents decided to settle in Japan, her social belonging
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increasingly shifted to Brazilian haken. Nevertheless, her social belonging in transnational striver
did not disappear altogether. Rather, it was reactivated as Stella actually experienced the limited
prospect of haken worker’s life in Japan.

Table 3-4: The Development of Stella’s and João’s Social Belonging at the Three Life Stages
Life stage
(I) childhood

(II) adolescence

(III) early adulthood

Middle-class
mainstream

none

none

none

Bicultural striver

language, school,
friend and social
networks, ethnic
identity

attenuated except
language and
ethnic identity

language, iethnic dentity

Brazilian haken

none

migrant bargain,
school, friend and
social networks,
work, ethnic
identity

attenuated

Transnational
striver

migrant bargain,
school, language,
friend and social
networks, ethnic
identity

school, language,
friend and social
networks, ethnic
identity

school, friend and social
networks, work, ethnic
identity

Middle-class
mainstream

none

none

identity

Bicultural striver

school, language,
friend and social
networks, ethnic
identity

language, friend
and social
networks, ethnic
identity

language, friend and
social networks, work,
ethnic identity

Brazilian haken

migrant bargain

migrant bargain,
school

friend and social
networks, ethnic identity

Transnational
striver

migrant bargain,
school, friend and
social networks

school, language,
friend and social
networks

attenuated

Stella

Subcultural
types and
salient traits

João

Like Stella, João displayed his social belonging in bicultural striver and transnational
striver during his childhood period. In contrast to Stella, João did not keep the transnational
bargain with the parents. His sense of transnational striver remained weak while in the Brazilian
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school. On the contrary, he maintained the sense of bicultural striver when he advanced to
adolescence. With such a configuration of social belonging, João found a relative advantage even
in an unskilled or semi-skilled job in Japan comparing to the upwardly mobile return to Brazil,
not to mention unskilled jobs there. In addition, his social belonging in bicultural striver helped
him to find a modest but relatively stable job in Japanese labor market. Even though Stella and
João shared the same school context and both of their parents offered the transnational bargain,
they built different agency because the migrant bargain became dissonant at the different timing
in their life course.

Conclusion
Brazilian Nikkei youths in Japan demonstrate a wide range of life pathways into early
adulthood, including a shallow slope incorporation into the working-class life in Japan and an
upwardly mobile return to Brazil, which has not been documented in the existent literature on the
second-generation migrants. This chapter analyzed the process through which Nikkei youths’ life
trajectories diverge widely. I examined three major approaches to the assimilation and
transnationalism of children of migrants and showed that they cannot fully account for the
variation among the four Nikkei youths’ life trajectories in this chapter. A shared shortcoming is
the static understanding of migrant youths’ agency. Although all the causal factors claimed by
the prior approaches, especially institution and culture, matter in divergence mechanism of
Nikkei youths’ life trajectories in this chapter, they must be analyzed in relation to their changing
agency through the life course. I elaborated the micro-agency side of the interactive process
approach that draws sustained attention to the process through which the Nikkei youths develop
varying agency, defined as the dynamic relationship between social belonging and possible
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selves over time. The comparative analysis of four Nikkei youths’ life histories allowed me to
examine both the shift of social belonging in each case over time and the divergence of their life
trajectories across the cases.
Nikkei youths’ social belonging is shaped in interaction with the school context and the
migrant bargain. First, the comparison between Taina and Yukari examined how the different
school context affects their agency and the consequential path choice. Both Taina and Yukari
started their childhood in Brazilian childcare program. Whereas Taina continued Brazilian school
up until high school, Yukari was transferred to Japanese school in early adolescence. Taina has
developed the strong sense of transnational striver, continuously being enrolled in the Brazilian
school. As a result, Taina found a more desirable and achievable pathway in the upward return
path to Brazil in comparison to her limited prospect in Japan. In contrast, Yukari increasingly
attenuated her sense of transnational striver as she successfully progressed in the Japanese school
system. In addition, she developed the sense of bicultural striver with the help of extra-family
mentorship despite the disadvantageous school context. As a result, she found the most desirable
and achievable pathway in the Japanese college.
However, the school context does not solely determine Nikkei youths’ pathways into
early adulthood. Different types of migrant bargain intersect with the school context and yield
wide variations in the agency. The comparison between Stella and João analyzed how the
different migrant bargain, especially the different timing of the dissonant migrant bargain, makes
a difference in their path choices into early adulthood within the same Brazilian school context.
When Stella and João transferred to Brazilian schools, Stella has cultivated the sense of
transnational striver by keeping the transnational migrant bargain with her parents whereas João
did not because he broke the transnational migrant bargain earlier than Stella. As a result, they
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found contrasting meanings to the haken labor market in Japan and the return pathway to Brazil
respectively. Stella viewed a desirable and achievable prospect in the upward return pathway to
Brazil comparing to the undesirable and avoidable haken labor market in Japan. In contrast, João
saw neither the upward return to Brazil nor the upward path to Japanese university unachievable.
He rather perceived that the shallow slope mobility in Japan was not only achievable but also
more desirable than the downward return to Brazil and the haken labor market in Japan.
Both the school context and the migrant bargain affect Nikkei youths’ social belonging
and their consequent pathways to early adulthood. However, they do so not as independent
factors but as interacting effects. Nikkei youths develop different social belonging over time and
it provides a different decision framework for future possible selves. When they enter early
adulthood, their pathways diverge significantly not only in terms of social mobility but also in
terms of cross-border mobility.
The Brazilian Nikkei youths in Japan are an uncommon case. Nevertheless, it brings up
two broader implications. First, this chapter underscored the transnational context of social
mobility. Most studies on migrant youths have predominantly focused on their social mobility in
the host society. However, as the cases of Taina and Stella demonstrated, Brazilian schools as an
exclave institution provide an attainable return option to the students that is inaccessible to those
in the Japanese public schools. The close attention to migrant institutions, especially exclave
institutions, sheds light on an alternative upward mobility pathway to the homeland and broadens
our understanding of the life trajectories of migrant youths in the transnational framework.
Second, I elaborated the micro-agency side of the interactive process approach that draws
attention to processual nature of agency. Nikkei youths’ agency is not given as if being present
from conception. Nor is it the random expression of pure volition. They develop varying social
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belonging interacting with the school context and the migrant bargain over time. When they
come of age, the meaning and weight of available choices vary depending on one’s social
belonging. By paying sustained attention to the processual nature of migrant youths’ agency, we
can advance the theoretical debate about the dynamics of their diverging life trajectories.
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CONCLUSION:
MIGRANT TRANSNATIONALISM AS AN INTERACTIVE PROCESS

This dissertation sought to understand various transnational ties and lives, including their
decline and absence, among Brazilian Nikkeis throughout their century-long history. Why did
Japanese migrants show broader support to the homeland’s war efforts than Italian migrants in
pre-World War II São Paulo? Why did Brazilian Nikkeis in Bastos undergo an escalation of
intra-group conflicts whereas those in Registro did not in the aftermath of the Japanese defeat in
WWII? Why did the life trajectories of four Brazilian Nikkei youths, Taina, Yukari, Stella, and
João, widely diverge not only in terms of social mobility in the host society, but also in terms of
cross-border mobility – including a presumably permanent return to Brazil despite the shared
socioeconomic and family backgrounds? More generally, what mechanisms shape and reshape
various patterns of migrants’ transnational lives? This dissertation sought to answer these
questions by developing an interactive process approach to migrant transnationalism. I argued
first that the varieties of migrants’ transnational ties are products of the interactive process
between the diasporic bureaucracy of sending state, the incorporative capacity of the receiving
state, and the mobilizing capacity of migrants’ networks within the international state system,
and second that migrants’ agency, which changes over time by interacting with meso-level
contexts such as the school contexts and the migrant bargain, generates further variations in their
transnational lives even within a given configuration of macro-level contexts.
By employing the interactive process approach, this dissertation underscored three major
analytical implications that can be useful to advance our understandings of varying migrants’
transnational ties more generally. First, this approach developed an analytical framework that
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considers the varying configuration between the diasporic bureaucracy of a sending state, the
incorporative capacity of a receiving state, and the mobilizing capacity of migrants’ networks
within the given international state system. Second, not just seeing a contextual configuration at
a certain point, it puts a great emphasis on timing and sequential dynamics that bring about
changes in migrants’ transnational ties. Third, related to the second, I addressed the processual
nature of migrant youths’ agency. In the following space, I summarize the three analytical
implications.

Institutional Aspects of Migrant Transnational Lives
This dissertation sought to further advance the institutional approaches to migrant
transnationalism by elaborating an analytical framework that pays attention to the varying
configuration between the diasporic bureaucracy of the sending state, the incorporative capacity
of the receiving state, and the mobilizing capacity of migrants’ networks within the given
international state system.
In a globalizing world where a large amount of capital, goods, information, and, most
importantly, people move across national borders, the power and legitimacy of modern nationstates came under suspicion. Scholars have debated whether nation-states continue to be the valid
framework to organize and understand our social life over last three decades or so. Against this
backdrop, migrant transnationalism offered a new vocabulary to overcome the limitations of
methodological nationalism prevalent in social science thinking that takes for granted the nationstates as the unit of analysis (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002).
Cross-border movements of people are by no means new phenomena. Migrant
transnationalism added a research agenda in the studies of international migration that focuses on
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migrants’ transnational ties with the homelands in addition to the traditional one that centers on
their assimilation into the host societies. At the same time, it also directed researchers to seek
factors to explain transnational or cross-border phenomena in either larger or smaller forces than
nation-states, such as global capitalism, social networks, or individual choice. This may be part
of the reason why early scholarship drew attention to “the agency of transmigrants” (Basch et al.
1994: 22). However, it is tautological to say that migrants’ agency transcending the constraints of
nation-states produce their transnational ties with the homelands in conflating the explanandum
with the explanans. Even though migrants’ agency matters, the factors and mechanisms that
make (and unmake) it transnational must be explained. In this respect, there is no reason to
presume that transnational phenomena cannot be explained by factors residing in the nationstate, since one of the salient features of methodological nationalism is to omit the significance
of nationalism and nation-states in shaping our social life (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002,
Amelia et al. 2012).
Institutional approaches to migrant transnationalism emerged in this context. They are
attentive to the effects of institutional contexts on migrants’ transnational ties. In particular, they
redirected our attention to an aspect of the criticism of methodological nationalism once
unlearned – that is, the importance of the nation-state as a variable factor, not merely a constant
environment (Dahinden 2017: 1480-1481). A few but emerging literature started to see migrants’
transnational ties with the homelands in a triadic framework between a sending state, a receiving
state, and a migrant population (Brubaker 1996, Smith 2003a, Cook-Martín 2013, Mylonas 2013,
Kim 2016).
Building on this emerging literature, this dissertation developed an interactive process
approach that looks at varying configurations among the diasporic bureaucracy of sending state,
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the incorporative power of receiving state, and the mobilizing capacity of migrants’ networks
and associations within the international state system. I argued that migrants’ transnational ties
with the homeland varies depending on the various configuration among these contexts. This
framework helps us understand not only various patterns of migrants’ transnational ties with the
homelands but also their incorporation into the host society in a cohesive way. International
migration is inherently a transnational process. It starts when people go across national borders.
Some maintain various types of connections with the homelands, including an eventual return to
the homelands. Others are incorporated into the host societies without denouncing their ethnic
salience. And others abandon the ties with the homelands completely and build social relations in
the host societies anew. In this framework, assimilation can be understood as a variant of
migrants’ transnational ties. The interactive process approach explored the dynamics that
produces the varieties of migrants’ transnational ties and lives.
Chapter 1 analyzed different forms and breadths of patriotic donation to the homelands
by Italian and Japanese migrants in early 20th century São Paulo. The Italian patriotic campaign
was divided between upper- and middle-class and working class migrants whereas Japanese one
was broadly supported by Japanese migrants despite the social differentiation between
landowners and sharecroppers and other lower status migrants. Upper- and middle-class Italians
supported the patriotic donation campaign as they formed an integrated exclave where their
intensive networks and associations was embraced both by the Italian diasporic bureaucracy and
the Brazilian incorporative power whereas working-class Italians did not because their hitherto
dispersive networks were incorporated into the corporatist labor regime by the Brazilian
incorporative power with a weak penetration of Italy’s diasporic bureaucracy. In contrast,
Japanese migrants broadly supported the patriotic campaign because they formed diasporic
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exclaves where their intensive networks were deeply embraced by the Japanese diasporic
bureaucracy with less penetration of Brazilian incorporative power.
While it was less foregrounded, Chapters 2 and 3 also situated the cases in the contextual
configuration framework. Chapter 2 examined the dissolution process of Japanese diasporic
exclaves in the rural area. The dissolution started when the Japanese diasporic bureaucracy
retreated from Brazil in the wake of the Pacific War. Without the effective embrace of Japanese
diasporic bureaucracy, Japanese diasporic exclaves in the hinterlands of São Paulo shifted
towards settlement enclaves and gradually Japanese migrants and their descendants assimilated
into the mainstream of Brazilian society in the long run. Chapter 3 analyzed divergent life paths
of Brazilian Nikkei youths in Japan. Most Brazilian Nikkeis come to Japan by making the most
of legal opportunity offered by the Japanese government and are incorporated into the segmented
unskilled labor sector. In this broader context, Brazilian schools in Japan are working as an
institutionalized exclave. They are institutionalized as a product of interstate reciprocity in a
globalizing world more than an utter nationalist project of Brazilian diasporic bureaucracy. The
effect of this institutionalized exclave on Brazilian Nikkei youths’ life course is clear when
comparing to those in Japanese public school system. While none of my informants in Japanese
public schools did not consider a return pathway to Brazil, some informants in Brazilian schools
envisioned and did realize an upwardly mobile return pathway. In each chapter, Brazilian
Nikkei’s transnational ties and lives are largely affected by the varying configuration of
institutional contexts.
However, the interactive process approach does not just point to the snapshot
configurations of contexts for migrants’ transnational ties with the homelands. In fact, the main
analytical focus of Chapter 2 was not on the general dissolution process of Japanese diasporic
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exclave but rather on two different courses — Bastos entailed intra-group violence and Registro
did not — that eventually led to the dissolution and the mechanisms that produced the difference.
Similarly, Chapter 3 not only illuminated the effect of institutional bifurcation between Brazilian
and Japanese schools on Brazilian Nikkei youths’ life trajectories but also analyzed the
divergence of their life trajectories much greater than the school bifurcation predicts: while some
graduates of Brazilian schools return to Brazil, others stay in Japan even after graduating from
the Brazilian schools. In other words, migrants’ transnational lives are not determined simply by
the contextual configuration at a certain point but show more intricate and nuanced variations. In
this respect, this dissertation highlighted temporal and sequential dimensions of configuration
and the processual nature of migrants’ agency that next sections discuss.

Timing and Sequential Dynamics of Migrant Transnational Ties
In addition to various contextual configurations, the interactive process approach sheds
light on timing and sequential aspects of migrants’ transnational ties. First, the timing of events
happening in the migration process affects their subsequent development. Second, when a
change happens in a contextual configuration, the impact of the change on migrants’
transnational ties varies depending on the precedent processes. These sequential interactions
bring about more nuanced variations in migrants’ transnational ties.
Literature on migrant assimilation and transnationalism has never failed to acknowledge
the impact of contextual configurations on the patterns of assimilation and transnational ties.
Most research, however, tends to view each different contextual configuration as if it was an
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independent case. A common analytical strategy is to compare different contextual
configurations with varying outcomes.1
This does not mean that they are not attentive to the processual nature of international
migration. As mentioned above, international migration is inherently a process. However, they
tend to grasp the process in a linear fashion.2 Indeed, these two tendencies prevalent in the
studies of international migration — a methodological tendency to separate each contextual
configuration as a discrete case and a theoretical tendency to view the migration process in a
linear fashion — complement each other. Researchers identify various relevant contextual
configurations and study the linear stepwise process through which each configuration pushes
migrants towards a certain outcome on the time horizon of “general linear reality” (Abbott 2001:
ch.1). This analytical strategy works well when the configuration is relatively stable. However,
even the macro context changes sometimes in a drastic manner such as a change in border
control regime due to a war or a pandemic. More importantly, a contextual configuration often
changes partly and sequentially. Each relevant context in a configuration moves with its own
temporal rhythm and interacts with other relevant contexts (Haydu 1998, 2010). As a result, the
configuration among them unfolds sequentially rather than instantly all at once.

1

For instance, different modes of incorporation result in varying “segmented” assimilation patterns (Portes and
Rumbaut 2001, 2014). Furthermore, different institutional and discursive structures between North American and
European countries affect migrants’ incorporation and transnational ties (Faist 1995, Koopmans et al. 2005,
Bloemraad 2006, Crul et al. 2012, Alba and Foner 2015). Even when studying historical cases, existing literature
often divides the past and present into several periods and treats each period as a discrete case and compare them. In
this vein, scholars compare the past immigrants in the industrializing periods with the present immigrants under an
hourglass economy (Portes and Zhou 1993), or different incorporation patterns of Mexican immigrants between preand post-1986 U.S. immigration system (Massey et al. 2002).
2
See, for instance, Park’s (1950) race relations cycle from contact through competition, accommodation, and to
assimilation, Gordon’s (1964) seven stages of assimilation from acculturation to structural assimilation and beyond,
Alba and Nee’s (2003) definition of assimilation as the decline of ethnic salience, and Waldinger’s (2015)
conceptualization of the decline of migrants’ cross-border ties as a shift from intersocietal convergence to
divergence.
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In this respect, the interactive process approach highlights the development and
transformation of migrants’ transnational ties over time and the timing and sequential dynamics
that produce their divergence. This dissertation illustrated two such dynamics. First, the timing of
events happening in a trajectory generates a branching point for the subsequent development of
the contextual configuration. Second, when a change happens in a given configuration, its impact
varies depending on the configuration preceding the change. They are closely related but two
different dynamics: the first points to an upstream divergence dynamism whereas the second
points to a downstream divergence dynamism.
First, the timing of an event makes a difference in the pattern of migrants’ transnational
ties by generating a branching point for the subsequent development of the patterns. Chapter 1
(and a part of Chapter 2) demonstrated this type of upstream dynamism in two ways. First,
different timings of entry of Italian and Japanese migrants to Brazil vis-à-vis the development of
Brazilian national economy set the context for the different development patterns of their
networks and associations: Italian class-divided networks and associations in the urban centers,
Japanese intensive networks and associations in the rural areas. Second, the timing of which
infrastructural power — the diasporic bureaucracy of sending state or the incorporative power of
receiving state — reached out to migrants earlier affected the subsequent development of their
transnational ties. A clear contrast lied between working-class Italian migrants and Japanese
migrants. The Brazilian incorporative power incorporated the Italian working-class into the
emerging national corporatist regime before the Italian Fascist government started extending its
diasporic bureaucracy to them. The Italian diasporic bureaucracy was foreclosed to embrace the
working-class Italians because of its late arrival. In contrast, the Japanese diasporic bureaucracy
embraced Japanese migrants earlier than the Brazilian incorporative power arrived at the rural
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areas where most Japanese migrants had settled. As a result, the Japanese diasporic exclaves
endured as informal networks even after the Brazilian incorporative power restrained their
formal organizations during the war period. These instances illustrated the timing and sequence
dynamics that produce a branching point for the subsequent trajectory of migrants’ transnational
ties.
Second, the casual meaning of an event on migrants’ transnational ties varies depending
on the contextual configuration preceding the event. Chapter 2 illustrated this downstream
dynamism by comparing two Japanese communities in the state of São Paulo, Bastos and
Registro. Until the outbreak of the Pacific War, both communities were organized as diasporic
exclaves sustained by the Japanese diasporic bureaucracy, except a difference in socioeconomic
conditions: Bastos with an export-oriented cotton industry and Registro with a variegated
economy oriented towards the Brazilian domestic market. This difference was not salient in the
pre-war period because the diasporic bureaucracy bolstered, though in different fashions, the two
communities’ economy. However, when it suddenly retreated from Brazil, its impact varied
significantly between the two communities: the legitimacy of community associations was
weakened in Batsos but not in Registro. I argued that the interaction between the retreat of the
diasporic bureaucracy and the different conditions of Bastos and Registro preceding the retreat
largely shaped the ways in which the intra-group conflicts between deniers and accepters
unfolded differently in the two communities after the war. This instance demonstrated a
downstream dynamism by which the legacies of precedent contexts affect the causal meaning of
an event and bring about divergence in the outcomes.
The timing and sequential dynamics also matter in the individuals’ life trajectories and
transnational lives. Chapter 3 also demonstrated both upstream and downstream divergence
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dynamics in individual migrants’ life trajectories by comparing the four Brazilian Nikkei youths
in Japan. The next section focuses on the processual nature of migrants’ agency.

Processual Nature of Migrant Youths’ Agency
The interactive process approach to migrant transnationalism also emphasizes timing and
sequential dynamics at the micro-agency level. To grasp these temporal dynamics, I
conceptualized the agency as the dynamic relationship between their social belonging and
possible selves. Interacting with the relevant contexts over the life course, migrants cumulatively
develop varying agency with which they navigate their life trajectories. Chapter 3 analyzed how
Nikkei youths in contemporary Japan developed their agency interacting with the school contexts
and the migrant bargain and how it navigates their choice on future pathways in the transition to
early adulthood. While the macro-contextual configuration shapes the dominant pattern of
transnational lives for the Nikkei youths, their agency generates broader variations of
transnational lives at the micro-individual level.
This dissertation employed a case-oriented comparative analytical strategy (Skocpol
1984, Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003, Ragin 2014). It helped me to compare the cases over
time and examine how varying configuration of relevant contexts forms and transforms Brazilian
Nikkeis’ transnational ties. However, partly due to the data limitation on the micro level and
partly due to the research strategy to highlight the dynamics of contextual configuration at the
macro-institutional level, Chapters 1 and 2 treated their agency as a black box that constantly
translate the relevant contexts into a certain outcome (Katznelson 2003). What acted in the
explanation are, at best, collective role characters, whose goals are inferred from the contexts in
which they are embedded, such as an Italian working-class migrant in the city of São Paulo or a
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Japanese migrant in the countryside, but not an individual with his or her own biographical life.
However, the contexts do not act by themselves. While the contexts can condition migrants’
agency, migrant’s agency is not overwhelmed by the contextual determination. Even when a
certain type of transnational ties becomes dominant under a certain set of contexts, there are
always cases divergent from the dominant tendency.
As an actual participant in the social life, all we know that we grow (and decline) over
time, our lives unfold as a sequence, and our goals change along the life. However, social science
research has often unlearned these common-sense wisdoms and instead presumed a homunculuslike agency such as the utilitarian calculator whose preferences are preformed and too immune to
life course changes or the structural and cultural adherent who is too deeply embedded in the
contexts and whose agency is fixed on them. In this respect, the interactive process approach
viewed migrants’!agency as an evolving process with a biographical life (Heimer 2002). I argued
that the agency of Brazilian Nikkei youths in Japan generates the further divergence in migrants’
transnational lives even under the same contextual constraints. I conceptualized the agency as the
dynamic relationship between one’s social belonging that represents one’s sense of belonging to
the relevant subcultures and possible selves that informs future pathways. Each individual has its
own unique biographical life. In this respect, migrants presumably demonstrate almost infinite
variations of transnational life, each one of which is singular.3 Yet, by identifying the four
heuristic types of relevant subcultural groups inferred from the contexts, this dissertation
articulated the variable but patterned relationships between social belonging and future possible

3

Some scholars claim that social identities are essentially multiple, variable, in flux, contingent, fragmented, hybrid,
and so on, but do not necessarily demonstrate to what extent, on what conditions, and how flexible, hybrid,
fragmented and contingent they are (Hall 1990, Gupta and Ferguson 1992, Bhabha 1994, Papastergiadis 2000, Iyall
Smith and Leavy 2008). The hybridity of social identity is claimed but not so much demonstrated.
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selves that navigate Brazilian Nikkei youths’ choice of future pathways in the transition to early
adulthood.
Nikkei youths in contemporary Japan develop their agency, interacting with the school
contexts and the migrant bargaining. The comparison between Taina and Yukari in Chapter 3
showed the two different school systems and the consonant migrant bargaining respectively
shaped their different agencies that eventually led them to upwardly mobile pathways but in
different countries: Taina’s case in Brazil and Yukari’s case in Japan. However, the contextual
conditions do not directly determine his or her transnational life because their social belonging is
often multiple and it is always relational with future possible selves. At turning points in the life
course where migrants have wider range of choices, one’s social belonging provides a decision
framework for choosing a future pathway that is desirable and actionable (see, Abbott 2001:
ch.8).
The comparison between Stella and João in Chapter 3 illustrated this dynamic
relationship between social belonging and possible selves. Both Stella and João started their
school career in Japanese elementary school, then transferred to Brazilian school in late
childhood, and have been there until adolescence. However, they choose different pathways in
the transition to early adulthood: Stella pursued an upwardly mobile pathway in Brazil whereas
João chose a modest pathway in Japan. In this light, both upstream and downstream divergence
mechanisms at the micro-level shaped their agencies.
First, the timing of migrant bargain dissonance happened in the different stage of the life
course marked a significant branching point in the development of their agency. While their
parents sustained the parent’s side of transnational bargain respectively, João broke his side of
transnational bargain in childhood whereas Stella held it up until the adolescence. Resultantly,
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their social belonging started diverging: João’s sense of transnational striver was attenuated since
then whereas Stella sustained it. This interaction between the migrant bargain and their social
belonging points to an upstream mechanism working at the micro-agency level.
Second, when they faced the transition to early adulthood, the meanings and weights of
possible selves that informs future pathways varied between Stella and João. For Stella, a
pathway to the unskilled or semi-skilled job market in Japan, which was undesirable but difficult
to avoid for João (and also for Steven), appeared undesirable and avoidable. For João, a pathway
to go to a college in Brazil, which was achievable and desirable comparing to a pathway to the
unskilled Brazilian haken labor market in Japan for Stella, appeared unachievable and not so
much desirable comparing to the haken labor market. Stella and João assigned different
meanings to available pathways ahead when both of them reached the coming of age because the
development patterns of their social belonging preceding the transition period differed
considerably. This interaction between their social belonging and possible selves at a significant
life turning point indicates a downstream mechanism for the divergence of the migrants’
transnational lives including incorporation pathways in the host society.
When social theories, both macro-structuralist and variable-centered ones alike, find the
cases deviant from the theoretical prediction, they often treat the outliers as the manifestation of
the volition of human agency that transcends social-contextual constraints or simply as an error
(Abbott 2001: ch.4). When an explanation relegates theoretical residues to the free will of
agency, the quest for social understanding ends there. Certainly, the interactive process approach
did not solve the problem of volition. For instance, this dissertation could not account for why
João broke the transnational bargain with his parents in his childhood (and why Stella kept it)
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other than by his disposition and volition in the end.4 Nevertheless, the interactive process
approach sought to understand micro-agency dynamics that generate the divergence in migrants’
transnational lives within the dominant contextual configuration by viewing human agency itself
as a process without hastily reducing it to the pure volition.5 Migrants’ transnational lives
diverge as relevant contextual conditions and their agency interacts with one another over time.
Finally, I mention some limitations of this dissertation, which are derived from the
characteristic of the analytical framework itself. The analytical framework developed in this
dissertation is a sensitizing framework, which indicates the directions along which to look, rather
than the definitive theory, which designates what to exactly look (Blumer 1954). First, I
conceptualized the diasporic bureaucracy of sending state and the incorporative power of
receiving state in largely materialistic terms centered on the provision of collective goods such as
subsidies to ethnic schools, agricultural orientations, and labor and welfare provisions. Other
studies look at more symbolic aspects and more formal legal regimes such as passport, other
identification systems, citizenship, and nationality laws (Cook-Martín 2013, Kim 2016). This
dissertation did not explore how material and symbolic aspects of diasporic bureaucracy and
incorporative power are related. Here again, it is highly likely that states’ materialistic incentive

4

If I had attended João’s and other informants’ life stories, especially their early childhood stories, more intensively
and more deeply, I could have found more intricate dynamics that made João break the transnational bargain with
his parents. Notwithstanding, I also wonder if we would be able to expel human volition from the social explanation.
5
Rational choice theorists presume the universal rationality at the core of human agency. However, the rational
models usually do not specify any substantial qualities in human agency other than the universalized self-interest to
maximize one’s utility (Sen 1977, Douglas and Nay 1998, Somers 1998). Some tried to incorporate social
backgrounds that shape one’s interests and preferences by employing the notion of so-called situated rationality
(North 1990, Hall and Taylor 1996, Levi 1997, Katznelson and Weingast 2007). I do not reject the notion of
rationality in human agency. In fact, I employed the notions of sanction and reward induced by the provision of club
goods to explain the formation of Japanese diasporic exclaves and the intra-group conflicts in Chapters 1 and 2.
Even in Chapter 3, I posit desirability and achievability as crucial criterion for the future path choice for the
Brazilian Nikkei youths in Japan. In my view, however, rational choice theories reduce the analytical leverage to the
extent that they incorporate many contexts beyond the formal conception of rationality (see also, Smith 2009: ch.7).
It seems more productive and promising to carefully attend to the social and biographical contexts, through
interactions with which one’s processual agency is formed, than forcefully overextending the conceptual contour of
rationality itself.
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policies and their symbolic and legal regimes move with different rhythm and make their
interactions processual.
Second, the subculture types relevant to the migrant groups in question vary depending
on particular contexts. For instance, I rejected rainbow underclass, which the American
scholarship often employs as a subculture of inner-city migrant youths, as a relevant subculture
to the case of Brazilian Nikkei youths in Japan. I did so because, based on my informants’
narratives, I judged that socioeconomic conditions that the notion of rainbow underclass implies,
where work itself has gone (Wilson 1996, Waldinger and Feliciano 2004), is not (at least for
now) prevalent in contemporary Japan. Instead, I created the Brazilian haken type to
conceptually capture the dilemma my Nikkei informants confront in the face of the easilyaccessible but unstable labor market of temporary contracts in contemporary Japan. What
subcultures become relevant depends on the particular case, i.e., the different configuration of
contexts.
Nonetheless, I believe that the interactive process approach to migrant transnationalism
can stimulate further theory development without losing sight of each case’s particularities. This
dissertation ends with an invitation for the theoretically informed comparative research sensitive
to processual dynamics in the areas of international migration and migrant transnationalism.
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APPENDIX A: MAP OF JAPAN
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APPENDIX B: CHRONOLOGICAL EXPANSION OF COFFEE AGRICULTURE IN THE
STATE OF SAO PAULO

Source: Argollo. 2016: 172.
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APPENDIX C: MAP OF SAO PAULO AND ITS SUB-REGIONS

Note: Regional names and borders are ones employed in Census Committee for the Japanese
Immigrants in Brazil 1964.
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APPENDIX D: PROCEDURE FOR THE ESTIMATION OF THE PROPORTION OF SHINDO
RENMEI ASSOCIATES BY AND WITHIN REGION
The proportion of Shindo Renmei associates within each region in the state of São Paulo
presented in Table 2-1 was estimated by following procedures.
First, actual numbers of Shindo Renmei associates by regions in 1945 are estimated as
follows. The DEOPS-SP collection at Centro de Estudos Nipo-Brasileiros, which is a series of
evidences and testimonies confiscated and filed by Departamento de Ordem Política e Social em
São Paulo (DOEPS-SP, Department of Political and Social Order in São Paulo) concerning the
Shindo Renmei incidents, includes a report titled “Relação de Representantes de Filiais da
Sociedade ‘Shindo Renmmei’ (On Representatives and Branches of ‘Shindo Renmei’ Society).”
It lists 52 local chapters in Brazil and registered number of associates in each chapter in circa
1945. Among them, three chapters are located outside the state of São Paulo. I exempted these
three chapters and organized the rest by the regional categories based on Map (Appendix C) and
aggregated the number of the associates by the region (A in Table 2-1). Shindo Renmei counted
all household members of an associate also as associates (Mita 1978: 41). Assuming that the
male family head had the sole discretion over the entire household, I estimated actual numbers of
Shindo-Renmei associates (B) by dividing (A) by then average household size of Japanese
migrants (5.9, see Wago 1939: 14). B by region are: 7,517 in Alta Paulista, 6,695 in Noroeste,
3,644 in Sorocabana, 1,000 in Araraquara and Borda do Planalto, 42 in São Paulo city and its
environs, 186 in Vale do Paraíba, and 0 in Coastal.
Second, Japanese migrant population by regions in 1945 is estimated as follows. A 195859 survey was an inventory survey that covered practically entire Japanese migrant population in
Brazil, including 438,719 individuals (Census Committee for the Japanese Immigrants in Brazil
1964, vol.1: 3). It contains survey items that indicate surveyees’ residential location year by year.
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The data, however, are based on number of family head, not each individual. I multiplied them
by 5.9 (then average household size of Japanese migrants) and acquired the estimated numbers
of Japanese migrants by region in 1946 (C): 30,816 in Alta Paulista, 34,226 in Noroeste, 18,219
in Sorocabana, 12,809 in Araraquara and Borda do Planato, 27,347 in São Paulo city and its
environs, 1,847 in Vale do Paraíba, 5,814 in Coastal, and 6,992 in other regions. Given (B) and
(C), third, I estimated the proportion of Shindo Renmei associates within each region (D) by
dividing (B) by (C) and multiplied by 100.
Needless to say, the estimated proportion of Shindo Renmei associates within each region
(D) is far from accurate. In the first place, the numbers of Shindo Renmei associates listed on the
DEOPS collection data are those reported by Shindo Renmei itself and it is highly likely that
they were exaggerated and inaccurate. Nevertheless, the estimation seems sufficient to infer the
contrasting difference in Japanese migrants’ involvements in Shindo Renmei between three
regions (Alta Paulista, Noroeste, and Sorocabana) and others.
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APPENDIX E: BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF BRAZILIAN NIKKEI YOUTH INFORMANTS
No.

School system Pesudonym
dominant in
informant’s
life course

Age at the Language of Age of
Educational
Social status as
first
interview
arrival to status at the
of early 2019
intervew
Japan
first interview

1

Fabio

29

Japanese

11

Evening high
Freelance job in
school graduate Japan

2

Midori

19

Japanese

Born in
Japan

High school
graduate

Vocational
school in Japan

3

Gilberto

16

Japanese

10

Evening High
School

Regular manual
job in Japan

4

Lucia

26

Japanese

4

Evening high
Regular job in
school graduate Japan

Yoshi

18

Japanese

Born in
Japan

High school
dropout

Part time job in
Japan

6

Luis

19

Jpanese

Born in
Japan

Vocational
school

n/a

7*

Yukari

18

Japanese

Born in
Japan

College in
Japan

College student
in Japan

8

Rafael

16

Japanese and 2
Portuguese

High school

n/a

9

Andrina

15

Japanese and 6 months
Portuguese

High school

n/a

10

Mario

24

Japanese

Brazilian high n/a
school graduate

11*

João

26

Japanese and 10 months Brazilian high Regular factory
Portuguese
school graduate job in Japan

12

Flora

16

Portuguese

13

Brazilian high
school

Vestibular prep
in Brazil

13

Erik

16

Portuguese

7

Brazilian high
school

Vestibular prep
in Brazil

Angelica

26

Portuguese
and English

12

Brazilian high Ethnic
school dropout entrepreneur in
Japan

15

Miki

16

Japanese and 6 months
Portuguese

Brazilian high
school

Vocational
school in Japan

16

Steven

17

Portuguese

Born in
Japan

Brazilian high
school

Haken job in
Japan

17

Alyson

15

Portuguese

6

Brazilian high
school

n/a

18

Juan

16

Portuguese

4

Brazilian high
school

n/a

5

14

Japanese
school

Brazilian
school
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Born in
Japan

APPENDIX E (cont.)
No.

Pseudonym

Age at the
first
interview

Language
of interview

Age of
arrival to
Japan

Educational
status at the
first interview

19

Paula

16

Portuguese

15

20

Edson

17

Portuguese

21

Deniz

15

Portuguese

22

Wagner

15

Portuguese

Born in
Japan
Born in
Japan
7

23

Jose Luis

22

Portuguese
and Japanese

10

Brazilian high
school
Brazilian high
school
Brazilian high
school
Brazilian high
school
Brazilian high
school graduate

Taina

16

Portuguese

3

Brazilian high
school

25

Aline

18

Portuguese

7

26

Augusto

17

Portuguese

13

27*

Stella

20

Portuguese
and Japanese

newborn

Brazilian high
school
Brazilian high
school
Brazilian high
school dropout

28

Thais

26

Portuguese
and Japanese

3

24*

School system
dominant in
informant’s
life course

Brazilian
School

Brazilian high
school dropout

* Primary cases were with an asterisk on the right side of case number.
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Social
status as
of early
2019
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
Vestibular
prep in
Brazil
Vestibular
prep in
Brazil
Haken job
in Japan
n/a
College
student in
Brazil
n/a
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